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Agenda items 2 and 5

**Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights and reports of the Office of
the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General****Human rights bodies and mechanisms****Cooperation with the United Nations, its representatives and
mechanisms in the field of human rights****Report of the Secretary-General^{*} ^{**}***Summary*

In the present report, the Secretary-General highlights activities, policy developments and good practices within the United Nations system and beyond to address intimidation of and reprisals against those seeking to cooperate or having cooperated with the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights. The report includes observations on and recommendations for addressing and preventing intimidation and reprisals, and information on allegations of intimidation and reprisals received during the period of 1 May 2024 to 30 April 2025, including follow-up information on cases included in previous reports.

^{*} The present report was submitted to the conference services for processing after the deadline for technical reasons beyond the control of the submitting office.

^{**} The annexes to the present document are circulated as received, in the language of submission only.

I. Introduction

1. The Human Rights Council, in its resolution 12/2, expressed its concern over continued reports of intimidation and reprisals against individuals and groups seeking to cooperate or having cooperated with the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights. The Council condemned all acts of intimidation and reprisal committed by Governments and non-State actors against such individuals and groups and invited the Secretary-General to report annually on alleged reprisals, including recommendations on how to address the issue. The present report is the sixteenth report submitted pursuant to resolution 12/2.¹

II. Activities in response to acts of intimidation and reprisal

2. Forms of reprisal and retaliation for ongoing or past cooperation and intimidation designed to discourage future participation or cooperation with a wide range of United Nations entities at headquarter locations and in the field continued throughout the reporting period. Incidents or trends were addressed within the United Nations system by the Secretariat, including the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and United Nations field offices and peace operations, and intergovernmental organs, such as the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Human Rights Council and its special procedure mandate holders, human rights treaty bodies and other mechanisms, such as the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, the United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture and the high-level political forum on sustainable development. The United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), the Governing Body of the International Labour Office and its Committee on Freedom of Association also addressed reprisal incidents during the period.

3. The Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights, the senior United Nations official designated by the Secretary-General to lead system-wide efforts to address intimidation and reprisals, continued her engagement with Member States, United Nations entities, civil society and other stakeholders to raise awareness of and concern about these trends and incidents.

4. The General Assembly and the Human Rights Council addressed acts of intimidation and reprisal for cooperation with the United Nations in several country and thematic resolutions.² On 22 October 2024, 80 Member States and the European Union delivered a cross-regional statement on reprisals to the Third Committee of the General Assembly, recognizing the crucial role of civil society and human rights defenders in upholding human rights and contributing to the work of the United Nations, as well as the responsibility and commitment of the United Nations in addressing reprisals. They also welcomed the “United Nations Agenda for Protection: strengthening the ability of the United Nations system to protect people through their human rights”³ and efforts to increase coordination for the identification, documentation, reporting and follow-up of cases of reprisals, while expressing concern about the global trends identified by the Secretary-General in his latest report on the matter.⁴

5. The presidency of the Human Rights Council received allegations of intimidation and reprisals concerning six States, two of which were members of the Council at the time of the

¹ Previous reports are available at <https://www.ohchr.org/en/reprisals/annual-reports-reprisals-cooperation-un>.

² See, for example, General Assembly resolutions 79/182 and 79/183 and Human Rights Council resolutions 55/27, 56/1, 57/3, 57/15, 57/22, 57/23 and 58/19.

³ See <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/protection/Agenda-Protection-Pledge-Policy-Brief.pdf>.

⁴ See <https://www.ireland.ie/en/un/newyork/news-and-speeches/speeches-archive/joint-statement-on-reprisals-for-cooperation-with-the-united-nations> and <https://press.un.org/en/2024/gashc4416.doc.htm> <https://>

alleged incidents. Successive Presidents of the Council have continued the practice of addressing the allegations with the permanent representatives of the States concerned.

6. During the reporting period, Member States expressed concern over reported cases of reprisals against human rights defenders and civil society actors in the context of the universal periodic review during the fifty-sixth, fifty-seventh and fifty-eighth sessions of the Human Rights Council.

7. The special procedure mandate holders of the Human Rights Council continued to dedicate communications, statements and reports to allegations of intimidation and reprisals related to cooperation with them and the wider United Nations system.⁵ The present report includes new allegations from five communications concerning five States (see annex I),⁶ and follow-up information on cases and legislation concerning five States (see annex II).⁷ The mandate holders noted concerns regarding reprisals due to cooperation with the United Nations in nine reports⁸ and four oral statements^{9F}⁹ to the Human Rights Council and in one report to the General Assembly.¹⁰ They also included references to the issue in two public statements in connection with country visits,¹¹ and in five press releases concerning four countries.¹²

8. In terms of the human rights treaty bodies, the Committee on Enforced Disappearances, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, the Human Rights Committee, the Committee against Torture, the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and Other Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights addressed allegations of reprisals.¹³ The allegations addressed by the Committee on Enforced Disappearances and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination during the reporting period are included in this report. The Subcommittee addressed an allegation of reprisal involving negative consequences faced by a person deprived of liberty with whom it had met during a country visit in 2023. The Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture communicated with the ombudsperson of the country concerned during the period and will continue to follow the case. Four treaty bodies issued requests for interim measures to address allegations of risk of reprisals following the registration of individual communications or reiterated requests for interim measures granted previously.¹⁴

9. Regarding good practices and prevention, and further to the Guidelines against Intimidation or Reprisals, several committees issued statements on prevention of reprisals at the beginning of sessions or prior to a State Party review. In these statements, the committees

⁵ A/HRC/58/70, paras. 70 and 71.

⁶ See communications EGY 6/2024, IDN 5/2024, PAK 4/2024, RUS 5/2024, and VNM 4/2024. All communications mentioned in the present report are available from <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/Tmsearch/TMDocuments>.

⁷ See communications BHR 4/2024, BLR 5/2024, EGY 8/2024, PER 4/2024, TKM 1/2025 and ARE 3/2025.

⁸ A/HRC/56/46/Add.2, para. 25; A/HRC/56/50/Add.2, paras. 81 and 82; A/HRC/56/65, para. 9; A/HRC/57/44, paras. 29–31; A/HRC/57/47/Add.1, para. 4; A/HRC/57/59, paras. 131–135, 148 and 150; A/HRC/58/53/Add.1, paras. 3, 63 and 64; A/HRC/58/74, para. 30; and A/HRC/58/80, para. 27.

⁹ See <https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k11/k115rn0fme>, <https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k18/k1849bhm3y>, <https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1x/k1xc6qsgvt> and <https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k11/k11jmt4aw>.

¹⁰ A/79/263, para. 29.

¹¹ See <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/housing/statements/20240830-eom-statement-uzbekistan-sr-housing-en.pdf> and <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/torture/sr/20250213-eom-senegal-sr-torture-en.pdf>.

¹² See <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/07/russia-must-free-human-rights-defender-alexey-sokolov-arrested-posting>, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/10/rwanda-must-provide-answers-fate-abducted-brothers-jean-nsengimana-and>, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2025/01/russia-must-drop-charges-against-human-rights-defender-alexey>, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/01/egypt-special-rapporteur-concerned-about-use-anti-terrorism-legislation> and <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/04/un-experts-urge-pakistan-address-human-rights-violations-balochistan>.

¹³ HRI/MC/2025/2, paras. 21–32.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, para 35.

acknowledged the important contribution of civil society and emphasized that the committees must be vigilant and responsive to the issue of intimidation and reprisals.¹⁵

10. In its 2024 report to the General Assembly, the United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture noted that some of its grantees continued to face reprisals for their work with United Nations human rights mechanisms, including the Fund. It also stated that, where required to ensure continued delivery of services to torture survivors, its response included the awarding of emergency grants to current grantees subjected to restrictive or retaliatory measures (such as reprisals for collaborating with the United Nations) resulting from the implementation of their projects.¹⁶

11. Ahead of the sixty-ninth session of the Commission on the Status of Women, UN-Women reminded participants of the United Nations zero-tolerance approach to all forms of intimidation and reprisals against those engaging with the United Nations and encouraged them to report any such incidents using a dedicated email address. UN-Women sent a survey to 55 women civil society representatives who had briefed the Security Council in 2024. Out of 25 respondents, 7 reported reprisal concerns in connection with their respective briefings to the Council.

12. The World Bank continued its efforts to track and respond to credible allegations of reprisals in the context of the projects it supports. By April 2025, the Inspection Panel had received 175 requests for inspection, corresponding to 152 Panel cases. Of those, 62 cases (41 per cent) included allegations of reprisals, 75 cases (49 per cent) contained requests for confidentiality and 47 cases (31 per cent) included both. The number of allegations of reprisals and requests for confidentiality in investigations has continued to rise in recent years, as also documented in the December 2021 Inspection Panel report on reprisal incidents.¹⁷

III. Policy developments and good practices

13. In March 2025, the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights sent a questionnaire to Member States on good practices to prevent and address reprisals for cooperation with the United Nations. A group of Member States reaffirmed their zero-tolerance approach to intimidation and reprisals aimed at ensuring a safe and enabling environment for civil society participation at the United Nations. They highlighted their ongoing practice of issuing joint statements in multilateral forums, including the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council, that describe, with the informed consent of those concerned, cases of reprisals for cooperation with the United Nations from different regions and noted their practice of tracking the impact of the interventions.

14. To protect victims who allegedly face intimidation and reprisals, including for cooperation with the United Nations, one Member State noted the issuance of a directive updating guidelines on the investigation and prosecution of crimes committed against human rights defenders, along with a guide highlighting best practices in the investigation and prosecution of threats against them. The same Member State noted the existence of a national protection unit with the authority to protect individuals who were at extraordinary or extreme risk, such as members of human rights organizations. Another Member State launched a pilot programme to host, for a period of time, a number of human rights defenders facing threats, harassment and risk to their lives (including for cooperation with the United Nations), thus enabling them to safely continue their work and engage with local networks.¹⁸

15. Several Member States reported normative or institutional developments that were aimed at protecting civil society actors, including from reprisals for cooperating with the United Nations. One noted the issuance of a directive on the right to social protest,

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, paras. 44 and 47–49.

¹⁶ A/HRC/58/31, paras. 5 and 25.

¹⁷ See https://www.inspectionpanel.org/sites/default/files/publications/Emerging-Lessons-Series-07-Intimidation-and-reprisals-in-IPN-Cases-Dec2021_0.pdf.

¹⁸ See <https://artistsatrisk.org/2025/06/17/new-pilot-programme-for-protecting-human-rights-defenders-hrds/?lang=en>.

establishing parameters for the special protection of human rights defenders and recognizing their engagement at the national or international level. Another referred to legislation and government efforts to protect journalists and to the establishment of mechanisms that ensure transparency. Another Member State highlighted its decision to establish a body tasked with creating an enabling environment for civil society, composed of 20 members, 11 of whom were civil society representatives.

16. In the area of prevention, a group of Member States highlighted their practice of promoting positive narratives about civil society actors, including a joint statement to the Human Rights Council on behalf of a cross-regional group of 71 countries, elaborating on the positive impact of human rights defenders. Another Member State highlighted the recognition of human rights defenders through the granting of awards and referenced a civil society-led initiative that honoured 75 defenders for their human rights work.

17. In the context of the election of the members of the Human Rights Council for the 2025–2027 term, two States voluntarily pledged support for initiatives aimed at strengthening the United Nations space for civil society participation and protecting against reprisals,¹⁹ while another committed to continue sponsoring the resolution on reprisals.²⁰ Several States also pledged support for initiatives aimed at strengthening civil society participation in the Council's work.²¹

18. During the reporting period, the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples addressed allegations of intimidation and reprisals for participation in the Mechanism. In its annual report to the Human Rights Council, the Expert Mechanism urged the Council to call upon States to behave with respect towards all participants and to condemn acts of intimidation or reprisals against Indigenous human rights defenders and leaders for their participation in or collaboration with the United Nations, including transnational reprisals. Furthermore, it requested the Council to urge the host countries of the United Nations or of United Nations events to ensure that all Indigenous individuals who sought to participate in United Nations meetings were granted visas without discrimination or delay.²²

19. At its thirteenth session, the Forum on Business and Human Rights strengthened its response to reprisals with a focus on prevention. The Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises and OHCHR issued an information note on the zero-tolerance policy and reporting procedures.²³ During the opening and closing ceremonies, the Chair and Vice-Chairs highlighted the importance of safe, meaningful and inclusive participation.²⁴ OHCHR also implemented risk mitigation measures with regard to some participants at risk, designated focal points within the Working Group and OHCHR secretariat and set up a system to address, document and report on allegations, in coordination with OHCHR country and regional offices. The Working Group shared good practices and lessons learned with United Nations entities to inform efforts in other United Nations regional business and human rights forums.

20. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs offered advice on communication and protection considerations for over 150 participants in the second dialogue on peacebuilding between civil society organizations and the United Nations, held in December 2024 in New York, with the aim of preventing intimidation or reprisals for cooperation with the United Nations.

21. On 5 November 2024, the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights addressed the incoming members of the Security Council as part of the annual induction workshop for new elected members organized by the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. The session addressed the framework for civil society participation in Security Council

¹⁹ See [A/79/90](#) and [A/79/116](#).

²⁰ See [A/79/74](#).

²¹ See [A/79/67](#), [A/79/86](#), [A/79/90](#) and [A/79/116](#).

²² A/HRC/57/64, paras. 38 and 39.

²³ See

<https://indico.un.org/event/1005651/attachments/17079/56165/Practical%20information%20EN.pdf>.

²⁴ See <https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1g/k1g47ip0y3> (14:15); and <https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1q/k1qkxsc95f> (1:10).

meetings, the related opportunities and risks of reprisals, and good practices for Council members to support safe civil society engagement with the Council.

22. In its regular consultations with members of the Security Council as they prepare to assume their monthly presidency of the Council, the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs systematically draws attention to issues related to the participation of civil society representatives in Security Council meetings, including risks of intimidation and reprisals, and directly engages with presiding Council delegations, together with OHCHR, to promote best practices.

23. The Office of Counter-Terrorism developed a standard operating procedure for the implementation of the Human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces, which involves conducting human rights risk assessments that consider, among other factors, possible intimidation and reprisals for cooperation with the United Nations.

24. In September 2024, the United Nations Youth Office launched a dedicated module on preventing and responding to intimidation and reprisals related to cooperation with the United Nations as part of its youth-friendly online training course on engaging safely at the United Nations. Nearly 2,000 young people have registered since its launch, and the module is actively promoted ahead of major United Nations events involving youth participation. In collaboration with OHCHR, the United Nations Youth Office, organized dedicated preparatory sessions on safe engagement with the United Nations ahead of the Youth Action Day of the Summit of the Future on risk prevention and response. For the Economic and Social Council Youth Forum 2025, it disseminated a guidance note on safe and meaningful youth participation in United Nations events.²⁵

25. During the reporting period, the Special Rapporteur on environmental defenders under the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters held several regional consultations with environmental defenders from outside the territories of States Parties to the Convention who were facing harassment linked to the operations of companies headquartered in States Parties. Ahead of the consultation for Western and Central Africa in September 2024, a participant was threatened with reprisals.

IV. Ensuring access to the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights

26. Previous reports have addressed obstacles facing individuals and organizations who addressed United Nations forums.²⁶ Reports of attempts by representatives of Member States to block or delay the accreditation of civil society representatives continued to be received. Attempts by representatives of States to prevent, interrupt or discredit civil society's interventions at United Nations meetings were also documented. Incidents of intimidation and harassment on United Nations premises, including at United Nations Headquarters, were documented, in particular affecting Indigenous Peoples. Incidents included individuals being photographed or recorded without their consent or government representatives addressing civil society representatives in an intimidating manner, before, during or after their participation in United Nations forums.

27. Some United Nations peace operations²⁷ reported that individuals and communities seeking to access and engage with them, including to share information, faced challenges and obstacles. In its resolutions, the Security Council has continued to urge States and all parties to ensure full and unhindered access and freedom of movement for peace operations,

²⁵ See https://ecosoc.un.org/sites/default/files/2025-04/SAFE-AND-MEANINGFUL-PARTICIPATION-IN-UN-EVENTS_UN-Youth-Office-Guidance.pdf.

²⁶ See A/HRC/42/30, A/HRC/45/36, A/HRC/48/28, A/HRC/51/47, AHRC/54/61 and A/HRC/57/60.

²⁷ The term peace operations in this context is used to refer to both peacekeeping operations and special political missions.

associated personnel and expert mechanisms.²⁸ During the reporting period, the targeting of independent experts of United Nations human rights mechanisms continued and had a deterrent effect on individuals and groups seeking to cooperate with them.

28. Efforts to strengthen the capacity of the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations of the Economic and Social Council have continued given the growing number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with or applying for consultative status. At its regular session in 2025, the Committee received 536 new applications for consultative status, including 323 applications deferred from an earlier session. The Committee recommended 148 applications for consultative status at its regular session and deferred 356 for further consideration.

29. At the Committee's 2025 regular session, Member States reiterated its role as the primary specialized United Nations body for considering NGO applications for consultative status and as an important entry point for NGO engagement with the Organization. Following the adoption of Economic and Social Council decision 2024/342 on improving the work of the Committee, new working methods implemented during the 2025 regular session allowed both Committee members and NGOs additional time to review questions and responses.

30. Greater participation of civil society in the work of the United Nations remains critical for its effective functioning. The Secretary-General reiterates his previous calls upon the Committee to ensure that the criteria applied for assessing organizations are fair and transparent. As previously highlighted, continued deferral of applications for consultative status has, in some cases, amounted to de facto rejection for organizations working on human rights.²⁹

V. Information received on cases of intimidation and reprisal for cooperation with the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights

A. General comment

31. The present report includes cases based on information gathered between 1 May 2024 and 30 April 2025, in accordance with Human Rights Council resolutions 12/2 and 24/24, and contains information on acts of intimidation or reprisal against individuals and groups, as established by the Council in its resolution 12/2.

32. The information received has been verified and corroborated by primary and other sources, to the extent possible. Reference is made to United Nations publications or documents if the cases mentioned have been made public. Responses provided by Governments are summarized, including positive actions taken.³⁰

33. The present report and its annexes do not contain an exhaustive list of cases. The principle of do no harm and the consent of alleged victims to being named were strictly adhered to. As a result, cases were anonymized or omitted when the security risk to the individuals or their family members was deemed to be high. Furthermore, a number of cases brought to the attention of the Secretary-General were addressed confidentially.

34. As with previous reports on the subject, owing to the word limit, annex I contains additional information about new cases or situations presented during the reporting period that are summarized in the main report, with replies received from Governments to the relevant notes verbales. Annex II contains information on developments during the reporting period on ongoing cases or situations included in previous reports that are listed in the main report, with replies received from Governments. References are made in the present report to

²⁸ See Security Council resolutions [2729 \(2024\)](#) (South Sudan); [2759 \(2024\)](#) (Central African Republic); [2763 \(2024\)](#) (Afghanistan); [2765 \(2024\)](#) (Democratic Republic of the Congo) and [2767 \(2024\)](#) (Somalia).

²⁹ [A/HRC/48/28](#), para. 35; [A/HRC/51/57](#), para. 28; [A/HRC/54/61](#), para. 35; and [A/HRC/57/60](#), para. 35.

³⁰ Only government replies received within the deadline have been included.

communications of special procedure mandate holders and the replies from Governments thereto, which may be found on the website for the communications of special procedures.³¹

B. Summary of cases

Afghanistan

35. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan documented four incidents of reprisals against women and media workers for their cooperation with the United Nations, including arbitrary detention by the de facto authorities. Names and details of those concerned are withheld due to risks of further reprisals.

36. The Human Rights Council, in its resolution 57/3 on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, called upon relevant actors in the country to ensure that civil society organizations, human rights defenders, victims and other individuals had unhindered access to United Nations human rights mechanisms without fear of reprisal, intimidation or attack.

Algeria

37. Annex II contains information on developments in the situation of Ms. Jamila Loukil, Mr. Kaddour Chouicha, Mr. Ahmed Manseri, Mr. Malik Riahi and Mr. Mustapha Bendjamaa.

38. The Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the present report.

Bahrain

39. Mr. Ali al-Hajee, a human rights defender and former political prisoner, was interrogated about his human rights work, particularly his social media posts, including one on his meeting with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders in October 2024,³² and his engagement with the United Nations. He was then detained for allegedly spreading false news using social media and released on 10 March 2025 after 11 days in custody.

40. Annex II contains information on developments in the situation of Mr. Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, Mr. Abduljalil al-Singace and Mr. Hassan Mushaima.

41. The Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the present report.

Bangladesh

42. OHCHR documented incidents of intimidation against two youth civil society actors for their cooperation with the United Nations. One individual self-identified as a member of an Indigenous People, and the other is reportedly perceived as an advocate for LGBTIQ+ rights. Names and details of those concerned are withheld due to fear of further reprisals.

43. Annex II contains information on developments in the situation of human rights organization Odhikar, as well as its members Mr. Adilur Rahman Khan and Mr. Nasiruddin Elan.

Belarus

44. Mr. Maksim Pazniakou, acting Chair of the now-outlawed Belarusian Congress of Democratic Trade Unions, faced legal proceedings allegedly linked to his cooperation with the International Labour Organization.

45. The Human Rights Council, in its resolution 58/19 on the situation of human rights in Belarus, urged the authorities to establish full and non-selective engagement with all United Nations human rights bodies and mechanisms and to refrain from all forms of intimidation

³¹ See <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/Tmsearch/TMDocuments>.

³² See <https://x.com/elhajee/status/1849947641620090907?s=46>.

and reprisals against persons and associations for their cooperation with those bodies and mechanisms.

46. Annex II contains information on developments in the situation of Mr. Aliaksandr Yarashuk and the NGO Human Rights Centre Viasna.

47. The Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the present report.

Cameroon

48. Annex II contains information on developments in the situation of Ms. Maximilienne Ngo Mbe and Ms. Alice Nkom, as well as the civil society organization Organic Farming for Gorillas Cameroon, Mr. Jan Joris Cappelle and Mr. Elvis Brown Luma Mukuna.

China

49. Two staff members of the Hong Kong Democracy Council, Ms. Anna Kwok and Ms. Carmen Lau, were allegedly subjected to reprisals for their past and ongoing cooperation with the United Nations, including in the context of the fourth cycle of the universal periodic review of China by the Human Rights Council.³³ Arrest warrants were issued for both and their passports were revoked.

50. Mr. Abduweli Ayup, a Uyghur linguist and activist, was allegedly intimidated during his participation in the Second International Conference on Language Technologies for All, co-organized by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the European Language Resources Association and its Special Interest Group on Under-resourced Languages.

51. Annex II contains information on developments in the situations of two members of the international legal team supporting Mr. Jimmi Lai and his son Mr. Sebastian Lai, as well as Ms. Hang Tung Chow, Ms. Li Qiaochu, Ms. Xu Yan, Mr. Yu Wensheng, Ms. Chen Jianfang, Ms. Wang Yu, Ms. Li Wenzu, Mr. Wang Quanzhang, Ms. Wang Qiaoling, Mr. Li Heping and Mr. Jiang Tianyong.

52. The Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the present report.

Cuba

53. The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention reported allegations of reprisals and intimidation against Mr. Roberto Pérez Fonseca after the Government was notified of the Working Group's opinion of 31 August 2023 in which it had found his detention arbitrary.³⁴ The Government has not released Mr. Pérez Fonseca, and his situation in detention has reportedly worsened.³⁵

54. The Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the present report.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

55. The Human Rights Office of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo documented seven incidents of reprisals for cooperation with the Mission. These included physical assault and violence, death threats and attempted abduction. Names and details have been withheld due to fear of further reprisals.

Egypt

56. Mr. Hossam Bahgat, the executive director of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, was arrested and charged with terrorism-related offences, possibly in connection with

³³ See <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/upr/cn-stakeholders-info-s45>.

³⁴ See A/HRC/WGAD/2023/51.

³⁵ A/HRC/57/44, para. 30.

his human rights work and engagement with the United Nations and its human rights mechanisms.

57. Several special procedure mandate holders addressed allegations of continued harassment in the form of surveillance, threats of arrest and transnational repression against Ms. Basma Mostafa in connection with her participation in an international advocacy programme for human rights and her meetings with United Nations human rights mechanisms and OHCHR.³⁶

58. Annex II contains information on developments in the situations of Mr. Ahmed Shawky Abdelsattar Mohamed Amasha and Mr. Ebrahim Abdelmonem Metwally Hegazy and the impact of Egyptian legislation on the ability of individuals and civil society groups to cooperate with the United Nations.

59. The Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the present report.

Guatemala

60. Annex II contains information on developments in the situation of Ms. Claudia González Orellana, Ms. Samari Gómez Díaz, Ms. Virginia Laparra Rivas, Ms. Leily Santizo, Ms. Érika Aifán Dávila, Mr. Juan Francisco Sandoval, Mr. Stuardo Ernesto Campo Aguilar, Ms. Thelma Aldana, Ms. Claudia Maselli, Mr. Pablo Xitumul de Paz and Mr. Carlos Ruano Pineda.

61. The Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the present report.

India

62. Annex II contains information on developments in the situations of the staff and associates of the Jammu and Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society, Mr. Khurram Parvez, the Centre for Social Development and its staff, including Mr. Nobokishore Urikhimbam and the Centre for Promotion of Social Concerns.

63. The Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the present report.

Indonesia

64. Several special procedure mandate holders addressed allegations of harassment and intimidation against Indigenous West Papuan human rights defender Ms. Lamberti Faan following her participation in the fifty-sixth session of the Human Rights Council.³⁷

65. In a separate incident, a woman human rights defender was placed under surveillance and interrogated in connection with her advocacy with the United Nations. Names and additional details are withheld due to fear of further reprisals.

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

66. Mr. Mohammad Seifzadeh, a human rights lawyer, was summoned to serve a one-year prison sentence following his conviction for co-signing a joint letter with 45 activists, urging the Secretary-General to condemn executions in the Islamic Republic of Iran. He presented himself at the prison, was detained and then released shortly thereafter, reportedly on bail.

67. General Assembly resolution 79/183 on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran called upon the State to end reprisals, including against those who cooperated or attempted to cooperate with the United Nations.

³⁶ See communication EGY 6/2024.

³⁷ See communication IDN 5/2024.

68. The Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the present report.

Iraq

69. OHCHR documented incidents of intimidation against civil society actors for their cooperation with the United Nations, including its human rights mechanisms. Names and details of those concerned are withheld due to fear of further reprisals.

Israel

70. Following her briefing to the Security Council, Ms. Yuli Novak, director of the Israeli NGO B'Tselem, was targeted and harassed on social media in relation to her statement before the Council. One member of the Knesset called on the relevant authorities to launch an investigation into Ms. Novak for suspected "assistance to the enemy in time of war" and another for her citizenship to be revoked.

71. At least four Palestinian individuals released from Israeli detention who were allegedly victims or witnesses of violations of international humanitarian and international human rights law declined to be interviewed by OHCHR for fear of reprisal. Several released detainees indicated that, prior to their release, Israeli forces had warned them not to give interviews about their detention, including to the United Nations.

72. Annex II contains information on developments in the case of the designation by Israeli authorities as terrorist organizations of six Palestinian NGOs.

Mexico

73. Ms. Maria Isabel Cruz Bernal, a human rights defender, faced threats by an unknown individual or individuals following her participation in the first World Congress on Enforced Disappearances, held in Geneva on 15 and 16 January 2025.

74. The Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the present report.

Myanmar

75. The vast majority of individuals with whom OHCHR interacted in the context of its human rights work, including its reporting to the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly, agreed to do so only under condition of confidentiality and anonymity and without public disclosure of personal information or details that could identify them, indicating fear of possible reprisals, including for engagement with OHCHR.

Nicaragua

76. OHCHR continued to receive requests from victims and sources to anonymize information published regarding their cases, as well as denials to engage in any way with United Nations human rights mechanisms, due to fear of reprisals.

77. Severe government restrictions on civil society, such as the forced dissolution of civil society organizations, undermined their ability to operate effectively and engage with the United Nations.

78. Annex II contains information on developments in the situations of Mr. Guillermo Gonzalo Carrión Maradiaga, Ms. Ana Quirós, Ms. Francisca Ramírez, Mr. Braulio Abarca, Mr. Félix Alejandro Maradiaga, Mr. Brooklyn Rivera, Ms. Tininiska Rivera Castellón, the Standing Committee on Human Rights and its staff.

Pakistan

79. Allegations of arbitrary travel restrictions against woman human rights defender Ms. Sammi Deen Baloch were addressed by several special procedure mandate holders.³⁸

³⁸ See communication PAK 4/2024.

The restrictions allegedly prevented Ms. Baloch's engagement with the Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances and her participation in the fifty-seventh session of the Human Rights Council.

80. Several special procedures mandate holders expressed concern at the detention of leaders of the Baloch Yakjehti Committee and their supporters and actions against their family members and lawyers, noting that these might amount to reprisals for their interaction with United Nations mechanisms.³⁹

81. The Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the present report.

Peru

82. Mr. Julio César Rimac Damián, an environmental lawyer and community leader, was the target of an act of intimidation to deter him from cooperating with the United Nations on human rights issues. As a result of threats and concern for the safety of his family, he withdrew from his planned cooperation with the United Nations.

83. The Act amending the Peruvian Agency for International Cooperation Act, which entered into force on 16 April 2025, could have a negative impact on the ability of civil society to engage with the United Nations.

84. The Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the present report.

Russian Federation

85. Several special procedure mandate holders addressed allegations of arrest, ill-treatment and pretrial detention of Mr. Alexey Sokolov, reportedly in connection with his human rights work, as well as reprisals for his cooperation with the United Nations.⁴⁰

86. The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Russian Federation reported that the designation of the International Committee of Indigenous Peoples of Russia as "extremist" may constitute reprisals for its cooperation with the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and other human rights mechanisms.⁴¹

87. The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention reported having received allegations of reprisals and intimidation against human rights defender Mr. Alexey Gorinov. Reportedly, the authorities increased punitive measures against him following the Working Group's decision that his detention was arbitrary.⁴²

88. OHCHR received information on the withdrawal of invitations extended to a civil society representative from the Russian Federation to participate in two United Nations events in the Asia-Pacific region, following the alleged involvement of a State actor from the Russian Federation. Names and details of those concerned are withheld due to fear of reprisals.

89. In its resolution 57/20 on the situation of human rights in the Russian Federation, the Human Rights Council expressed alarm about the use of legislative measures to penalize and criminalize cooperation with United Nations human rights mechanisms.

90. Annex II contains information on developments in the situations of the NGO Human Rights House Foundation and the Centre for Support of Indigenous Peoples of the North and on the alleged impact of the arbitrary application of restrictive legislation, in particular laws on so-called foreign agents or undesirable organizations.

91. The Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the present report.

³⁹ See <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/04/un-experts-urge-pakistan-address-human-rights-violations-balochistan>.

⁴⁰ See communication [RUS 5/2024](#).

⁴¹ See [A/HRC/57/59](#), para. 69.

⁴² [A/HRC/57/44](#), para. 30.

Saudi Arabia

92. Annex II contains information on developments in the situations of Mr. Mohammad Fahad al-Qahtani, Mr. Essa al-Nukheifi, Ms. Loujain al-Hathloul and Mr. Fawzan Mohsen Awad al-Harbi.

93. The Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the present report.

Sri Lanka

94. OHCHR documented harassment and intimidation by State security officials against five individuals due to their engagement with the United Nations. Names and details of those concerned are withheld due to fear of further reprisals.

Sudan

95. OHCHR documented four incidents of intimidation and reprisals against Sudanese women human rights defenders and one organization actively advocating for women's rights in connection with their cooperation with the United Nations. Names and details of those concerned are withheld due to fear of further reprisals.

Thailand

96. Ms. Pimsiri Petchnamrob, a woman human rights defender, is reportedly banned from travelling outside Thailand, allegedly to prevent her international advocacy work and participation in the Human Rights Council.

97. Several special procedure mandate holders addressed allegations that Thailand was cooperating in efforts by the Government of Viet Nam to secure the involuntary or forced repatriation of Vietnamese Montagnards from Thailand, with specific reference to Mr. Y Quynh Bdap, recognized as a refugee since 2019.

98. Annex II contains information on developments in the situations of Ms. Angkhana Neelapaijit.

99. The Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the present report.

Turkmenistan

100. Annex II contains information on developments in the situations of Ms. Gurban Soltan Achilova.

United Arab Emirates

101. Annex II contains information on developments in the situations of Mr. Mohamed al-Mansoori, Mr. Ahmed Mansoor and Mr. Ahmad Ali Mekkaoui.

Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

102. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and several special procedure mandate holders raised serious concerns about the authorities' widespread use of detention following the July 2024 presidential elections. Many of those released from detention were subjected to conditional measures that may have restricted their ability to report any potential human rights violations to OHCHR and international human rights mechanisms.

103. The international independent fact-finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela reported that its investigations continued to be limited by individuals' fear of reprisals for engagement with it.

104. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination expressed serious concern regarding allegations of reprisals and intimidation for cooperation with the Committee against Mr. Yendri Velásquez, a human rights defender and coordinator of a civil

society organization defending the rights of LGBTIQ+ persons, who was prevented from attending the Committee's review of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in August 2024.

105. Mr. Olnar Alberto Ortiz Bolívar, a member of the Baré people and a human rights lawyer and defender, has reportedly been subjected to acts of intimidation and reprisals in connection with his participation in the twenty-third session of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues.

Viet Nam

106. Several special procedure mandate holders raised concerns about reprisals for cooperation with the United Nations in relation to the listing of Montagnards Stand for Justice as a terrorist organization and the trial, conviction and sentencing in absentia of its co-founder, Y Quynh Bdap, as part of a mass trial of 100 individuals, mostly Indigenous Montagnards, on terrorism-related charges.⁴³

107. Annex II contains information on developments in the situations of Y Khiu Niê, Y Sĩ Êban and on the alleged impact of the arbitrary application of restrictive legislation.

108. The Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the present report.

Yemen

109. Annex II contains information on developments in the situations of the NGO Mwatana Organization for Human Rights and its staff.

State of Palestine

110. Palestinian journalists who had been arrested were reportedly threatened by Palestinian National Security Forces officers before their release. This led some journalists to refuse to share information on their detention with the United Nations for fear of reprisals.

111. Annex II contains information on developments in the situations of several Palestinian and international women's organizations and human rights defenders.

VI. Conclusions and recommendations

112. The number of reported acts of intimidation and reprisals by both State and non-State actors against individuals or groups seeking to cooperate or having cooperated with the United Nations remained high during the reporting period. Incidents were reported across all regions, involving 32 Member States – the same number as in last year's report. Verified allegations relating to two Member States could not be included in the present report due to severe protection concerns for the victims.

113. The cases and situations reported do not reflect the actual breadth and scope of the issue. As in previous reports, some cases had to be reported anonymously due to protection concerns. Other cases were excluded, as victims and others declined any public reporting because they no longer considered anonymity as sufficient to offer adequate protection, or due to the serious risk of further reprisals.

114. The absence or decrease of reported allegations of reprisals in certain contexts is not necessarily a positive sign. Civic space and the protection of the rights and fundamental freedoms necessary to engage with the United Nations continue to be undermined. Civil society actors around the world continue to face online and offline threats and attacks, creating a chilling effect that has led to self-censorship. This makes it increasingly difficult to report and respond to reprisals. In addition, many civil society actors face significant restrictions in their activities and operations and lack access to

⁴³ See communication VNM 4/2024. The Government's reply is available at <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=38749>:

funding or secure sustainable resources to continue their work, a situation that significantly deteriorated in 2025.

115. While United Nations entities continued to document global trends similar to those identified in previous years, new, deepening concerns emerged during the reporting period.

116. Allegations of transnational repression across borders⁴⁴ have increased, with examples from around the world.⁴⁵ Targeted repression across borders appears to be growing in scale and sophistication, and the impact on the protection of human rights defenders and affected individuals in exile, as well as the chilling effect on those who continue to defend human rights in challenging contexts, is of increasing concern.

117. As reflected in this report, during the reporting period, OHCHR documented nine cases where individuals and organizations residing in third States were allegedly subjected to intimidation and reprisals by State and non-State actors affiliated with their countries of origin in connection with their engagement with the United Nations. In two additional cases, individuals and organizations originally from, or registered in, third States were allegedly targeted by Member States with which they had no formal affiliation, apart from their engagement with the United Nations on human rights issues concerning those States.

118. Six Member States were reportedly responsible for these 11 incidents. Documented acts included criminal charges related to national security or terrorism, surveillance, harassment, threats, confiscation of property and passports, denial of passport renewal, refusal of re-entry after travel abroad, and ongoing extradition attempts against a human rights defender and recognized refugee. These actions targeted those directly engaging with the United Nations, their organizations and, in some cases, their family members and colleagues.

119. Another emerging concern in this year's report is the targeting of individuals who belong to the LGBTIQ+ community or who advocate for their rights at the United Nations. The targeting of youth, women human rights defenders, peacebuilders and Indigenous Peoples persisted. Others at heightened risk included human rights defenders, activists, journalists, victims of human rights violations, witnesses and their relatives, lawyers and trade unionists.

120. The following trends, consistent with those documented in previous years, were again observed during the reporting period, with some variations and evolving features. Self-censorship and the choice not to cooperate with the United Nations or to do so under conditions of anonymity due to fear of reprisals continued. Self-censorship was documented in contexts marked by repressive policies, human rights violations, fear of reprisals and criminal liability for cooperation with the United Nations.

121. The choice not to cooperate continues to pose methodological challenges in the documentation of allegations and is likely underidentified and underreported. In several instances, OHCHR and other United Nations entities, including peace operations, documented cases of individuals who declined engagement with the United Nations citing fear of reprisals, including 62 individuals in one State. While the number of individuals and organizations requesting anonymous reporting (more than 40 individuals and 14 organizations) represents a small reduction compared to last year's figure, the numbers remain significant, consistent with earlier reporting periods.

122. Online and offline surveillance of those who cooperate or attempt to cooperate with the United Nations remains a concern. As in the previous reporting period, surveillance was reported in one third of the States included in the present report.

⁴⁴ See <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/transnational-repression-1-en.pdf>.

⁴⁵ See <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2025/03/turbulence-and-unpredictability-amid-growing-conflict-and-divided> and <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2024/06/we-must-urgently-find-our-way-back-peace-says-high-commissioner>.

123. More than half of the States included in the present report apply or continue to apply laws and regulations concerning civil society, counter-terrorism and national security that have had the effect of deterring or hindering cooperation with the United Nations. Some States have amended existing laws or enacted new ones, further increasing restrictions on and complicating the registration of civil society organizations, which results in additional obstacles to civil society's engagement with the United Nations.

124. As noted in past reports, some cases and situations included in annex II are more than isolated incidents. Recurring allegations of repeated incidents of reprisals may signal patterns, and concerns expressed by multiple United Nations actors about the same cases or situations can indicate the severity and/or widespread nature of reprisals in the States concerned. This and the continued protection challenges facing individuals who have been subjected to reprisals remain a matter of deep concern.

125. I am concerned about reports that continue to underscore the gender-specific nature and severity of reprisals targeting women, particularly in connection with their cooperation with the Security Council and peace operations.⁴⁶ In addition, reports continue to show that youth and Indigenous Peoples are at high risk when engaging with the Organization.⁴⁷ The targeting of these groups not only silences critical voices but also erodes the inclusivity of our collective efforts.

126. I remain committed to making the prevention of and response to reprisals central to United Nations action. Ensuring that interlocutors, partners and civil society actors can engage safely and meaningfully with the Organization is essential for it to be able to discharge its mandate effectively across all pillars of work and requires an enhanced response based on United Nations system-wide documentation and reporting, sustained political will, increased accountability and close collaboration with Member States and affected individuals.

127. Member States bear the primary responsibility for preventing and addressing acts of intimidation and reprisals for cooperation with the United Nations. I urge them to intensify their efforts and response, with particular attention paid to prevention and accountability. At the same time, effective action requires coordinated efforts by Member States, the United Nations and civil society. I remain committed to strengthening our collective capacity to respond, guided by a gender-responsive and victim-centred approach. Together, the Member States, the United Nations and civil society must ensure that all those who engage with the United Nations can do so safely, freely and without fear.

⁴⁶ S/2025/556, paras. 40 and 101.

⁴⁷ [E/2024/43-E/C.19/2024/8](#), paras. 52, 55 and 114.

Annex I

Comprehensive information on alleged cases of reprisals and intimidation for cooperation with the United Nations on human rights

1. Afghanistan

1. During the reporting period, UNAMA recorded at least four instances of reprisals against **individuals, including women and media workers**, for their cooperation with the United Nations. Three of these cases involved arbitrary detentions by Afghanistan's *de facto* authorities, for a variety of reasons, including participating in events supported by the United Nations and sharing information with the United Nations.

2. In one instance, a male journalist who had shared information with UNAMA was detained and reportedly warned by the *de facto* authorities not to share information with international organizations, or else there would be severe punishment. He was released the same day. In the other three instances, the individuals concerned did not consent to having the details of their cases shared due to fear of further reprisals. Names and details of those concerned are withheld due to risks of further reprisals.

3. During the reporting period, the United Nations Security Council¹, the High Commissioner for Human Rights,² UNAMA³ and special procedures mandate holders of the Human Rights Council⁴ expressed serious concern about the erosion of respect for human rights, in particular for women and girls, the reduction of civic space and media freedom and the arbitrary detention, threats and ill treatment of journalists, media and civil society actors, and the Law on the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice. The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan reported that the Taliban's oppressive policies, including the said law, reinforce a pervasive climate of fear and that communities are increasingly resorting to self-regulation and self-censorship (A/HRC/58/74, paras 92-93).

4. Reportedly, the climate of fear and intimidation created by the *de facto* authorities has adversely affected the ability and willingness of interlocutors to engage with the United Nations and poses challenges to the monitoring and documentation of human rights violations. Some interlocutors are reluctant to share information about allegations of human rights violations or to publicly engage in United Nations fora due to fears of reprisals against them, their relatives or co-workers. For instance, interlocutors often report fears for their safety if the *de facto* authorities find out that they have discussed with or reported to UNAMA

¹ A/78/789-S/2024/196, paras. 40, 55, 79 S/RES/2777 (2025), A/79/675-S/2024/675, paras 12, 31-34, 40, 67. A/79/341-S/2024/664, paras 35, 69-70; A/79/797 S/2025/109, 39-40, 72.

² <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2024/03/turks-global-update-human-rights-council> <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2024/12/afghanistan-licenses-ngos-must-not-be-revoked>; <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2024/09/afghanistan-can-advance-rights-or-spiral-deeper-failure-turk-says>.

³ https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_report_on_media_freedom_in_afghanistan.pdf; <https://unama.unmissions.org/un-urges-afghanistan%E2%80%99s-de-facto-authorities-protect-media-freedom>; https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_pvpv_report_10_april_2025_english.pdf; <https://unama.unmissions.org/human-rights-situation-afghanistan-april-june-2024-updateenglish>; https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/english_-_unama_-_update_on_hr_situation_in_afghanistan_-_july-sept_2024.pdf; https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/human_rights_situation_in_afghanistan_october_-_december_2024_-_english.pdf; https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_update_on_human_rights_in_afghanistan_january-march_2025.pdf.

⁴ A/HRC/58/80, 24-43; A/HRC/58/74, OTH (9/2024), <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/04/afghanistan-must-immediately-stop-public-executions-and-corporal-punishment>.

allegations of human rights violations and therefore often request that their interaction be kept confidential.

5. The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan also reported that the collapse of civic space has severely hampered the documentation of human rights violations and abuses owing to censorship, self-regulation and reprisals against Afghans and their family members on account of their cooperation with the United Nations, including with regard to the mandate of the Special Rapporteur (AHRC/58/80, para 27).

6. In October 2024, the Human Rights Council adopted resolution 57/3 on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan calling on relevant actors in Afghanistan to ensure that civil society organizations, human rights defenders, victims, survivors, their families and other individuals have unhindered access to the Special Rapporteur, the special procedures of the Human Rights Council, the treaty bodies and other international bodies seized of the situation in Afghanistan without fear of reprisal, intimidation or attack (A/HRC/RES/57/3, para 25).

2. Bahrain

7. On 28 February 2025, **Mr. AlHajee**, a human rights defender and former political prisoner, received a written summons from the Ministry of Interior's General Directorate of Crime Detection and Forensic Science, followed by a telephone call from the Criminal Investigation Directorate (CID), instructing him to report to it immediately.

8. Upon compliance, Mr. AlHajee was reportedly subjected to prolonged interrogation regarding his human rights activities, in particular his social media posts, including one on his meeting with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders in October 2024.⁵ He was also allegedly questioned about his engagement with the United Nations.

9. On 1 March 2025, the Public Prosecution's Terrorism Crimes Unit ordered his detention for seven days on charges of "spreading false news using social media." Reportedly, both his interrogation and detention orders were carried out without access to legal counsel. On 3 March, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders publicly denounced Mr. AlHajee's detention and interrogation regarding his human rights work in a post on social media, and called for his immediate release.⁶

10. During the first six days of detention, Mr. AlHajee was reportedly denied access to basic necessities, held in unsanitary conditions, and not provided meals suitable for his health needs. On 6 March, his detention was extended by 15 days, but he was released on 10 March after 11 days in custody.

11. On 31 July 2025, the Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection to the present report denying allegations of reprisals against Mr. Al Hajee and stating that he had not been interrogated or targeted due to his engagement with United Nations Human Rights Mechanisms. The Government noted that Mr. Al Hajee had been summoned on 28 February 2025 by the relevant authorities pursuant to a Public Prosecution order to investigate allegations of dissemination of false information online. The Government noted further that he had been placed in pre-trial detention and released on 10 March 2025, and that his case had been formally closed following a thorough legal review. According to the Government, while in detention, Mr. Al Hajee was examined twice by a medical doctor, had telephone contact with his family, and received adequate food and health care. The Government added that, following a complaint, the Ombudsman investigated and confirmed that he had been treated in accordance with national and international law.

3. Bangladesh

12. According to information received by OHCHR, two youth civil society actors were reportedly subjected to acts of intimidation in connection with their cooperation with the United Nations. One individual self-identifies as a member of an Indigenous People and the

⁵ <https://x.com/elhajee/status/1849947641620090907?s=46>.

⁶ <https://x.com/marylawlorhrds/status/1896507400649351574?s=12>.

other is reportedly perceived to be an advocate of the rights of the LGBTIQ+ community. One of the individuals was allegedly followed and monitored by state actors at the United Nations, and the other was subjected to intimidation and harassment online, that exposed the individual concerned to risk of harm, in connection to United Nations engagement. Names and details of those concerned are withheld due to fear of intimidation and reprisals.

4. Belarus

13. During the reporting period, **Mr. Maksim Pazniakou**, acting Chairperson of the now-outlawed Belarusian Congress of Democratic Trade Unions (BKDP), was charged in absentia with offences that fall under Article 361 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Belarus No. 275 of 9 July 1999. This provision relates, to public calls for actions that may harm national security, including appeals for sanctions,. GB.353/INS/7/(Rev.1) According to information received by OHCHR, the legal proceedings against him, as well as ongoing harassment against his relatives in Belarus, appear to be directly linked to his cooperation with the International Labour Organization (ILO) (GB.353/NSP/PV, para 223).

14. Following the commencement of criminal proceedings against Mr. Pazniakou, state officials reportedly conducted five visits to the residence of his 75-year-old mother, where he remains officially registered. These visits included one search of the premises, three interrogations, and one attempt to locate him. During these visits, officials informed his mother that he had been placed on a national “wanted” list. However, no procedural documents were presented to her, nor did she receive any formal notification or legal documentation. The repeated visits and interactions have reportedly caused significant emotional distress to Mr. Pazniakou’s elderly mother. Her advanced age, combined with the psychological impact of these events, have reportedly affected her well-being and her memory.

15. During the reporting period, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus stated that individuals who fled Belarus face extraterritorial persecution⁷ and that those that remain in the country live in an atmosphere of fear, censorship and self-censorship. (A/HRC/59/59, para. 3) The Special Rapporteur noted further that families of many prisoners avoid contact with human rights defenders and with mandate holders, owing to fear of retaliation by the authorities and urged the Government to ensure protection from reprisals for anyone engaging with them. (A/HRC/59/59, para. 45, 88 a)

16. According to information received by OHCHR, the environment of fear and intimidation among Belarussian citizens living in neighbouring third countries has contributed to self-censorship, which reportedly inhibits cooperation with the United Nations. The Group of Independent Experts on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus reported that fears have been further exacerbated by recent developments indicating the use of enhanced digital surveillance, both in the country and abroad, and the launching of criminal proceedings in absentia against hundreds of Belarusians in exile(A/HRC/58/68 paras 33, 58-59, 63-65).

17. In its 2025 resolution on the situation of human rights in Belarus, the Human Rights Council urged the Belarusian authorities to establish full and non-selective engagement with all United Nations human rights mechanisms, including the Group of Independent Experts, and to refrain from all forms of intimidation and reprisals against persons and associations for their cooperation with those mechanisms (A/HRC/RES/58/19).

18. On 16 July 2025, the Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection to the present report noting that Mr. Pazniakou had been charged on 31 December 2024 with crimes under Article 361 (parts 1 and 2) of the Criminal Code, and that due to the inability to locate him, the preliminary investigation had been suspended. The Government further noted that the criminal prosecution of Mr. Pazniakou related to his alleged cooperation with an extremist group and to his interaction with the United Nations, and in particular with the ILO, and noted that the questioning of relatives is a standard investigative practice.

⁷ See also <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/01/belarus-un-experts-alarmed-about-widespread-absentia-trials>.

5. China

19. According to information received by OHCHR, during the reporting period, two staff members of the **Hong Kong Democracy Council (HKDC)**, **Ms. Anna Kwok** (Executive Director) and **Ms. Carmen Lau**, (Senior International Advocacy Associate), neither of whom resided in China, were allegedly the subject of reprisals for their past and ongoing cooperation with the United Nations, including in the context of the fourth cycle of the Universal Periodic Review of China in the Human Rights Council.⁸ The work of both Ms. Kwok and Ms. Lau focused on human rights advocacy with the United Nations and its human rights mechanisms and with Member States.

20. On 24 December 2024, at an official press conference of the Government of HKSAR, the Secretary for Security announced the designation of seven individuals, including **Ms. Anna Kwok**, as “absconders” under the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance, and the revocation of their HKSAR passports, among other measures. The Secretary further informed that arrest warrants had been issued by the Court for all seven individuals.⁹ The same day, HKSAR Police issued a public appeal for information on Ms. Kwok, offering a reward of approximately 1 million HKD (around USD 130,000) for information leading to her arrest. The appeal stated that she was suspected of “collusion with foreign forces” under article 29 of the Hong Kong National Security Law (NSL),¹⁰ in connection with her meetings with foreign officials and political figures in her capacity as a member of HKDC, and her alleged engagement in other hostile actions against China, including HKSAR specifically, between September 2021 and February 2022.

21. In October 2023, special procedure mandate holders expressed concerns on the arrest warrant issued in July 2023 against Ms. Anna Kwok and six other individuals in self-exile in the context of the first mass trial under the NSL (CHN 16/2023). In November 2024, OHCHR expressed grave concern about the use of the NSL to convict and impose harsh sentences on 45 people in HKSAR in the context of the mass trial, reiterating further that the United Nations Human Rights Office, special procedures and human rights treaty bodies had repeatedly called on the HKSAR authorities to repeal the NSL. The chilling effect of this law on human rights defenders and other parts of civil society was also noted.¹¹

22. At the 24 December 2024 press conference, the HKSAR Deputy Commissioner of Police and HKSAR Senior Superintendent identified six individuals, including **Ms. Carmen Lau**, as wanted fugitives who had fled to a third State, for whom arrest warrants and “red notices” had been issued.¹² Specifically, Ms. Carmen Lau was cited as suspected of “incitement to secession” and “collusion with foreign forces”, under articles 21 and 29 of the NSL. On the same day, the HKSAR Police also issued a public appeal for information offering a reward of approximately 1 million HKD (around 130,000 USD) for information leading to Ms. Lau’s arrest. The public appeal also linked the alleged crimes to her role as a core member of HKDC, citing publication of articles, delivery of speeches and dissemination of messages or videos on social media advocating for HKSAR’s separation from China, and her engagement in other alleged hostile actions against China, including HKSAR specifically, between October 2021 and May 2024.¹³

23. Reportedly, in February and March 2025, neighbours of Ms. Lau’s residence in a third country received leaflets containing a public appeal issued by HKSAR’s Police concerning Ms. Lau. In March 2025, Ms. Lau was reportedly targeted through the wide dissemination of a video apparently generated by artificial intelligence on social media platforms. The video mimicked her and included false statements that reportedly discredited her.

24. During the reporting period, OHCHR received allegations of intimidation against **Mr. Abduweli Ayup**, a Uyghur linguist and activist, during his participation in the Second

⁸ <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/upr/cn-stakeholders-info-s45>.

⁹ <https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202412/24/P2024122400343.htm>.

¹⁰ https://www.police.gov.hk/ppp_en/06_appeals_public/nsc/detail.html?id=20230003.

¹¹ https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/11/hong-kong-grave-concerns-over-sentencing-under-national-security-law?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

¹² <https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202412/24/P2024122400343.htm>.

¹³ https://www.police.gov.hk/ppp_en/06_appeals_public/nsc/detail.html?id=20240001.

International Conference on Language Technologies for All, co-organized by UNESCO, the European Language Resources Association, and its Special Interest Group on Under-resourced Languages, and held at UNESCO's Headquarters between 24 and 26 February 2025.¹⁴

25. According to information received by OHCHR, on 24 February 2025, the first day of the conference, Mr. Ayup intervened twice in the plenary during the question and answer segments. He reportedly raised concerns regarding the situation of the Uyghur language in the country. Following his public interventions, he was allegedly approached by unidentified individuals, who challenged his views and inquired about the whereabouts of his family. When Mr. Ayup stated that his siblings were detained, possibly in prison facilities following earlier internment, the individuals challenged this statement and referred to the siblings as "terrorists".

26. Later on 24 February 2025, the Organizing Committee informed Mr. Ayup via email that they were unable to secure approval to include his "poster" presentation in the program of the following day. Nevertheless, on 25 February 2025, Mr. Ayup proceeded to deliver his presentation informally at the conference, during which he was reportedly filmed without his consent by an unknown individual. Mr. Ayup was reportedly being followed and at times filmed during his participation in the conference by an unknown individual.

27. On 18 July 2025, the Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection to the present report, stating that, in accordance with the law, the State protects individuals and organizations engaged in normal exchanges and cooperation with the United Nations, and rejected the allegations of reprisals against those who cooperate with United Nations human rights mechanisms. The Government emphasized that China is governed by the rule of law, that judicial authorities act in accordance with the law, and that false allegations of reprisals against those cooperating with United Nations human rights mechanisms must not be used to interfere with lawful judicial proceedings or to advocate on behalf of offenders, as this undermines the rule of law and infringes on China's judicial sovereignty, which China firmly opposes.

28. The Government noted that the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) protects human rights in accordance with the Constitution of the People's Republic of China and the Basic Law of the HKSAR. It noted that national security legislation requires respect for human rights, while emphasizing that rights and freedoms must be exercised within the law. The Government stated that HKSAR law enforcement actions strictly follow legal procedures and are based on evidence, adding that the HKSAR opposes any external interference in its judicial processes or attempts to influence judicial independence.

29. Regarding the cases of Ms. Anna Kwok and Ms. Carmen Lau, the Government stated that the extraterritorial application of the HKSAR National Security Law is consistent with international law principles, and that its pursuit of wanted fugitives is in line with prevailing international practice.. It further noted that Ms. Kwok and Ms. Lau met with foreign officials and politicians and advocated for the imposition of sanctions against HKSAR, which, according to the Government, constituted threats to national security and did not represent legitimate cooperation with United Nations human rights mechanisms. The Government further affirmed that all law enforcement actions were lawful.

6. Cuba

30. During the reporting period, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention reported allegations of reprisals and/or intimidation against **Mr. Pérez Fonseca** after the Government was notified of the opinion of the Working Group of 26 October 2023 that found his detention arbitrary (A/HRC/WGAD/2023/51). The Government has not released Mr. Perez, and his situation in detention has reportedly worsened (A/HRC/57/44 para 30). In October and November 2023, the authorities allegedly suspended his right to telephone communications for several weeks. In January 2024, Mr. Pérez Fonseca reportedly found a note on his bed containing a threat to kill him, and the same threat was reiterated verbally by other inmates

¹⁴ <https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/language-technologies-all-lt4all-2025>.

who are members of the penitentiary establishment's Disciplinary Council. On 15 January 2024, following a health emergency, Mr. Pérez Fonseca was denied medical assistance until 9 February 2024. Reportedly, Mr. Pérez Fonseca is persistently harassed by an official of the Ministry of the Interior, including through summonses to appear before authorities and interrogations under duress, without legal counsel present. Allegedly, the authorities have indicated that Mr. Pérez Fonseca will not be granted any penitentiary benefits, such as early release.

31. On 1 August 2025, the Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection to the present report, reaffirming its support for civil society's engagement with United Nations human rights mechanisms and highlighting its vibrant civil society composed of a wide range of social movements and local networks. The Government noted with concern the inclusion in the report of allegations of intimidation and reprisals, mainly from developing countries, which it considered unverified, incomplete or misrepresented. It further observed that the continued disregard of responses from countries of the Global South is alarming.

32. With regard to Mr. Pérez Fonseca, the Government regretted the inclusion in the report of what it considered to be false allegations. It stated that these allegations had first been made by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, in a manner it viewed as arbitrary. The Government further noted that the information reflected in the report was, in its assessment, unrelated to his alleged cooperation with the United Nations. It affirmed that Mr. Pérez Fonseca had not been subjected to any form of reprisals, including in connection with his cooperation with the UN, nor had he been detained, intimidated or harassed for the legitimate exercise of his human rights. The Government also rejected what it described as the instrumentalization of United Nations human rights mechanisms and requested additional time for Member States to submit their responses.

7. Democratic Republic of the Congo

33. During the reporting period, the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO) of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) documented seven incidents of reprisals against male (2) and female (5) civil society actors, mostly human rights defenders, including three youth, for cooperation with the Mission, described below. Four incidents were attributed to the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23), two to local armed groups, and one to State actors, in different locations in conflict-affected provinces of North Kivu and Ituri Provinces. Names and details of those concerned are withheld due to fear of further reprisals.

34. According to information received by OHCHR, the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) continued to be openly hostile¹⁵ towards human rights defenders and journalists whom they accused of reporting on M23's activities, including to the United Nations. This public hostility worsened during the reporting period, when the M23 gained control of large territories, including Goma and Bukavu, the two largest cities of the Eastern provinces of North and South Kivu, and publicly banned activities of civil society actors, human rights defenders and independent media in occupied areas and systematically targeted them. The number of reported cases of reprisals for cooperation with UNJHRO and other United Nations agencies in the affected areas during the period is believed to underrepresent the actual figures. Many victims fled or went into hiding before they could report allegations of human rights violations to the United Nations, and in some instances, UNJHRO could not secure their consent for fear of further reprisals. Cases in other provinces are also likely under-reported due to a lack of communication infrastructure hindering access to victims and reporting as well as to limited awareness of what constitutes reprisals, the importance of reporting them, and how to do so.

35. Specifically, since July 2024, the **head of a human rights non-governmental organization (NGO)** active in the promotion and protection of human rights, including child

¹⁵ <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2025/02/serious-human-rights-concerns-situation-eastern-drc-deteriorates>; <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/03/un-expert-expresses-extreme-concern-safety-human-rights-defenders-eastern>; <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2025/02/hc>.

rights and the fight against sexual and gender-based violence in North Kivu Province, reportedly began receiving threats from members of the M23 rebel group instructing him “to stop spreading rumors about them or face the consequences,” reportedly in relation to his ongoing cooperation with UNJHRO, other components of MONUSCO and United Nations agencies funds and programs, including his reporting on human rights abuses by different armed groups. Despite changing his telephone number multiple times, the M23 allegedly continued to obtain his new contact information and escalated their threats. In October 2024, the M23 reportedly declared his organization illegal in areas under its control and ordered him to cease all activities. In November 2024, he was reportedly summoned to a meeting by the rebel group, which he suspected to be a trap and therefore did not attend. Subsequently, a group of armed men allegedly came to apprehend him. Failing to locate him, they reportedly padlocked the organization’s office and instructed neighbours to monitor and hand him over to the M23. The individual reportedly fled to Goma, where the M23 continued to send messages claiming they had located his hideout and would apprehend him.

36. In a separate incident, in April 2024, the M23 rebel group targeted **a young woman human rights defender** in North Kivu Province whom they knew served as the local reporter for a civil society organization (CSO) and regularly shared information on security developments with UNJHRO. In September 2024, elements of the M23 group reportedly began sending her threatening text messages and visiting her residence, warning her to remain silent or risk being killed. In November 2024, following public outcry over killings attributed to the M23 in the area where she was based, elements of the group searched for her. She subsequently went into hiding.

37. During the reporting period, UNJHRO also documented that, the M23, in the context of its rapid territorial expansion in North Kivu Province, reportedly sought to suppress reporting on human rights abuses by systematically targeting civil society activists and non-governmental organizations working on human rights, and media outlets, allegedly pressuring them to comply or face the consequences. In one instance, a **young woman human rights defender** who had been sharing information on developments in her locality with UNJHRO since April 2024, was targeted by the M23 in June 2024, as the rebel group intensified its presence in her hometown. Elements of the M23 allegedly attempted to coerce her into promoting their ideology, which she reportedly resisted. In response, they reportedly issued threats against her and her family, explicitly referencing her cooperation with UNJHRO. Despite the threats, the woman reportedly continued her human rights work while maintaining a low profile. Nevertheless, the threats reportedly escalated, and M23 allegedly increased surveillance of her movements. At the end of November 2024, elements of the group reportedly attempted to abduct her during a social gathering. She reportedly escaped with the assistance of neighbours and fled to another area, where she has been in hiding since.

38. A **woman human rights defender**, who had briefed the Security Council on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and highlighted the pervasive rape and other forms of sexual violence and violations committed by the M23 and urged the Security Council to take action to end atrocities committed against populations in Eastern DRC, was subsequently subjected to reprisals during the reporting period. One month after the briefing, her residence was forcibly entered into by armed M23 elements, who allegedly interrogated her family members and issued threats, stating that they “would deal with her big mouth” for accusing them and Rwanda at the United Nations.

39. In June 2024, **the vice-chair of a local civil society coordination structure and member of an NGO promoting the rights of women farmers**, and who served as a focal point for UNJHRO, was reportedly abducted from her residence by approximately 40 armed individuals identifying themselves as members of the “Wazalendo”, a loose coalition of various local armed groups. The armed individuals allegedly looted her residence, took her to an isolated location, and subjected her to severe physical assault. During her captivity, she was accused of sharing information with the United Nations and of leasing her land for the establishment of a MONUSCO base. After two days, some members of the armed group allegedly facilitated her escape.

40. In another instance, **a member of a human rights organization** and focal point for UNJHRO had been sharing information on the human rights situation in his area, where the Zaire and Coopérative pour le Développement du Congo (CODECO) armed groups have

reportedly carried out attacks targeting civilians on ethnic grounds. In June 2024, the human rights defender was allegedly assaulted at his residence by armed individuals believed to be affiliated with the Zaire armed group. They reportedly subjected him to severe physical violence. In July 2024, a local chief reportedly informed the human rights defender that members of CODECO had allegedly planned to kill him and advised him to leave his home for safety.

41. Since November 2024, a **woman human rights defender** reportedly began receiving death threats in connection with her activism and collaboration with MONUSCO. In early December 2024, she participated in a radio talk show discussing MONUSCO's role in stabilization efforts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. A few days later, a group of men claiming to be affiliated with the military intelligence allegedly visited her residence while she was away. They reportedly warned her relatives that they would return if she did not cease mobilizing women in her community in support of MONUSCO. In the following week, threats reportedly intensified, and individuals from an armed group allegedly attempted to abduct her on two separate occasions, while she was traveling. She reportedly managed to evade both attempts.

8. Egypt

42. According to information received by OHCHR, **Mr. Hossam Bahgat** was subjected to reprisals in connection to his human rights work and engagement with the United Nations and its human rights mechanisms, in his capacity as the executive director of **the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR)**, a human rights organization, including in relation to the fourth cycle of the Universal Periodic Review of Egypt held on 28 January 2025.

43. In the months and weeks leading up to Egypt's Universal Periodic Review, Mr. Bahgat met with OHCHR and representatives of Permanent Missions to the United Nations in Geneva, as well as diplomatic missions in Cairo and Brussels in connection to the UPR process.

44. On 20 November 2024, Mr. Bahgat was a panellist in the NGO-organized pre-session of the Universal Periodic Review of Egypt, where he presented an EIPR report. During the reporting period, EIPR submitted information to special procedure mandate holders as well as five reports to the UPR Summary of Stakeholders' information.¹⁶ This included one individual report published on 10 December 2024 on EIPR's website and four additional joint ones. All five were subsequently posted on the UPR website on 19 December 2024.

45. Mr. Bahgat planned to travel to Geneva on 28 January 2025 to attend the 48th Session of the UPR Working Group and continue his organization's active engagement with the UPR process. However, just nine days before the session, on 19 January 2025, he was reportedly summoned by the Supreme State Security Prosecution (SSSP), arrested, and formally charged in case No. 6 of 2025 with "aiding a terrorist organization", "financing a terrorist organization" (a charge punishable with the death penalty subject to commutation to life in prison), and "disseminating false information to undermine national security and spread terror among citizens". While under arrest, the SSSP prosecutor reportedly informed him that the investigation and charges were based on a report by the National Security Agency that allegedly "proved he had received instructions from elements abroad and foreign organizations to broadcast false reports, news and statements, for the purpose of weakening state institutions, undermining public peace, and sowing terror in the hearts of citizens," reportedly in connection with EIPR human rights publications and activities.

46. Reportedly, Mr. Bahgat was released on bail of 20,000 EGP, after which he travelled to Geneva to attend the UPR session of Egypt. The investigation remains open at the time of writing.

47. According to information received by OHCHR, the aforementioned case against Mr. Bahgat is the fourth over the past four years, and the fifth against EIPR based solely on

¹⁶ <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/upr/eg-stakeholders-info-s48>; OHCHR report with the Summary of stakeholders' submissions on Egypt included twelve references to EIPR individual or joint submissions (A/HRC/WG.6/48/EGY/3).

its human rights activism, including engagement with the United Nations. Since 2015, mandate holders have raised concerns, including publicly, over the arrest, filing of criminal charges for terrorism and national security related crimes, travel bans and assets freeze of EIPR staff in connection to their human rights work. Those targeted have included Mr. Hossam Bahgat¹⁷, three former directors of EIPR, Mr. Gasser Abdel Rakez, Mr. Karim Ennarrah and Mr. Mohamed Basheer,¹⁸ and another EIPR staff, Mr. Patrick Zaki, who was sentenced to three years in prison for an article he wrote on religious discrimination in Egypt. Mr Zaki was pardoned after spending nearly two years in prison¹⁹.

48. On 20 December 2024, mandate holders addressed allegations of continued harassment and transnational repression of **Ms. Basma Mostafa** in connection with her participation in an international advocacy program for human rights and her meetings with United Nations human rights mechanisms and OHCHR. Ms. Mostafa is an Egyptian investigative journalist and human rights defender who has been in exile since November 2020. (EGY 6/2024) The alleged harassment and transnational repression relate to acts by Egyptian State agents or agents apparently acting on behalf, or with the acquiescence, of Egyptian State authorities in Germany, Kenya, Lebanon, and Switzerland since 2020. (EGY 6/2024)

49. On 16 June 2024, in the context of Ms. Mostafa's participation in an international advocacy program for human rights defenders in Geneva and meetings with United Nations human rights mechanisms and OHCHR, an individual reportedly followed Ms. Mostafa to the hotel where she was staying. The following day, there was an attempt to hack her social media account by an unknown actor. On 18 June 2024, a man reportedly approached her, stating that he knew she was Egyptian and that he was a police officer who could arrest her on the spot. These incidents were reported to the Swiss authorities (EGY 6/2024).

50. Mandate holders raised concerns about the repeated and prolonged harassment, acts of intimidation, and cyberattack attempts against Ms. Mostafa, which appear to indicate that she is a victim of transnational repression in direct retribution for her work as a journalist and human rights defender and expressed deep concern that these acts may constitute acts of intimidation or reprisal for her cooperation with the United Nations and its mechanisms in the field of human rights. (EGY 6/2024) Mandate holders also expressed concerns about the arrest, detention, alleged enforced disappearance, and allegedly baseless charges brought against Ms. Mostafa, in direct connection with her work as a journalist and human rights defender, which ultimately forced her into exile (EGY 6/2024).

51. On 14 July 2025, the Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection to the present report noting that it respects the rule of law and the separation of powers and ensures compatibility of national legislation with its obligations under international law. It further stated that the Egyptian Public Prosecution is an independent judicial authority and that charges are made and law enforcement and judicial measures are undertaken based only on incontrovertible evidence. It also noted that it does not exercise its law enforcement jurisdiction except through the established legal channels either through Interpol or the execution of agreements on criminal or judicial cooperation, depending on each specific case.

9. Indonesia

52. On 26 March 2024, in its concluding observation on the second periodic report of Indonesia, the Human Rights Committee recommended that the State should conduct prompt, thorough and impartial investigations into all reports of harassment, intimidation and reprisals against human rights defenders, and ensure that perpetrators are brought to justice and, if convicted, punished with penalties commensurate with the seriousness of the offence, and that human rights defenders are able to carry out their work in a safe and enabling environment.²⁰

¹⁷ EGY 16/2015, EGY 6/2016, EGY 15/2020, EGY 2/2022.

¹⁸ EGY 15/2020, EGY 2/2022.

¹⁹ EGY 6/2020, EGY 10/2020, EGY 15/2020, EGY 2/2022.

²⁰ CCPR/C/IDN/CO/2, para. 33b.

53. On 7 October 2024, special procedure mandate holders addressed allegations of harassment and intimidation of indigenous West Papuan human rights defender **Ms. Lamberti Faan** following her participation in the 56th Session of the Human Rights Council in Geneva. Mandate holders expressed grave concern at the alleged intimidation and harassment by security forces against Ms. Faan in reprisal for her engagement with United Nations human rights mechanisms, to the extent that she had been forced to relocate for her safety (IDN 5/2024).

54. On 21 June 2024, Ms. Faan gave a statement at the 56th Session of the Human Rights Council about the situation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Maybrat Regency of West Papua, and the following day she returned to Jakarta. A video of her statement was shared on social media, and authorities in Maybrat reportedly started approaching IDPs in the area and asking for Ms. Faan and her relatives. Between 25 June and 15 July 2024, Ms. Faan's siblings were allegedly approached on different occasions by the Maybrat Police Chief, Maybrat Military Chief and an individual suspected to be an intelligence officer, seeking information about Ms. Faan, her whereabouts, her family and religion, occupation and residence, among others. On 15 July 2024, a close relative of Ms. Faan was reportedly approached by two men who showed him a video of her statement at the Human Rights Council and asked questions about her. The following day, drones were reportedly spotted flying over Ms. Faan's house in Sorong, Papua Barat Daya Province, where she had returned on 1 July. Because of these reported incidents, Ms. Faan relocated to a different town for safety purposes (IDN 5/2024).

55. On 18 December 2024, the Government responded²¹ to the mandate holders noting that the Police had not received information nor reports regarding allegations of intimidation against Ms. Faan by security forces. The reply added that claims of repeated telephone calls, surveillance using drones and visits by unidentified individuals were clarified with the Police, who confirmed that no such incidents had occurred.

56. In a separate incident, and according to information received by OHCHR, a **woman human rights defender** was under surveillance and interrogated in connection to her advocacy with the United Nations during the reporting period. Names and additional details are withheld due to fear of further reprisals.

10. Iran (Islamic Republic of)

57. According to information received by OHCHR, in August 2024, **Mr. Mohammad Seifzadeh** was summoned to Evin Prison in Tehran to begin serving a one-year prison sentence following his conviction, for co-signing a joint letter with 45 Iranian activists, urging the United Nations Secretary-General to condemn executions in Iran. The letter was published on 10 December 2022 amidst nation-wide protests in Iran. Mr. Seifzadeh presented himself at prison, was detained, and then released shortly thereafter, reportedly on bail.

58. Mohammad Seifzadeh, is a 75 year-old Iranian human rights lawyer and co-founder of the Defenders of Human Rights Center, an Iranian human rights organization established in 2002 at the initiative of Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Shirin Ebadi.

59. Mr. Seifzadeh was reportedly sentenced to one year of imprisonment on charges of "propaganda against the state" and "publishing falsehoods" by Branch 29 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court in May 2023, for co-signing the joint letter. In July 2023, Branch 36 of the Tehran Court of Appeal upheld the sentence. Reportedly, Mr. Seifzadeh refused to attend both the trial and the appeal hearing in protest, asserting that he did not recognize the legitimacy of revolutionary courts in Iran.

60. According to information received by OHCHR, over the years, Mr. Seifzadeh has faced repeated harassment, arrests, and detention for his human rights work and activism. In 2010, he was convicted on national security charges, sentenced to 9 years of imprisonment and prohibited from practicing law for 10 years. These charges were allegedly linked to his

²¹ See Government reply at <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=38816>.

co-founding the Defenders of Human Rights Center. His health and heart condition deteriorated while in prison, including in the context of reportedly inadequate medical care, and he reportedly suffered several strokes while in prison. Reportedly, the execution of his sentence remains suspended due to his advanced age and health condition and according to information received by OHCHR, he has thus far refused to be granted any amnesty asserting he has not committed a crime.

61. On 19 December 2024, the General Assembly adopted resolution 79/183 on the situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran in which it called upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to end reprisals against human rights defenders, including women human rights defenders, the families of protesters, journalists and other media workers covering protests, lawyers who represent or seek to represent protesters, and those who cooperate or attempt to cooperate with the United Nations human rights mechanisms. The resolution also -emphasized the importance of prompt, independent, impartial, effective and transparent investigations into all instances of human rights violations and of holding those responsible to account (A/RES/79/183, para 17).

62. In its report to the Human Rights Council, the Fact-Finding Mission on Iran expressed gratitude to victims, witnesses and civil society organizations for providing information, despite ever increasing security risks for them and their families, including well-founded fears of reprisals for cooperating with the mission (A/HRC/58/63, para 4).

63. On 16 July 2025, the Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection to the present report noting that Mr. Seifzadeh had been granted a general amnesty on 14 October 2024, resulting in his release from prison and allowing him to freely pursue medical care.

11. Iraq

64. According to information received by OHCHR, on 3 June 2024, three days after the adoption of Security Council resolution 2732 (2024) on the cessation of UNAMI operations by 31 December 2025, the Director General of the Department of Non-Governmental Organizations within the Secretariat of the Iraqi Council of Ministers chaired a meeting of representatives of civil society to explain the implications of the Security Council's resolution for civil society. The meeting was held under the auspices of the Prime Minister. A statement summarizing the meeting was posted on the Council of Minister's web page and subsequently removed.²²

65. According to the statement, during the meeting, the Prime Minister's Adviser on Political Affairs reassured participants of the authorities' continuing support to civil society organizations following the Security Council's resolution, including by "providing protection to the organizations and their workers from any threat or attempt to harm them". The statement noted that civil society representatives present at the meeting were also warned that they must "preserve the customs and traditions of Iraqi society and take into account that Iraq is an Arab country that does not allow the introduction of strange and abnormal ideas into our society."

66. During the reporting period, OHCHR documented incidents of intimidation against civil society actors (male and female) for their cooperation with the United Nations, including United Nations human rights mechanisms. Names and details of those concerned are withheld due to fear of further reprisals.

12. Israel

67. On 4 September 2024, **Ms. Yuli Novak**, the Director of the Israeli non-governmental organisation B'Tselem, briefed the Security Council on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question, upon the invitation of the Presidency of the Security

²² The page has since been removed and is no longer available online. A copy of its content is available with OHCHR.

Council (Slovenia).²³ In connection with her statement to the Security Council, the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations in New York shared three posts on social media²⁴ and spoke on several programs broadcast on national Israeli television,²⁵ where he stated that Ms. Novak had “spread lies,” “incited against the State of Israel and the Israel Defense Forces, and “slander[ed].” In his post of 6 September 2024, in response to expressions of concern for the well-being of Ms. Novak, the Permanent Representative stated that “there was no concern that she would be arrested”.²⁶

68. The posts were widely re-posted by other social media users, with dozens sharing intimidatory messages or calling for the revocation of Ms. Novak’s citizenship. Separately, on at least one occasion, a social media user re-posted content from another source regarding Ms. Novak’s intervention at the Security Council and added a call for serious violence, including sexual violence, against her.²⁷

69. On 5 September 2024, Member of Knesset Ms. Tally Gotliv sent an open letter to the Israeli Police Commissioner demanding an investigation into Ms. Novak on the suspected crime of ‘assistance to the enemy in time of war’.²⁸ The letter stated that Ms. Novak had appeared before the Security Council and “dared attack the State of Israel.”²⁹ The charge of assisting the enemy in time of war, under Section 99 of the Penal Code of Israel 5737-1977, as referenced by the Member of the Knesset in her letter, can carry the death penalty or a life sentence. At the time of writing, OHCHR was not aware of any action taken by the Police Commissioner to follow up on the letter from Ms. Gotliv.

70. On 9 September 2024, Member and Deputy Speaker of the Knesset, Mr. Nissim Vaturi, wrote an open letter to the Minister of Interior, drawing attention to Ms. Novak’s intervention before the United Nations and calling for her citizenship to be revoked, on the basis of the Israeli Citizenship Law, which allows for such a measure in extreme cases of ‘breach of allegiance’ to the State. At the time of writing, OHCHR was not aware of any action taken by the Minister of Interior in response to the letter.

71. According to information received by OHCHR, at least four Palestinian individuals, **allegedly victims and/or witnesses of violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law**, such as Palestinians released from Israeli detention both in the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem and Palestinians in Gaza, who had initially agreed to be interviewed by OHCHR, later reversed this decision for fear of reprisals from Israeli authorities. Several released detainees told OHCHR that, prior to their release, Israeli forces had warned them not to give interviews about their detention to journalists and human rights organisations, including the United Nations.

13. Mexico

72. During the reporting period, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Mexico documented threats by unknown individual(s) against **Ms. Maria Isabel Cruz Bernal**, a human rights defender, founder and President of the association Sabuesos Guerreras A.C., in connection to her participation in the first World Congress on Enforced Disappearances held in Geneva on 15 and 16 January 2025. The association

²³ S/PV.9717 pp. 6-7; <https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1k/k1k31jmc5g>; Note: Allegations of intimidation and reprisals in connection the engagement by a former director of B’Tselem with the Security Council were included in the 2017 and 2019 reports of the Secretary-General and also addressed by special procedure mandate holders. (A/HRC/36/31, para. 38 and Annex I, para. 43, A/HRC/42/30, Annex II, paras 63-64).

²⁴ <https://x.com/dannydanon/status/1831374569057218722>;
<https://x.com/dannydanon/status/1831434455203844292?s=46>;
<https://x.com/dannydanon/status/1831987272528412854>.

²⁵ See for example 5 September National Television programme on Kan 11 TV. A transcript of the interview in Hebrew and English is available with OHCHR.

²⁶ <https://x.com/dannydanon/status/1831987272528412854>.

²⁷ The post has since been removed and is no longer available online A copy of a screenshot and its content is available with OHCHR.

²⁸ <https://x.com/TallyGotliv/status/1831667346248814981>.

²⁹ Ibid.

Sabuesos Guerreras A.C. brings together family members involved in the search for and investigation of disappeared persons in the state of Sinaloa in Mexico.

73. The Congress was organized by the United Nations Committee on Enforced Disappearances (CED), the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (WGEID), OHCHR, and the Convention against Enforced Disappearances Initiative (CEDI).

74. On 13 January 2025, on the margins of the Congress, Ms. Cruz Bernal, together with other civil society representatives, met with the Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights.³⁰ On 16 January 2025, she participated as a panellist in the roundtable discussion on the impact of enforced disappearance on women. Her engagement in these events, along with her advocacy during the Congress – particularly her calls to end impunity for enforced disappearance – were covered by local media outlets in the state of Sinaloa.³¹

75. According to information received by OHCHR, during the two days of the Congress, Ms. Cruz Bernal received anonymous threats via text messages, allegedly in connection to her participation in the Congress. The messages reportedly demanded that she and her association “stop making noise” about disappearances and warned them to take the threats seriously, stating that otherwise they “could be next”.

76. Upon her return from Geneva, Ms. Cruz Bernal filed a complaint with the Sinaloa State Attorney General’s Office. During the same week, a vehicle was reportedly observed following her relative’s car. The vehicle subsequently stopped in front of their residence, in what appeared to be an act of surveillance. Pursuant to these incidents, Ms. Cruz Bernal has insisted that the protection measures granted by the State are insufficient and has had to seek alternatives to ensure her safety. OHCHR is closely monitoring the situation of Ms. Cruz Bernal and is in contact with the relevant authorities.

77. On 14 July 2025, the Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection to the present report informing that the National Protection Mechanism for Human Rights Defenders and Journalists followed up on the allegations of reprisals against Ms. Cruz, updated the risk assessment, and adopted protective measures.

14. Myanmar

78. During the reporting period, OHCHR conducted 126 consultations with 391 people in the context of its human rights work, including the documentation and research required for the Office’s reports to the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly. Among those consulted were 176 women, 16 youth groups, 27 ethnic and minority religious groups, and representatives of professional categories such as union members, lawyers, and doctors. These included both victims and witnesses inside the country and those who had fled the country. The vast majority of the interlocutors with whom OHCHR interacted agreed to do so only under condition of confidentiality and anonymity, and with no public disclosure of personally identifying information or details. This consistent request for anonymity indicates fear of possible reprisals, including for engagement with OHCHR.

79. The OHCHR’s 2024 report to the Human Rights Council documented widespread human rights violations, including killings, arbitrary arrest and detention, torture and ill-treatment, deaths in custody, sexual violence, and forced recruitment. Continued exposure to violence and fear has had a devastating impact on the mental health and well-being of victims and communities in Myanmar (A/HRC/57/56, paras 8, 22, 30-47, 54, and 60).

80. In July and December 2024, the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly adopted resolutions calling for full, unrestricted and unmonitored access for all United Nations mandate holders and human rights mechanisms, and to ensure that individuals can cooperate without hindrance with all United Nations mandate holders and human rights mechanisms, without fear of reprisals, intimidation or attack. (A/HRC/RES/56/1, para 17 and A/RES/79/182, para 14).

³⁰ <https://x.com/NadaNashif/status/1878811611387019580>.

³¹ See for example: <https://oem.com.mx/elsoldesinaloa/local/presidenta-de-sabuesos-guerreras-denuncia-impunidad-y-retrasos-en-identificacion-de-cuerpos-en-congreso-mundial-21158115>.

15. Nicaragua

81. During the reporting period, OHCHR continued to receive requests from **victims and other sources** to anonymize information published about their cases, due to fears of reprisals against themselves or their relatives, whether inside the country or in exile. OHCHR has also documented that at least **62 individuals** declined to engage in any form—including under conditions of confidentiality (disclosure of information without revealing data that could identify them)—with United Nations human rights mechanisms, citing the same reason. Among them were journalists, members of outlawed political parties, representatives of Indigenous Peoples affected by the illegal sale of collective territories, and former government officials. Moreover, in two cases documented by OHCHR, two women left Nicaragua permanently, in order to be able to continue to engage with international human rights mechanisms. Names and details of those concerned are withheld for fear of further reprisals.

82. OHCHR³² and the Group of Human Rights experts on Nicaragua (GHREN)³³ raised concerns about severe restrictions by the Nicaraguan government on civil society, the further erosion of civic space and the adoption of regressive constitutional and legislative reforms. Specifically, OHCHR and GHREN addressed **the forced dissolution of some 5,437 civil society organizations (CSOs) since 2018**, including approximately 1,939 since March 2024. According to GHREN, about 80% of the non-profit organizations registered in 2017 have since disappeared (A/HRC/58/26, para 68). Reportedly, during the period under review, 1,898 CSOs were forcibly dissolved. These developments have given rise to serious concerns that such restrictive measures and legislative developments further undermine the ability of civil society to operate effectively and to engage with the United Nations.

83. Furthermore, the National Assembly adopted legislative amendments, requiring all CSOs to operate exclusively through formal “partnership alliances” with state institutions, and to submit their programs and projects to the General Directorate of Registration and Control of CSOs.³⁴ These measures have reportedly reinforced state control over civil society’s project implementation and undermined their independence.

84. On 27 February 2025, the Government announced its disengagement from the Human Rights Council and all its subsidiary mechanisms, including the Universal Periodic Review. In February 2025, it also withdrew from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the ILO, and the International Organization of Migration (IOM) and ordered the closure of FAO offices in Managua. These actions have significantly reduced the ability of the Nicaraguan people to collaborate with the United Nations system, both within the country and abroad.

85. Recent **amendments to the Penal Code and cybercrime legislation**, which may broaden the criminalization of dissent,³⁵ and **include provisions targeting publications abroad and online**, have reportedly contributed to an increasing climate of fear and retaliation. These developments have discouraged individuals and organizations from sharing information that could be perceived as critical of the government—whether publicly or with relevant stakeholders, including the United Nations.

³² <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2024/08/comment-un-human-rights-office-spokesperson-liz-throssell-further>, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2024/12/deputy-high-commissioner-updates-human-rights-situation-nicaragua>, A/HRC/57/20, para 18, 21, 30, 80, 84.

³³ A/HRC/58/26, paras 3, 15, 65-68, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2024/09/oral-update-group-human-rights-experts-nicaragua>.

³⁴ Law 1212 of Reforms and Amendments to Law No. 1115, General Law on the Regulation and Control of Non-Profit Organizations; Law No. 1040, Law on the Regulation of Foreign Agents; and Reforms and Repeals to Law No. 822, Law on Tax Concertation, Nicaraguan Official Gazette N. 155, 22 August 2024, pages 2-3, available at: <http://legislacion.asamblea.gob.ni/gacetas/2024/8/g155.pdf> (Last Consultation April 2025).

³⁵ Law 1219 of Reforms and Amendments to Law No. 1042, Special Law on Cybercrimes, Nicaraguan Official Gazette N.170, 12 September 2024, pages 2-4, available at <https://www.uaf.gob.ni/images/Pdf/Leyes/Ley-No.-1219-Ley-de-Reformas-y-Adiciones-a-la-Ley-No.-1042-Ley-Especial-de-Ciberdelitos.pdf> (Last Consultation April 2025).

16. Pakistan

86. On 7 October 2024, special procedure mandate holders addressed allegations of arbitrary travel restrictions against human rights defender Ms. **Sammi Deen Baloch**, that prevented her engagement with the Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances and her participation in the 57th session of the Human Rights Council. Ms. Baloch is the General Secretary of the Voice for Baloch Missing Persons, a non-governmental organization that represents families of victims of enforced disappearance in Balochistan and has a history of engagement with the United Nations on this issue (PAK 4/2024).

87. Ms. Baloch had planned to travel to Geneva to meet with United Nations human rights experts in the context of the 134th session of the Working Group, scheduled from 16 to 25 September 2024 during 57th session of the Human Rights Council. On 8 September 2024, when presenting her passport to immigration officials at Karachi Airport, Ms. Baloch was reportedly told that her name had been put on an 'Exit Control List'. Her passport was reportedly confiscated for at least four hours, and when it was returned, it contained an exit control stamp. Reportedly, Ms. Baloch decided not to attempt travelling again out of fear that her passport could be confiscated permanently (UA PAK 4/2024).

88. Mandate holders expressed concerns at the alleged arbitrary travel restrictions imposed against Ms. Baloch that prevented her engagement with the Working Group, which had been reported as an act of intimidation and reprisal for her international advocacy, including her engagement with the United Nations human rights mechanisms on the issue of enforced disappearances in Balochistan. They further noted that the travel prohibition against Ms. Sammi Deen Baloch creates a chilling effect in society, whereby individuals working for the rights of victims of human rights violations are dissuaded from doing so out of fear of reprisals.

89. On 26 March 2025, mandate holders issued a press release³⁶ mentioning that two days earlier, Ms. Sammi Deen Baloch had been arrested alongside other human rights defenders by the Karachi Police as they protested police violence against the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC), a network advocating for the rights of the minority Baloch community. Her detention was allegedly ordered for 30 days under the Sindh Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance (MPO). Mandate holders called for the immediate release of Ms. Saami Deen Baloch and other activists, including human rights defender **Ms. Mahrang Baloch**, leader of BYC. In a 26 March press release replying to the statement of mandate holders, the government alleged that "these elements are not mere protesters but active participants in a broader campaign of lawlessness and violence (...), operating in collusion with terrorists."³⁷

90. On 29 April 2025, mandate holders publicly stated that Pakistan appears to conflate legitimate human and minority rights advocacy and public demonstrations with terrorism, threatening freedoms of expression, assembly, and association.³⁸ They expressed concern at the detention of **BYC** leaders and their supporters and actions against their family members and lawyers, noting these may amount to reprisals for their interaction with United Nations mechanisms.³⁹

91. During the reporting period, mandate holders had also addressed other allegations concerning Ms. Sammi Deen Baloch, Ms. Marangh Baloch and BYC (PAK 6-2024, PAK 1/2025). Specifically, mandate holders raised concerns over the alleged use of force against peaceful demonstrations organised by the BYC, the misuse of certain administrative and legal counter-terrorism measures against Baloch activists and organizations, including the alleged designation of activists and individuals associated with BYC as "proscribed

³⁶ <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/03/pakistan-un-experts-demand-release-baloch-human-rights-defenders-and-end>.

³⁷ [Spokesperson's Response to Questions about Statement by UN Human Rights Experts](#).

³⁸ <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/04/un-experts-urge-pakistan-address-human-rights-violations-balochistan>.

³⁹ <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/04/un-experts-urge-pakistan-address-human-rights-violations-balochistan>.

persons,” as well as allegations of internet blackouts in Balochistan in response to the activities of BYC activists (PAK 1/2025).

92. According to information received by OHCHR, Ms. Sammi Deen Baloch was released from detention on 1 April 2025 without charges. At the time of writing, Ms. Mahrang Baloch remained in detention at Huda Prison under Section 3 of the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance. She is reportedly facing other charges including sedition, murder and terrorism related charges.

93. On 23 July 2025, the Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection to the present report, stating that the allegation of intimidation and reprisals was unfounded. It further asserted that the actions of the relevant authorities were consistent with the law and Pakistan’s obligations under international human rights law, and that domestic remedies remained available and were being applied. The Government also reaffirmed its commitment to freedom of movement and noted that international human rights law permitted restrictions necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others.

17. Peru

94. During the reporting period, according to information received by OHCHR, **Mr. Julio César Rimac Damián**, an environmental lawyer and community leader, was the target of an act of intimidation to deter his (further) cooperation with the United Nations on human rights.

95. Reportedly, on 11 September 2024, while returning home in the afternoon, Mr. Rimac was intercepted by an unmarked vehicle driven by armed individuals. Two men reportedly exited the vehicle and threatened him, warning that they would harm him and his family if he continued to speak publicly about the environmental contamination caused by the Antamina mining company.

96. Mr. Rimac had planned to travel to Geneva on 12 September 2024 to engage with special procedures, specifically to raise concerns with the Special Rapporteur on the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation about water pollution linked to Antamina’s mining activities. That same night, following the threats, he travelled to Lima with the intent to continue his journey, but ultimately cancelled his United Nations-related mission out of concern for the safety of his wife and young daughter.

97. As a result of the threats, Mr. Rimac withdrew from his planned cooperation with the United Nations. Mr. Rimac and his family sought temporary refuge and remained away from their home for several days. He held a virtual meeting with staff supporting the Special Rapporteur and with the OHCHR office in Peru.

98. On 15 April 2025, **Law No. 32301, entitled “Law Amending the Law on the Creation of the Peruvian Agency for International Cooperation,”** was published in the Official Gazette of Peru and entered into force the following day.⁴⁰ The law amends Law No. 27692, which governs the Peruvian Agency for International Cooperation (APCI).

99. During the reporting period, OHCHR⁴¹ and special procedure mandate holders⁴² raised concerns about the law. Mandate holders noted that the law would prevent organisations, including human rights defenders, from advancing national and international advocacy actions⁴³ (OL PER 4/2024). The law could also negatively impact the ability of civil society to engage with international human rights mechanisms, including the United Nations.

⁴⁰ Reportedly, by 14 July 2025 the regulations of the law will have been developed and adopted enabling its application.

⁴¹ <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/04/peru-impact-international-cooperation-law-ngos>

⁴² <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/04/approval-amendments-apci-law-seriously-affects-freedom-association-peru-un>.

⁴³ <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/04/approval-amendments-apci-law-seriously-affects-freedom-association-peru-un>.

100. Specifically, Article 21(c) of the law classifies as a “very serious offence” the improper use of international cooperation funds, including their use “to advice, assist, or finance, in any form or manner, administrative, judicial or other types of actions in national or international instances against the Peruvian State.” Such “serious” and “very serious” infractions, are subject to penalties, including fines, of up to USD 700,000, suspension of activities, and cancellation of the organization’s legal registration, (Article 22).

101. Some civil society organizations that receive international cooperation funds have expressed serious concern about potential liability under the law for their engagement with United Nations human rights mechanisms and fear it could be used against those that provide legal representation to victims of human rights violations and/or submit cases and communications to United Nations international human rights mechanisms. Reportedly, the legislation could lead to reprisals and self-censorship and may deter individuals and organizations from seeking or continuing cooperation with the United Nations in cases involving human rights violations or abuses.

102. According to information received by OHCHR, the broadly defined infractions, and broad scope of the law create legal uncertainty and may enable discretionary application. The law also imposes additional administrative requirements on organizations receiving international cooperation funds. All such organizations must register with APCI, disclose plans, programs, and financial sources and obtain prior approval before implementing international cooperation-funded activities (Article 4.u, Article 5). APCI may also cancel an organization’s registration in cases of repeated “very serious infractions” (Article 22) and is authorized to report suspected misuses of funds to the Public Prosecutor’s Office, potentially triggering criminal investigations against organizations (Article 21).

103. On 30 July 2025, the Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection to the present report informing that the Intersectoral Mechanism for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders had followed up on the allegations of reprisals against Mr. Rimac Damián. The Mechanism had documented the risks and taken the necessary actions to assess appropriate measures. The Government also noted that the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights is responsible for implementing the Mechanism through its General Directorate of Human Rights.

104. With regard to Law No. 32301, which amends the law creating the Peruvian Agency for International Cooperation, the Government affirmed that State bodies are primarily responsible for ensuring the compatibility of domestic legislation with the Constitution and Peru’s international human rights obligations. It also referred to the legal mechanisms available to challenge any law or act that may contravene these obligations and emphasized that the State bears responsibility for safeguarding fundamental rights and freedoms and does not intend to use domestic law to justify non-compliance with international obligations.

18. Russian Federation

105. During the reporting period, OHCHR documented four allegations of intimidation and reprisals for cooperation with the United Nations as described below.

106. On 30 July 2024, Special Procedures mandate holders addressed allegations concerning the arrest, ill-treatment and pre-trial detention of **Mr. Alexey Sokolov**, reportedly in connection with his human rights work as well as reprisals for cooperation with the United Nations, in relation to a police search of his residence and seizure of private documents. Mr. Sokolov is a human rights defender, and founder of the NGO “Pravovaya Osnava,” addressing human rights violations in detention in Russia. (AL RUS 5/2024)

107. On 5 July 2024, Mr. Sokolov was arrested and detained on charges of “repeated demonstration of extremist symbols,” under part 1 of Article 282.4, of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, which carry a sentence of up to four years imprisonment. Earlier the same day, law enforcement officials had reportedly conducted a search of his apartment and seized various documents, including powers of attorney, authorizing Mr. Sokolov to represent alleged victims of ill-treatment before United Nations treaty bodies. Reportedly, photographs of these documents were later published on a pro-government channel, which

allegedly claimed that Mr. Sokolov was part of a foreign intelligence network. (AL RUS 5/2024)

108. On 6 July 2024, the Leninskiy District Court of Yekaterinburg authorized the administrative detention of Mr. Sokolov, and, two days later, ordered his pre-trial detention until 1 September 2024. The investigation found that Mr. Sokolov had posted materials which were described as discrediting the penitentiary system, and that he had publicly displayed from October to December 2023 a social media logo, which is prohibited.. Mr. Sokolov had reportedly been the first to disclose a video showing the severe beating of a detainee, which was reportedly then publicly circulated (AL RUS 5/2024).

109. On 26 July 2024, mandate holders raised concerns that Mr. Sokolov had been subjected to reprisals for cooperation with the United Nations. They highlighted the potential deterrent effect this could have on others who may want to engage with United Nations human rights mechanisms and called on the authorities to end intimidation and reprisals against those who seek to cooperate with United Nations human rights bodies and mechanisms.⁴⁴

110. On 8 January 2025, mandate holders welcomed the 4 January 2025 release of Mr. Sokolov from pre-trial detention. They emphasized that Mr. Sokolov should not have been deprived of his liberty in the first place and urged that all charges against him be dropped.⁴⁵

111. In another instance, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Russian Federation reported to the Human Rights Council that the designation of the **International Committee of Indigenous Peoples of Russia** as “extremist” may constitute a possible reprisal for its cooperation with the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and other human rights mechanisms (A/HRC/57/59 para 134-135). She further reported that reprisals were used as another way to attack civil society and that many Russian civil society members had sought anonymity when engaging with her, citing fear of intimidation and reprisals from the Government (A/HRC/57/59, para 131).

112. During the reporting period, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention reported having received allegations of reprisals and/or intimidation against **Mr. Alexey Gorinov**, emphasizing that any such acts were absolutely unacceptable and calling for an immediate end to them (A/HRC/57/44 para 30). Following the adoption by the Working Group of a decision on 16 November 2022 that found his detention to be arbitrary (A/HRC/WGAD/2022/78), the authorities reportedly increased punitive measures against Mr. Gorinov. In February 2023, Mr. Gorinov had been subjected to a special administrative procedure for people assessed to be “prone to escaping”, pursuant to which he had to report to and be checked by prison guards every two hours and admit that he was “prone to escaping”, including at night. Additionally, Mr. Gorinov was placed in isolation from 7 September to 25 October 2023. At the end of September 2023, the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for the Vladimir region initiated a second criminal case against Mr. Gorinov on charges related to terrorism (A/HRC/57/44 para 30).

113. Reportedly, Mr. Gorinov is being held in the Krayevoy Tuberculosis Hospital in Balnaul, Altai Krai, where he is undergoing medical examinations due to continued deterioration of his health.

114. According to information received by OHCHR in another instance, during the reporting period, invitations extended to **a civil society representative from the Russian Federation** to participate in two United Nations events in the Asia Pacific region were reportedly withdrawn following the alleged involvement of a State actor from the Russian Federation. This followed incidents in connection with the representative’s previous role and participation in a previous regional United Nations event. Names and details of those concerned are withheld due to fear of reprisals for their cooperation with the United Nations.

115. In October 2024, the Human Rights Council adopted resolution 57/20 on the situation of human rights in the Russian Federation, which expressed concern that legislative measures were being used by the authorities against Russian civil society, human rights defenders and

⁴⁴ <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/07/russia-must-free-human-rights-defender-alexey-sokolov-arrested-posting>. See also, A/HRC/57/59, para 135.

⁴⁵ <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2025/01/russia-must-drop-charges-against-human-rights-defender-alexey>.

Indigenous Peoples to penalize and criminalize cooperation with international organizations, including as intimidation and reprisal for cooperation with the United Nations human rights mechanisms (A/HRC/RES/57/20).

116. On 17 July 2025, the Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection to the present report, asserting that, with regard to the Russian Federation, the report does not accurately reflect the facts and the allegations should not be included. Specific allegations included in the report were not otherwise addressed. The Government provided additional information unrelated to allegations of intimidation and reprisals for cooperation with the United Nations.

19. Sri Lanka

117. During the reporting period, OHCHR documented harassment and intimidation by state security officials against five individuals (male and female) due to their engagement with United Nations human rights bodies and mechanisms. All five individuals are from the northern and eastern regions of the country. Names and details of those concerned are withheld due to fear of further reprisals. OHCHR is following the situation of those concerned.

118. Three of the five individuals concerned collaborated with OHCHR on a public report. Following the release of the report, state security officials reportedly summoned and interrogated the individuals involved, as well as their family members, questioning their negative portrayal of the country to the international community and inquiring who the sources behind the report were. The other two individuals were questioned by officials of the Counter-Terrorism Investigation Division about their previous visits to Geneva and participation in the Human Rights Council, and/or activities of their organization.

119. In his 2024 report presented to the Human Rights Council pursuant to resolution 51/1, the High Commissioner for Human Rights reported having received six cases of intimidation, surveillance, and reprisals against family members of the disappeared engaging with the United Nations or international actors, including members of the diplomatic community (A/HRC/57/19 para 22). The report noted that the female victims had reportedly received late-night calls from individuals claiming to be from the Criminal Investigations Department or the Terrorism Investigation Division, who had questioned them about their participation in protests and visits to Colombo or Geneva, including funding for the visits and whom they had met (A/HRC/57/19 para 22).

120. Since March 2024, the Committee on Enforced Disappearances' rapporteur on reprisals received one allegation related to cooperation with the Committee in the context of an urgent action request that had been closed after the disappeared person had been located in Sri Lanka. At the time of writing, the State party had not replied to the allegation. In view of the situation and the inability to further undertake follow-up on the case in the context of the Urgent Action procedure, the rapporteur on reprisals brought the case to the attention of the State party, expressing the Committee's concern that the family's submission to the Committee, along with the other activities they had undertaken to search for their loved one, may have contributed to the alleged acts of intimidation and reprisals, including by State officials.

121. The Committee requested the State party to adopt protection measures in favour of the alleged victims, ensuring differential approaches that take into account their specific needs.

20. Sudan

122. During the reporting period, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Sudan documented four incidents of intimidation and reprisals against Sudanese women human rights defenders and one organization in connection with their cooperation with the United Nations. Names and details of those concerned are withheld due to fear of further reprisals.

123. According to information received by OHCHR, in two different incidents, **two women human rights defenders** who publicly cooperated with the United Nations faced intimidation and reprisals, following their respective engagements with the United Nations. Both reported fear of reprisals against family members. One of them reportedly limited her public engagement and visibility to mitigate risks.

124. In a different case, an **organization actively advocating for women's rights** in the context of the ongoing conflict was reportedly subjected to online harassment and surveillance following its public intervention at a high-level United Nations meeting. These acts of reprisals were allegedly carried out both by both State and non-State actors.

125. In a separate case, a **woman human rights defender** advocating for the rights of survivors of sexual and gender-based violence, including conflict-related sexual violence in Sudan, declined invitations to participate in a United Nations public forum on three consecutive occasions. Her decision was reportedly based on fear of reprisals against herself and her team should she engage publicly with the United Nations. There are serious concerns that public engagement, including with the United Nations, on alleged violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law committed by parties to the conflict in Sudan, could lead to accusations of collaboration by each of the parties to the conflict. Such accusations have resulted in serious human rights violations and abuses as documented by OHCHR during the reporting period, including arbitrary detention, torture, and ill-treatment as well as extrajudicial killings.⁴⁶

21. Thailand

126. During the reporting period, OHCHR received two allegations of reprisals for cooperation with the United Nations.

127. In the first instance, according to information received by OHCHR, woman human rights defender **Ms. Pimsiri Petchnamrob** is banned from traveling outside Thailand, allegedly to prevent her from her international advocacy on human rights, including her participation in the Human Rights Council.

128. Ms. Petchnamrob has not been able to travel abroad since 25 November 2021, after being charged with ten criminal offences and released on bail the same day under several conditions, including a restriction on international travel without prior court approval. Ms. Petchnamrob faced 10 different criminal charges, including lèse-majesté and sedition under Section 112 and 116 of the Criminal Code. Her case is currently pending a decision in court.

129. Ms. Petchnamrob's charges and associated travel restrictions are reportedly connected to a speech she delivered at a rally in November 2020, during which she cited the then Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression's analysis of the lèse-majesté laws.⁴⁷ This reference was allegedly presented by the public prosecutor as one of the two principal grounds for the charges brought against her.

130. Ms. Petchnamrob had previously delivered public statements to the Council in 2016 and 2018,⁴⁸ which reportedly drew the attention of the Thai authorities to her activism. In August 2021, a confidential document labelled "Top Secret" was leaked by local media, reporting that Thai immigration authorities were allegedly monitoring 183 individuals, including Ms. Petchnamrob.

131. Due to her travel restrictions, on 13 February 2023 and again on 24 February 2023 with additional information supporting her application, Ms. Petchnamrob applied for court

⁴⁶ A/HRC/58/29, para 91; <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/sudan/report-ohchr-sudan-country-office-detention-facilities-khartoum.pdf>; <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/05/horrors-sudan-know-no-bounds-warns-turk-urging-end-conflict>; <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/04/sudan-un-human-rights-chief-appalled-widespread-extrajudicial-killings>.

⁴⁷ Thailand: UN rights expert concerned by the continued use of lèse-majesté prosecutions | OHCHR.

⁴⁸ <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2017/02/thailand-un-rights-expert-concerned-continued-use-lèse-majesté-prosecutions>.

permission to attend the Human Rights Council session in Geneva as a representative of ARTICLE 19. Both applications were rejected by the Court of First Instance.. Her appeal of 9 March 2023 was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

132. On 12 March 2024, Ms. Petchnamrob applied again for court permission to travel, this time to the United States for an in-person programme, which the court denied, citing the possibility of online participation. As of 9 April 2024, she had filed another request for permission to attend the same programme.

133. Between 2022 and 2024, several individuals charged under Section 112 were granted court permission to travel abroad for personal or academic purposes. However, as of the time of writing, Ms. Petchnamrob's applications have been consistently denied.

134. The lack of court approval has restricted Ms. Petchnamrob's ability to engage in international advocacy on human rights, including with the United Nations. Concerns have been reported that Ms. Petchnamrob is being targeted in connection with her public advocacy on human rights, including with the United Nations, and that ongoing restrictions may deter further participation in human rights forums such as the Human Rights Council.

135. In the second instance, on 14 June 2024, mandate holders addressed allegations concerning efforts by the Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to secure the involuntary or forced repatriation of Vietnamese Montagnards from the Kingdom of Thailand, and Thailand's possible cooperation in such efforts, with specific reference to **Mr. Y Quynh Bdap**, the co-founder of **Montagnards Stand for Justice (MSFJ)** and a refugee recognized by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) since 2019, who is in the process of resettlement to a third country (THA 6/2024) (See Annex I section on Viet Nam).⁴⁹

136. On 14 March 2024, the Thai police reportedly accompanied a delegation of several Vietnamese public security police to neighbourhoods with large concentrations of Montagnard refugees in Nonthaburi and Nakhon Pathom Provinces. The Vietnamese delegation asked about the location of the six Montagnards convicted in absentia on 20 January 2024. In that trial, 100 defendants were convicted by a 'mobile court' in Viet Nam in relation to a violent attack on Vietnamese police stations that took place on 11 June 2023 in Dak Lak Province, in the Central Highlands of Viet Nam. They also showed arrest warrants and photographs of those individuals and declared that they would arrest 100 other Montagnard activists. Just prior to the visit to Thailand, on 13 March 2024, Viet Nam's Minister for Public Security met with the Thai Government to propose a bilateral extradition agreement. (THA 6/2024).

137. Mandate holders expressed concerns that the Vietnamese authorities may be exchanging information with the Government of Thailand regarding some of the Montagnards, including those recognized as refugees, and emphasized the obligation of Thailand not to return any individual to a country where there is a well-founded fear of persecution or substantial grounds for believing that the person would be at risk of irreparable harm on return on account of serious human rights violations (the obligation of non-refoulement). Mandate holders expressed particular concern about Mr. Y Quynh Bdap, one of the six convicted in absentia, who has always proclaimed he is innocent of the abovementioned charges. Mandate holders noted further that Mr. Bdap had fled to Thailand in 2018, is recognized as a refugee by UNHCR, has undergone two resettlement interviews with the Government of Canada, the last on 10 June 2024, and is waiting for his case to be decided (THA 6/2024).

138. On 4 June 2024, Thai police visited Mr. Bdap's former residence in Bangkok and questioned neighbours about his whereabouts. On 6 June 2024, Thai police located his new residence and stationed themselves in front, waiting to arrest him pursuant to an extradition request from Viet Nam. The National Human Rights Commission of Thailand (NHRCT) intervened to prevent the arrest and reminded the Police of Thailand's non-refoulement

⁴⁹ The allegation of intimidation and reprisals concerning the NGO Montagnards Stand for Justice (MSFJ) and its founder Mr. Y Quynh Bdap is connected to and should be read in conjunction with the related allegation concerning the same organization and individual, as detailed in Annex I, section on Viet Nam.

obligations under international and domestic law. On 11 June 2024, Thai police arrested Mr. Bdap under the Immigration Act and placed him in judicial custody at the Bangkok Remand Prison.

139. Mandate holders stated that there are reasons to believe that this arrest was made in connection with an extradition request from Viet Nam regarding his 10-year prison sentence for terrorism and that if he is forcibly returned to Viet Nam, his life and bodily integrity may be at risk (THA 6/2024).

140. Mandate holders underlined that some of the Montagnards refugees are actively involved in NGOs in exile that advocate for the protection of the human rights of Montagnard indigenous and religious minorities in Viet Nam. They referred specifically to MSFJ and its engagement with the United Nations human rights mechanisms, including with the Universal Periodic Review and treaty bodies.

141. Mandate holders requested the Government to take effective measures to ensure that the Vietnamese authorities do not hinder the legitimate activities of Montagnard groups in Thailand in defence of human rights in Viet Nam, including by engaging with the United Nations and recalled the prohibition on refoulement under international human rights law, where there are substantial grounds for believing that the returnee would be at risk of irreparable harm (THA 6/2024).

142. According to information received by OHCHR during the reporting period, the Thai public prosecutor filed an extradition request on 13 June 2024. On 12 July 2024, the Deputy Attorney General and prosecutors from International Affairs Department of Thailand met with Viet Nam's Director-General of the Department of Internal Security, along with the delegation from the Ministry of Public Security of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, to discuss an exchange of information regarding cooperation in handling extradition requests.

143. Reportedly, on 30 September 2024, the Criminal Court of Bangkok delivered its verdict on the extradition request for Mr. Y Quynh Bdap. The Court found that there were sufficient grounds to proceed with extradition under Section 19 (1), (2), and (3) of the Thailand Extradition Act (2008) and ordered that Mr. Bdap be detained pending the execution of the extradition request. On 15 February 2025, Mr. Bdap's lawyer filed an appeal and the case is pending.

144. On 1 August 2025, the Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection to the present report.

145. Regarding Ms. Petchnamrob and her conditional temporary release, including the prohibition on traveling abroad, the Government noted that Ms. Petchnamrob's case remains under judicial consideration. Therefore, it falls within the discretion of the court to determine whether such permission will be granted, which may include taking into account the nature of the offense, the severity of the possible penalty, and the risk of flight.

146. Regarding Mr. Y Bdap the Government noted that his arrest warrant had been issued in accordance with the Extradition Act B.E. 255. It stated that the 12 July 2024 meeting between Thailand's Deputy Attorney General and Viet Nam's delegation from the Ministry of Public Security was a courtesy call. It also noted that Mr. Bdap's lawyer deposited an appeal on 14 February 2025.

147. The Government further stated that Thailand had received written assurance from the Minister of Public Security of Viet Nam that, if extradited to Viet Nam, Mr. Bdap would not be subjected to torture, intimidation, assault, harassment or any forms of physical or mental harm. Viet Nam had also reassured the Government of Thailand that Mr. Bdap would be protected from any forms of discrimination, cruel, degrading, and inhuman treatment, and that his human rights would be protected in accordance with Viet Nam's domestic laws and international obligations. The Government added that in extradition cases, the ruling of the Court of Appeal is final.

22. Venezuela

148. During the reporting period, OHCHR documented several allegations of intimidation and reprisals for cooperation with the United Nations as described below.

149. The High Commissioner for Human Rights⁵⁰ and special procedure mandate holders⁵¹ raised serious concerns about developments following the July presidential elections. In this context, authorities launched a security operation referred to as “Tun Tun,”⁵² characterized by widespread detentions, enforced disappearances, home raids, online intimidation and harassment, and random stop-and-search operations by State security forces. These included the inspection of individuals’ mobile phones for content perceived by the authorities to be indicative of dissent. The authorities reported the detention of over 2,500 individuals⁵³ under terrorism-related charges.

150. OHCHR further documented that, in the context of post-election releases, officially reported at 2,006 individuals,⁵⁴ civil society organizations were able to verify 1,485 releases at the time of writing,⁵⁵ most of them under conditional measures. Released persons were reportedly instructed or coerced into signing documents prohibiting them from speaking about their detention, or conditions thereof. There are concerns that such measures inhibited the ability of released detainees to report potential human rights violations related to detention to OHCHR and international human rights mechanisms, fearing renewed detention, given the conditional nature of these releases. OHCHR also observed that State officials employed a hostile rhetoric directed at the United Nations and international human rights mechanisms during the reporting period,⁵⁶ which has contributed to an overall climate of fear that inhibited willingness to cooperate due to fear of reprisals.

151. In its 2024 report, the International Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela noted that its investigations continue to be limited by individuals’ fear of reprisals. Many of the family members and witnesses of most of those detained during the post-election crisis preferred not to provide their testimonies to the mission for fear of reprisals, in particular in the case of children and survivors of sexual and gender-based violence.⁵⁷ The Fact-Finding Mission noted further that the identities of sources, witnesses and victims had been anonymized where disclosure would pose a risk of reprisals to those concerned.⁵⁸

152. On 6 and 7 August 2024, during the consideration of the combined 22nd and 23rd periodic review of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination expressed serious concern regarding allegations it had received of reprisals and intimidation for cooperation with the Committee. The Committee inquired specifically about the case of **Mr. Yendri Velásquez**, a human rights defender and coordinator of a civil society organization defending the rights of LGBTIQ+persons, who was prevented from attending the review. In this connection, the Committee underscored the United Nations’ zero-tolerance policy on reprisals, and regretted that the State party’s delegation had not provided further information on his case during the review (CERD/C/SR.3081, paras 7, 26 and 70 and CERD/C/SR.3082, paras 20 and 63). In response to a separate incident involving the apparent unauthorized taking of photographs and/or video recording in the room, the Chair reminded participants of the established policy prohibiting

⁵⁰ <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2024/07/comment-un-human-rights-chief-volker-turk-venezuela>, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/08/venezuela-ongoing-arbitrary-detentions-disproportionate-use-force-fuelling>, <https://www.ohchr.org/es/statements-and-speeches/2025/03/oral-update-human-rights-situation-venezuela>. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/03/turkiye-concern-widespread-detentions>.

⁵¹ VEN 7/2024, AL 10/2024; VEN 11/2024, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/09/venezuela-must-stop-human-rights-violations-following-elections-say-experts>, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/01/venezuela-must-respect-right-peaceful-protest-and-democratic-dissent-new>, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/02/experts-urge-venezuela-comply-international-law-prevent-irreparable-harm> <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/02/experts-urge-venezuela-comply-international-law-prevent-irreparable-harm>.

⁵² Onomatopoeic reference to the sound of knocking on doors. VEN 7/2024.

⁵³ <https://www.instagram.com/reel/C-tnRP1ojRE/>.

⁵⁴ <https://www.instagram.com/p/DGvRr3YpYOb/?hl=es>.

⁵⁵ <https://www.ohchr.org/es/statements-and-speeches/2025/03/oral-update-human-rights-situation-venezuela>.

⁵⁶ <https://x.com/minpublicoven/status/1818309832698450104?s=46&t=ZmhS3PwG-4kWMVMneEB5Tg>.

⁵⁷ A/HRC/57/57.

⁵⁸ A/HRC/57/CRP.5 paras 8, 15 and 578.

the capture of images or videos of representatives of Non-Governmental Organizations present in the room and urged full compliance with this policy throughout the dialogue.⁵⁹

153. In its concluding observations of 20 August 2024, the Committee addressed the case of Mr. Velásquez and noted that, on 3 August 2024, Mr. Velásquez was detained for several hours at Caracas airport, while en route to Geneva to participate in the review and that his passport, along with those of other human rights defenders, had been cancelled (CERD/C/VEN/CO/22-24, para 6).⁶⁰ The Committee expressed broader concern about reports of intimidation and reprisals against human rights defenders and civil society representatives and the chilling effect such actions had on their participation in meetings with the Committee.⁶¹ The Committee urged the State party to act with due diligence and take effective measures to prevent all acts of harassment, intimidation, and threats directed at human rights defenders and civil society representatives for having cooperated with the Committee, and to conduct thorough investigations into such allegations. The Committee requested the State party to provide detailed information, by 20 August 2025, on the investigations into the allegations of Mr. Velásquez's arbitrary detention, as part of its follow-up procedure. (CERD/C/VEN/CO/22-24, paras 6 and 7 (a-c))

154. On 19 December 2024, special procedure mandate holders addressed Mr. Velásquez's case and expressed concern over the alleged arbitrary cancellation of the passport of Mr. Yendri and of other human rights defenders (VEN 12/2024).

155. During the reporting period, **Mr. Olnar Alberto Ortiz Bolívar**, a member of the Baré Indigenous People and a human rights lawyer and defender, has reportedly been subjected to acts of intimidation and reprisals, including threats, in connection with his participation in the twenty-third session of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII). Mr. Ortiz is currently benefitting from protective measures granted by the Inter-American commission on Human Rights, pursuant to Resolution Nr. 181/19, which was updated in November 2024 under Resolution Nr. 143/13.⁶²

156. During the twenty-third session of the UNPFII, Mr. Ortiz made public statements on at least three occasions, including during the plenary session. In his interventions, he presented his analysis on the human rights situation of Indigenous Peoples and human rights defenders in Venezuela. Reportedly, his statements received coverage in local media outlets in Venezuela. Following his first intervention on 17 April 2024, Mr. Ortiz was allegedly approached in the plenary by a representative of the official delegation of Venezuela to the UNPFII, who said "Always you. You know what happens to the toads (snitches)". In the hours and days that followed, Mr. Ortiz reportedly received text messages from an unidentified number, warning him to be cautious and indicating that his statements at the Forum had come to the attention of the authorities in Caracas.

157. In its 2024 annual report of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, the Forum expressed concern over the intimidation of Indigenous leaders and human rights defenders for their participation in that year's session of the Forum (E/2024/43, para 55).

158. In a separate incident, OHCHR documented the intimidation of **several individuals and organizations** for their cooperation with the United Nations, including its human rights mechanisms. Names and details of those concerned are withheld due to fear of further reprisals.

23. Viet Nam

159. On 14 June 2024, special procedure mandate holders raised concerns about reprisals for cooperation with the United Nations in relation to the listing of **Montagnards Stand for Justice (MSFJ)** as a terrorist organization and the trial, conviction and sentencing in absentia

⁵⁹ <https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k11/k11texazn5>, 54:10.

⁶⁰ Case – Venezuela (Mr. Yendri Velásquez), CERD 113th session 5-24 August 2024) CERD/C/VEN/CO/22-24.

⁶¹ CERD/C/VEN/CO/22-24, para 6.

⁶² https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/decisiones/mc/2024/res_92-24_mc_143-13%20y%20181-19_ve_es.pdf; <https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/decisiones/pdf/2019/7-19mc181-19-ve.pdf>.

of its co-founder, **Mr. Y Quynh Bdap**, as part of a mass trial of 100 individuals, mostly indigenous Montagnards,⁶³ on terrorism related charges in the Dak Lak Province in Viet Nam. The mass trial and listing were reportedly a response to the lethal attack of 11 June 2023 on two police stations in Dak Lak province (VNM 4/2024) (See Annex I section on Thailand).⁶⁴

160. With reference to Mr. Bdap's conviction and MSFJ listing as a terrorist organization, mandate holders recalled relevant Human Rights Council resolutions,⁶⁵ affirming the right to unhindered access to and communication with the United Nations and urging States to refrain from acts of intimidation or reprisals and to take all appropriate measures to prevent them. They also emphasized that MSFJ had regularly and publicly engaged with the United Nations human rights system, including its human rights mechanisms,⁶⁶ and warned that its designation as a terrorist organization effectively criminalizes any Vietnamese citizen – inside and outside the country – who engages with MSFJ's human rights work and advocacy, including at the United Nations (VNM 4/2024).

161. Mandate holders underlined that the listing of MSFJ, as an organization based outside of Viet Nam and the practice of visiting Thailand to seek the return of one member of MSFJ convicted in absentia in relation to the 11 June 2023 attack is a form of transnational repression. They stated that any bilateral extradition agreement with Thailand must fully respect the obligation of non-refoulement.(VNM 4/2024).

162. On 8 November 2024, the Government responded to mandate holders noting that the designation of MSFJ as a terrorist organization by the Ministry of Public Security on March 2024 was based on the ruling of 20 January 2024 by the Dak Lak Provincial Court and that it was not based on ethnic or religious discrimination.⁶⁷ It also stated that Mr. Bdap, as the commander of the terrorist organization, had led the "Degar Soldiers" group to attack the People's Committee offices in Dak Lak Province and informed of his conviction and sentence of 10 years' imprisonment under Article 299 of the Penal Code.

163. On 20 January 2024, **Mr. Y Quynh Bdap**, one of the six individuals convicted in absentia on charges of 'terrorism' under article 299 of the 2015 Criminal Code, was sentenced to 10 years in prison. Mr. Bdap had been recognized as a refugee by UNHCR in 2019 and is waiting for resettlement from Thailand to a third country (VNM 4/2024).

164. On 6 March 2024, MSFJ was listed as a terrorist organization on the accusation that it had engaged with the 'Degar Soldiers' group to carry out the 11 June 2023 attack, in order to establish a 'Degar State' with 'terrorism' or 'supporting terrorism.' MSFJ denied involvement in terrorism or the attack of 11 June 2023 and views the designations as a pretext for suppressing Montagnard groups in exile that document and expose human rights violations against Montagnards in Viet Nam (VNM 4/2024).

165. Following the listing, the authorities reportedly warned that "anyone who engaged in, propagated, enticed, incited others to participate, sponsored or received sponsorship, or participated in training courses organized by' MSFJ, or followed its direction, would be charged with terrorism or supporting terrorism". On 14 March 2024, a delegation of Vietnamese public security police went to neighbourhoods with large concentrations of Montagnard refugees in Nonthaburi and Nakhon Pathom Provinces, accompanied by Thai police. The Vietnamese delegation asked about the location of the six Montagnards convicted in absentia in the 20 January 2024 trial, showing their photographs and arrest warrants, and warned the refugees not to hide people being searched for by the Vietnamese police. (VNM 4/2024)

⁶³ Also known as người Thượng ('highlanders') or 'Degar'.

⁶⁴ The allegation of intimidation and reprisals concerning the NGO Montagnards Stand for Justice (MSFJ) and its founder Mr. Y Quynh Bdap is connected to and should be read in conjunction with the related allegation concerning the same organization an individual, as detailed in Annex I, section on Thailand.

⁶⁵ 12/2, 24/24, 36/21, 42/28, 48/15 and 54/24.

⁶⁶ Such cooperation has included with Special Procedures mandate-holders, treaty bodies, the Universal Periodic Review and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

⁶⁷ <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=38749>.

166. The Government clarified that based on Viet Nam's request, on 11 June 2024, Thai Royal Police arrested Mr. Y Quynh Bdap for illegal immigration and terrorism and that the criminal judgement from 20 January 2024 had been submitted to Thailand's Criminal Court for extradition proceedings. It informed further that on 13 June 2024, a Thai prosecutor filed an extradition case with Bangkok Criminal Court, based on an extradition request from Viet Nam. On 30 September 2024, Thailand's Criminal Court ruled in favour of extraditing Mr. Y Quynh Bdap to Viet Nam. The Government stated further its position that Mr. Y Quynh Bdap should be extradited to Viet Nam to serve his sentence.

167. On 14 June 2024, mandate holders addressed accusations made by Vietnamese authorities against the NGO **Boat People SOS (BPSOS)**, based in the United States and Thailand, of "terrorism" in response to its advocacy for religious freedom in Viet Nam (VNM 4/2024). BPSOS' advocacy includes active engagement with the United Nations and its human rights mechanisms on the human rights situation in Viet Nam. During the reporting period, BPSOS engaged with special procedures and submitted several reports to human rights mechanisms, including joint reports for the adoption of the list of issues prior to Viet Nam's review by the Human Rights Committee,⁶⁸ to the Universal Periodic review of Viet Nam,⁶⁹ and to the Committee Against Torture concerning Viet Nam in the context of Thailand's review.⁷⁰

168. On 14 February 2025, a few months after BPSOS submissions to human rights mechanisms were made public on OHCHR's website, the Ministry of Public Security of Viet Nam publicly announced on its website and on social media that BPSOS was involved in "terrorism" and "works closely with MSFJ, that had carried out the terrorist attack on 11 June 2023 in Dak Lak Province."

169. BPSOS denies involvement in terrorism and views the designation as a pretext for further suppressing Vietnamese groups in exile, particularly those that document and expose human rights violations against ethnic and religious minorities and Indigenous Peoples.

170. During the interactive dialogue of the fourth **Universal Periodic Review of Viet Nam** held on 7 May 2024, it was recommended that the State refrain from and prevent cases of intimidation and reprisals against civil society actors who engage with the United Nations and its human rights mechanisms, including treaty bodies, special procedures and the universal period review. It was also recommended that the State ensure that all reprisals by state authorities against all individuals who cooperate with the United Nations on human rights issues end immediately (A/HRC/57/7 para 42.34). Viet Nam accepted 253 recommendations fully and 18 partially, which did not include the latter (A/HRC/57/7/Add.1).

171. On 31 July 2025, the Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection to the present report, reaffirming its Human Rights Policy, expressing readiness for dialogue and information sharing with the UN and requesting a reassessment of the credibility of the sources of the allegations and to exclude the allegations from the report.

172. With regard to MSFJ, Mr. Bdap and BPSOS, the Government objected to the use of the term "Montagnard" in United Nations official documents to refer to any ethnic group in Viet Nam, citing its colonial and discriminatory origins. It highlighted its counter-terrorism legal framework and stated that it has credible evidence of MSFJ's terrorist nature and Mr. Bdap's direct role in the 11 June 2023 Dak Lak attack, which resulted in the killing of nine people, the injury of two others, and significant property damage. The Government noted MSFJ's designation as a terrorist organization on 6 March 2024, based on a court judgement issued on 20 January 2024. The Government further stated that BPSOS incited

⁶⁸ tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/SessionDetails1.aspx?SessionID=2824&Lang=en. BPSOS submitted four joint reports, (two jointly with Montagnards Stand for Justice) for the List of Issues and other four joint reports, (three jointly with Montagnards Stand for Justice) for the review of Viet Nam's 4th report by the Human Rights Committee. tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/SessionDetails1.aspx?SessionID=2824&Lang=en.

⁶⁹ <https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/WG.6/46/VNM/3>; See Joint submissions 12 and 18: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/upr/vn-stakeholders-info-s46>.

⁷⁰ tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=INT%2FCAT%2FCSS%2FTHA%2F60285&Lang=en.

hatred and supported individuals and organizations acting against Viet Nam, including MSFJ and its members post designation, while purporting to provide refugee assistance.

173. With regard to its legal framework and alleged restrictions on civil society organizations for cooperating with the United Nations, the Government affirmed that all individuals in Viet Nam are equal before the law and accountable for their actions. It stated further that cooperation with United Nations human rights mechanisms is not criminalized or prohibited, but must comply with national law, respect others' rights, and align with national security and interests.

174. The Government noted Viet Nam's engagement in international human rights forums, and its efforts fostering cooperation with the United Nations to promote socio-economic development and human rights, and highlighted domestic laws enabling the operation of approximately 72,000 domestic and 400 foreign NGOs. Regarding its non-acceptance of certain UPR recommendations, the Government maintained that these did not reflect the actual situation and refers to its position in document A/HRC/57/7/Add.

24. State of Palestine

175. During the reporting period, **Palestinian journalists** arrested while covering or attempting to cover large scale-operations conducted by Palestinian Security Forces (PSF) in the northern West Bank - between 5 December 2024 and 21 January 2025, were reportedly threatened by PSF officers before their release. They were warned not to speak publicly about their detention, including with media outlets or human rights organizations. This led some journalists to refuse to share further details on their detention with the United Nations for fear of reprisals.

Annex II

Information on alleged cases included in follow-up to previous reports

1. Algeria

1. The cases of **Ms. Jamila Loukil** and **Mr. Kaddour Chouicha**, both members of La Ligue Algérienne pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme (LADDH), were included in the 2023 and 2024 report of the Secretary-General¹ on allegations of obstacles to and a ban on travelling abroad that prevented their in-person participation in the fourth cycle of Algeria's Universal Periodic Review (UPR) in August 2022 (DZA 2/2023). In June 2023, mandateholders addressed allegations on the dissolution of LADDH, and of judicial harassment of Mr. Chouicha and Ms. Loukil since 2019. They also referenced the appeals lodged by Mr. Chouicha, including in relation to the interdiction to leave the national territory (DZA 2/2023). The Government responded noting that Mr. Chouicha was indicted under national security charges and awaiting trial and as such not permitted to travel. It further noted that in June 2024 his appeal related to the interdiction to leave the country had been rejected.² In July 2024, the Government informed that Ms. Jamila Loukil and Mr. Kaddour Chouicha had been acquitted of all charges against them and that no order banning their travel outside of Algeria had been issued.

2. According to information received by OHCHR, on 26 February 2025, the Algiers Court of Appeal upheld the judgement of the Court of First Instance acquitting Ms. Jamila Loukil and Mr. Kaddour Chouicha of the terrorism related charges and other charges brought against them since April 2021. Reportedly, the Prosecutor subsequently filed an appeal in cassation before the Supreme Court.

3. Mr. Chouicha is still awaiting the ruling of the Conseil d'Etat on the appeal he had lodged alleging that he had been effectively subjected to a travel ban, after the Administrative Court of Appeal had rejected his initial complaint against his travel ban on the grounds that there was no proof he had been prevented from travelling and that no such ban had been issued by the Ministry of the Interior.

4. In a separate legal proceeding, Mr Chouicha was reportedly sentenced *in absentia* by the Oran Court on 18 February 2024 to one year of imprisonment for "publishing information prejudicial to public order" without having been notified. He was subsequently retried before the Oran Court of Appeal and acquitted on 10 November 2024.

5. According to information received by OHCHR, in December 2024, the Administrative Court of Algiers confirmed the dissolution of the LADDH and rejected the appeal filed by Mr Chouicha in 2023. On 22 April 2025, Mr. Chouicha lodged an appeal before the *Conseil d'Etat*.

6. The cases of **Mr. Ahmed Manseri** and **Mr. Malik Riahi** on allegations of reprisals following their respective meetings with the Special Rapporteur on freedom of association and peaceful assembly in 2023 were included in the 2024 report of the Secretary-General.³ Mr. Manseri is the head of the Tiaret section of the now dissolved Ligue Algérienne pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme (LADDH) and of the Syndicat national autonome du personnel de l'administration publique (SNAPAP). Mr. Malik Riahi is a human rights defender, who actively participated in the Hirak ("movement" in Arabic).

7. In October 2023, mandate holders raised concerns regarding the police summoning and interrogation of Mr. Manseri and Mr. Riahi in connection with their meeting with the

¹ A/HRC/54/61 para. 41, Annex I paras. 7–11; A/HRC/57/60 para. 41, Annex II paras. 1–5.

² See Government reply at

<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=37649>.

³ A/HRC/57/60, Annex I, para 13–18.

Special Rapporteur during his official visit to Algeria. Mandate holders also raised concerns about the subsequent detention of Mr. Manseri under criminal charges⁴ in connection with his contacts with international organizations, and the reported surveillance of Mr. Riahi after his meeting with the Special Rapporteur (DZA 5/2023). In January 2024, the Government responded to the mandate holders, reporting that on 14 January 2024, Mr. Manseri had been sentenced under Articles 79, 100 and 196 bis (par. 1) of the Penal Code to 3 months in prison and 3 months suspended sentence, and released the same day.⁵ Regarding Mr. Riahi, the Government noted that the preliminary investigation against him preceded the arrival in Algeria of the Special Rapporteur, and that on 10 January 2024 the case against him under Article 96 of the Penal Code had been dismissed and that the prosecution had appealed the decision.

8. During the reporting period, the Special Rapporteur on freedom of association and peaceful assembly and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders each documented in their respective reports to the Human Rights Council fear and allegations of reprisals related to the September 2023 visit to Algeria of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of association and peaceful assembly. Both mandate holders referred specifically to Mr. Manseri's detention, and the Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders also mentioned the alleged intimidation of Mr. Malik Riahi (A/HRC/56/50/Add.2, paras 81-82 and A/HRC/58/53/Add.1 paras 3, 63-64). On 30 January 2025, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders expressed concerns publicly about the continued criminalization of human rights defenders after her visit to the country.⁶

9. According to information received by OHCHR, during the reporting period **Mr. Manseri** left the country in June 2024 due to fear for his safety, was granted refugee status on 25 October 2024, and his trial is ongoing. Regarding Mr. Riahi, according to information received by OHCHR during the reporting period, **Mr. Riahi** faced four different criminal proceedings before different Courts. Reportedly, he was arrested on 22 February 2025, subsequently charged under article 146, 144 bis, 196 bis, and 87 bis of the Penal Code and remains in pre-trial detention at Kolea prison in connection to these charges. In a separate proceeding, he was sentenced on 19 May 2024 to two years imprisonment and a fine of 500.000 dinars, which was confirmed by the Court of Appeal of Aïn Témouchen. Although he was convicted, there was no committal order. In another proceeding at the Sidi Mhamed Court, on 10 October 2024, the public prosecutor requested a sentence of three years imprisonment under articles 196, 100 and 96 of the Penal Code. On 8 December 2024, Mr. Riahi was sentenced to 18 months in prison by the criminal division of the Couria Court under article 146 bis and 183 of the Penal Code. At the time of writing, Mr. Riahi remains in prison based on the first case described above.

10. The case of **Mr. Mustapha Bendjamaa** was included in the 2024 report of the Secretary-General⁷ on allegations of arbitrary detention and criminal charges brought against him in connection to his cooperation with OHCHR. Mr. Bendjamaa is the chief editor of the Algerian regional newspaper "Le Provincial", and a representative of La Ligue Algérienne des Droits de l'Homme (LADH). Reportedly, Mr. Bendjamaa was detained in February 2023, three months after he had met with OHCHR during its technical cooperation mission in November 2022. On 22 August 2023, the Prosecutor questioned Mr. Bendjamaa about the reason for and content of the said meeting with OHCHR. In August 2023, he was reportedly sentenced to a DA 200,000 (USD 1,469) fine and two years of imprisonment, later on reduced to 8 months, and remained detained under other charges until his release on 18 April 2024.

⁴ Initially Mr. Manseri was charged under the crimes of "publication of information prejudicial to national unity" and "membership of a terrorist group" under Article 97 and 87 of the Penal Code, which were reclassified under articles 79, 100 and 196 bis (par. 1) of the Penal Code regarding national integrity, security, and public order.

⁵ See Government reply at

<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?Id=38101>.

⁶ <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/01/algeria-special-rapporteur-dismayed-continued-criminalisation-human-rights>.

⁷ A/HRC/57/60, Annex I, para 9-12.

OHCHR is closely following the case of Mr. Bendjamaa and is in contact with relevant authorities.

11. On 10 January 2024, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention found the detention of Mr. Bendjamaa to be arbitrary (A/HRC/WGAD/2024/24, para 111, 116, 125). The decision included a reference from the source to a question by the judge on whether Mr. Bendjamaa had contacts with international organizations, to which he responded, among other things, that he was in contact with OHCHR (A/HRC/WGAD/2024/24, para 19).

12. On 27 February 2025, mandate holders addressed the re-arrest of Mr. Bendjamaa on 30 December 2024 and expressed serious concerns about the national security related charges brought against him on 2 January 2025. These charges, reportedly based on Articles 79, 96 and 196 bis of the Algerian Penal Code, were allegedly linked to his social media publications on human rights, in retaliation for the complaint he had filed against the national gendarmerie for the acts of torture he was reportedly subjected to during his first police custody in February 2023 (DZA 1/2025). The Government responded to mandate holders, noting that Mr. Bendjamaa has been under judicial supervision since 2 January 2025 for allegedly disseminating false information and inciting unauthorized protests, and that the investigation is still ongoing.⁸

13. On 16 July 2025, the Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection to the present report, requesting the removal of references to Mr. Kaddour Chouicha, Ms. Jamila Loukil and Mr. Ahmed Manseri noting that they had been released and were no longer subject to legal proceedings. It stated that Mr. Chouicha and Ms. Loukil had been acquitted of national security charges in 2024 and terrorism-related charges in 2025, are no longer subject to legal proceedings, and that no travel ban had been issued against Mr. Chouicha. The Government further noted that the Appeal Court upheld Mr. Manseri's conviction and imposed a final one-year prison sentence. Regarding Mr. Bendjamaa, the Government referred to three legal cases. The first two are under cassation appeal: in the first, a six-month prison sentence was upheld on appeal; in the second, a two-year prison sentence was reduced on appeal to eight months. The third case remains under investigation. The Government also addressed two cases against Mr. Marik, including the one for which he has been placed in pretrial detention since February 2025.

2. Bahrain

14. During the period, mandate holders addressed the situation of **Mr. Abdulhadi Al-Khawaja**, **Mr. Abduljalil Al-Singace** and **Mr. Hassan Mushaima**, whose cases have been included in previous reports of the Secretary-General, on allegations of arbitrary arrest, torture and lengthy sentences on terrorism charges, following their engagement with the United Nations. Specifically, their situation was included in the 2011 and 2012 reports of the Secretary-General as well as in the 2021, 2023 and 2024 reports concerning Mr. Mushaima and since 2021 regarding Mr. Al-Khawaja and Mr. Al-Singace.⁹

15. Mr. Al-Khawaja, former Protection Coordinator of the NGO Frontline Defenders, Mr. Al-Singace, former Director of the Human Rights Bureau of the Haq Movement for Civil Liberties and Democracy and Mr. Mushaima, former Secretary of the Haq Movement for Liberty and Democracy, are currently serving a life sentence on terrorism related charges. Mr. Al-Singace has a disability and requires the use of a wheelchair. United Nations treaty bodies¹⁰ and special procedure mandate holders have addressed the situation of

⁸ <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=38993>.

⁹ A/HRC/18/19, paras. 15–24; A/HRC/21/18, paras. 53–54; A/HRC/48/28 Annex II paras. 5–8; A/HRC/51/47, Annex II paras. 5–6 and 9 and 14; A/HRC/54/61, Annex II, paras. 8–9. A/HRC/57/60, Annex II, paras. 9–13, 17–18;

¹⁰ E/C.12/BHR/CO/1, paras. 8–9.

Mr. Al-Khawaja¹¹, Mr. Al-Singace¹² and Mr. Mushaima¹³ on numerous occasions, to which the Government has responded.¹⁴

16. On 11 July 2024, mandate holders addressed allegations of continued arbitrary detention of Mr. Al-Khawaja, Mr. Al-Singace and Mr. Mushaima and their exclusion from the Royal Pardon of 8 April 2024. Mandate holders reiterated their alarm at their deteriorating health condition and lack of access to adequate medical treatment and care (BHR 3/2024), to which the Government responded.¹⁵

17. According to information received by OHCHR, on 16 March 2025, authorities suspended Mr. Al-Khawaja's video calls with his family. A week later, Mr. Al-Khawaja learnt that the video calls had been permanently suspended and started a water only hunger strike that he discontinued after prison authorities promised to reinstate the calls. On 9 April 2025, the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders publicly called for his immediate release in a video posted on social media.¹⁶ A week later, on 15 April 2025, Mr. Al-Khawaja reportedly initiated a peaceful sit-in outside his cell to protest that the suspension of the video calls with his family was still in force. Three days later, he reportedly discontinued the sit-in to protect access to medical treatment for other prisoners. In November 2024, he was recommended for hernia surgery by a medical professional, which has not yet been scheduled at the time of writing.

18. During the reporting period, Mr. Al-Singace reportedly remained in prolonged solitary confinement in his room at Kanoo Medical Centre and continued to be denied access to outdoor spaces, direct sunlight, the physiotherapy and mobility aids required for his disability, and adequate medical care for multiple conditions. He remains on a solid-food hunger strike to protest the confiscation of his scientific research.

19. According to information received by OHCHR, Mr. Mushaima's medical needs continued to be neglected despite his worsening health. During the reporting period, he reportedly faced delays receiving specialized care, including for chronic diseases, and his requests for scans and certain medical tests continue to be ignored. Reportedly, Mr. Mushaima remains in solitary confinement in Kanoo Medical Centre.

20. On 31 July 2025, the Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection to the present report, stating that there were no political prisoners in Bahrain, and that those incarcerated have been convicted of crimes, not for their political beliefs or affiliations. The

¹¹ BHR 3/2023; BHR 1/2023; A/HRC/WGAD/2012/6; BHR 3/2012; BHR 18/2011; 17/2011; 9/2011; 5/2011; 4/2011; 2/2009; 2/2007; 6/2005; see also press releases:

<https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2021/06/bahrain-un-expert-alarmed-prolonged-detention-human-rights-defenders>; <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/09/bahrain-un-expert-alarmed-health-human-rights-defenders-prison#:~:text=%E2%80%99CI%20am%20extremely%20concerned%20about,situation%20of%20human%20rights%20defenders>.

¹² BHR 3/2023; A/HRC/WGAD/2023/2; BHR 5/2021, BHR 4/2021, BHR 1/2019, BHR 5/2016, BHR 18/2011, BHR 4/2011, BHR 7/2010, and BHR 5/2010.

¹³ BHR 1/2019; BHR 5/2014; BHR 4/2012; BHR 17/2011; BHR 4/2011; BHR 3/2011; BHR 2/2007.

¹⁴ See government replies at:

<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=37802>
<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=37486>;
<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=30542>;
<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=30543>;
<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=30544>;
<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=30545>;
<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=30187>;
<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=2110>;
<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=36840>;
<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=30287>;
<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=30864>;
<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=32017>;
<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=34961>;
<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=34960>.

¹⁵ <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=38655>.

¹⁶ <https://x.com/MaryLawlorhrds/status/1909910485501169956>.

Government further stated that the judicial system upholds fair trial guarantees and emphasized that arrests are carried out based on credible evidence, reasonable suspicion and valid warrants, with detainees promptly informed of the charges against them.

21. Regarding Mr. Alkhawaja, the Government stated that video calls with his family had been reinstated, noting that their earlier suspension had been part of a general procedural measure applied across all detention facilities, and that while calls may be paused occasionally due to technical or logistical reasons, they are promptly resumed. The Government noted further that Mr. Alkhawaja's medical condition is regularly monitored by medical professionals, with records indicating 20 external medical appointments, and 52 internal clinic visits, and 97 video calls between May 2024 and May 2025. In cases of hunger strikes, including Mr. Alkhawaja's, detainees receive continuous medical supervision and are advised to end their hunger strikes for health reasons.

22. Regarding Mr. Al-Singace and Mr. Mushaima, the Government noted they are held in a private room at Kanoo Medical Center, where they receive medical care by qualified medical personnel. The Government further reported that Mr. Al-Singace has access to restroom facilities and natural light, takes his prescribed medication, receives ongoing medical care, and has declined certain scheduled outpatient appointments for further evaluations.

3. Bangladesh

23. The case of human rights organization **Odhikar**, as well as **Mr. Adilur Rahman Khan and Mr. Nasiruddin Elan**, Secretary and Director of Odhikar, was included in the 2011, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024 reports of the Secretary-General¹⁷ after allegedly being accused of anti-State and anti-Government activities following their engagement in the first cycle of the UPR of Bangladesh in 2009. The detention and charges against Odhikar staff as well as threats, harassment, surveillance, and the killing of one of its staff have been addressed by special procedures mandates holders since 2013.² On 16 October 2024, they were released on bail, remained under close surveillance and faced regular intimidation and harassment. Odhikar's bank account was frozen under the Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activities) Regulations Bill of 2016 and in June 2022 its application for renewal of registration was not approved by the Government.³

24. According to information received by OHCHR, on 22 August 2024, the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh declared the government's refusal to renew the registration of the human rights organization Odhikar illegal. The ruling overturned the NGO Affairs Bureau's 2022 decision to cancel Odhikar's registration, which had been pending renewal since its expiration in 2015. The Court's verdict allowed Odhikar to seek registration renewal and resume receiving foreign donations. On 5 June 2025, the High Court of Bangladesh dismissed the convictions of Mr. Adilur Rahman Khan and Mr. Nasiruddin Elan, overturning the two-year prison sentences handed down by the Dhaka Cyber Tribunal in September 2023, which had found them guilty under the Information and communication Technology Act for publishing a fact-finding report on alleged extrajudicial killings during a 2013 protest.

4. Belarus

25. The case of **Mr. Aliaksandr Yarashuk** was included in the 2023 and 2024 report of the Secretary-General¹⁸ on allegations of arbitrary detention, charges and sentencing under article 342 of the Criminal Code (disrupting social order), including for his submission of information to the International Labour Organization (ILO). Mr. Yarashuk is a Chair of the now outlawed Belarusian Congress of Democratic Trade Unions (BKDP) and a member of

¹⁷ [A/HRC/18/19](#), paras. 25–26; [A/HRC/42/30](#), para. 40 and Annex II, paras. 11–12; 10–11; [A/HRC/45/36](#), para. 47 and Annex II, paras. 8–9; [A/HRC/48/28](#), Annex II paras.; [A/HRC/51/47](#); Annex II, paras. 17–21, [A/HRC/54/61](#); Annex II, paras. 15–19; [A/HRC/57/60](#); Annex II, paras. 22–25.

¹⁸ [A/HRC/54/61](#), Annex I paras.

the ILO Governing Body. The ILO Governing Body and Special Procedures mandate holders addressed the situation of Mr. Yarashuk, to which the Government responded.¹⁹

26. In its 2023 and 2024 follow-up reports to the resolution on the measures on Belarus recommended under article 33 of the ILO Constitution, the ILO's Governing Body and the Committee on Freedom of Association noted with concern the change in the conditions of imprisonment of Mr. Yarashuk from "ordinary" to "strict", his transfer in November 2023 to Mogilev Prison No. 4. and the deteriorating conditions of his detention. On 12 September 2023, ILO's Director-General addressed his case (GB.349/INS/13(Rev.1), para. 7 and GB.350/INS/10 (Rev.1), paras. 6 and 51).

27. On 13 June 2024, mandate holders addressed concerns about the high number of older persons deprived of their liberty in inhuman conditions, including Mr. Yarashuk (72 years old) and his inclusion in the official list of persons involved in extremist activities. Mandate holders also noted that the draft amnesty law which proposes to grant amnesty to individuals who have reached the pensionable age (63 years for men) would not be applicable to him and other prisoners convicted under a broad range of provisions of the Criminal Code excluded from the scope of the proposed amnesty (BLR 5/2024). Reportedly, Mr. Yarashuk has not benefited from the recent pardons granted to some political detainees between July and December 2024. In its response to mandate holders, the Government noted that, in accordance with the requirements of Article 12 of Act No. 19-Z of 2 July 2024, an "amnesty" does not apply to individuals included convicted for extremist and terrorist activities, including Mr. Yarashuk.²⁰

28. In March 2025, during the 353rd session of the ILO's Governing Body, the chairperson paid special tribute to its member Aliaksandr Yarashuk. He highlighted that union activists and workers continue to be branded as terrorist and extremist and subjected to criminal and administrative sanctions (GB.353/NSP/PV, paras 15, 223).

29. The case of the **NGO Human Rights Centre Viasna**, a human rights organization providing legal aid in Belarus, has been included since 2021 in the reports of the Secretary-General²¹ on allegations of raids, arbitrary arrest, criminal charges and long prison sentencing of its Chair and staff in connection with their cooperation with the United Nations. special procedure mandate holders addressed the situation of the staff of the NGO Viasna and the persecution of the NGO Viasna on several occasions,²² to which the Government has responded.²³

30. In December 2023, special procedure mandate holders noted with concern the decisions in August 2023 by the State Security Committee and the Ministry of Internal Affairs declaring the NGO Viasna and its regional branches as "extremist" organizations. Based on these decisions, the NGO Viasna and its branches were added to the list of extremist organizations administered by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and their websites and other online resources were banned (BLR 10/2023).²⁴

31. During the reporting period, due to the threat of arbitrary detention, staff members of the NGO Viasna were compelled to go into exile and continue their human rights activities

¹⁹ See Minutes of the 346th session of the Governing Body of the International Labour Office (GB.346/PV), paras. 467–468; and BLR 6/2022.

²⁰ <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=38570>.

²¹ A/HRC/57/60, Annex II paras. 37–38, A/HRC/54/61, Annex II paras. 20–22. A/HRC/51/47, Annex II paras. 23–24; A/HRC/48/28, Annex I, para. 2.

²² BLR 1/2010; BLR 2/2011; BLR 7/2011; BLR 9/2011; BLR 2/2012; BLR 3/2012; BLR 1/2013; BLR 1/2019; BLR 2/2019; BLR 8/2021; BLR 3/2023.

²³ See Government replies at:

<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=31683>;
<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=31386>;
<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=31263>;
<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=32592>;
<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=34679>;
<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=36641>.

²⁴ See also <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/03/belarus-year-after-conviction-viasna-chair-and-members-concerns-about>.

from abroad. Some of them were subjected to “special criminal proceedings.”²⁵ Notably, on 17 June and 16 July 2024, Mr. Leanid Sudalenka and Ms. Alena Masliukova were sentenced in absentia to terms of imprisonment.

32. On 16 July 2025, the Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the present report noting that allegations that the criminal prosecution of the individuals listed in Annex II were prompted by their cooperation with the UN are inappropriate and invalid, and stating that allegations that an atmosphere of fear, repression and intimidation in the country hinders cooperation with the UN are biased and unfounded.

5. Cameroon

33. The cases of **Ms. Maximilienne Ngo Mbe** and **Ms. Alice Nkom** of Central Africa Human Rights Defenders Network (REDHAC) were included in the 2018 and 2019 report of the Secretary-General.²⁶ These individuals suffered physical attacks, intimidation and harassment reportedly in connection to their cooperation with the Human Rights Committee during the review of Cameroon in October 2017. On 26 October 2017, five special procedure mandate holders addressed their situation (CMR 5/2017), and on 11 July 2017 the Government responded affirming that Ms. Ngo Mbe and Ms. Nkom have never been persecuted for their human rights work or cooperation with the UN and requested further detail about the allegations.²⁷

34. During the reporting period, REDHAC actively engaged with the United Nations, particularly in the context of the review by the Committee against Torture and the Human Rights Committee of the 6th periodic reports of Cameroon under their respective Conventions.

35. On 19 September and 11 October 2024, respectively, REDHAC’s joint reports²⁸ submitted for the adoption of the list of issues prior to the review of 6th periodic report of Cameroon under the ICCPR and for the review of the 6th period report under CAT, were made public on the OHCHR website. Prior to that, on 4 and 5 September 2024, REDHAC had co-organised, with the OHCHR Treaty Body Capacity Building Programme and several civil society organizations a workshop in Yaoundé on the drafting of alternative reports in the context of the Lists of Issues Prior to Reporting for the Human Rights Committee, ensuring the participation of a broad range of civil society actors from all regions of the country. During the reporting period, the Human Rights Committee received and considered allegations of reprisals against REDHAC and its leadership reportedly for cooperation with the Committee.

36. According to information received by OHCHR, on 6 December 2024, the Ministry of Territorial Administration issued a decree suspending the activities of REDHAC for three months,²⁹ and subsequently issued an order banning the organization.³⁰ On 9 December, the doors of REDHAC’s offices were sealed by the authorities and its lawyers filed an administrative appeal.

37. On 20 and 22 January 2025 respectively, Ms. Nkom was summoned by the relevant authorities in connection with investigations into alleged “attempts to undermine State security”, “financing terrorism” and “breaking the seals” of REDHAC’s office. A week later, Ms. Nkom and Ms. Ngo Mbe were summoned to appear before the Court of First Instance of Douala-Bonanjo in relation to the offence of “breaking of seals.” Under Article 191 of the Penal Code, “breaking of seals” carries potential penalties of 6 months to 2 years of imprisonment and a fine ranging from 50,000 to 500,000 FCFA (around 80 to 870 USD). The hearing, initially scheduled for 7 April 2025, was postponed to 2 June 2025. Reportedly,

²⁵ Articles 468-25 and 468-28, Chapter 49-3 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

²⁶ A/HRC/39/41, para. 31, and Annex I, paras. 7–8; A/HRC/42/30, Annex II, paras 15-16.

²⁷ <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=34200>.

²⁸ https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=INT%2FCCPR%2FICS%2FCMR%2F59851&Lang=en.

²⁹ <https://x.com/MinatDivcom/status/1865451597515346303>. See ARRETE N°000121/A/MINAT.

³⁰ See ARRETE N°000122/A/MINAT.

the accusations of “rebellion,” “attempting to undermine State security” and “financing of terrorism”, remain under investigation at the Secretariat of State for Defence (SED) and have not yet resulted in formal judicial charges or court proceedings against Alice Nkom or Maximilienne Ngo Mbe.³¹

38. The case of the civil society organization **Organic Farming for Gorillas Cameroon** (OFFGO) has been included since 2020 in the Secretary-General’s reports³² on allegations of reprisals following a communication by special procedure mandate holders (CMR 3/2019). Alleged reprisals against OFFGO members have included the expulsion of **Mr. Jan Joris Cappelle**, a Belgian national and co-founder of the organization, from Cameroon in 2019; threats against **Mr. (Prince) Vincent Awazi**, a traditional chief; and death threats, surveillance and attacks against **Mr. Elvis Brown Luma Mukuna**, the lawyer of OFFGO, and his relatives. Mandate holders have addressed the allegations (CMR 5/2019 and CMR 4/2022), to which the Government has responded.³³ Reportedly, in June 2023, the Examining Magistrate at the High Court of Momo (Mbengwi) issued a “no case ruling” in the preliminary inquiry into Mr. Cappelle’s case and consequently closed the case.³⁴ On 20 September 2023, Mr. Brown addressed the General Prosecutor of the North West Region urging the opening of a new investigation into the case. In December 2023, he was notified by the High Court of Momo of the continuation of the proceedings. In May 2024, Mr. Cappelle was granted a visa to travel to Cameroon to attend hearings before the Court of First Instance of Mbengwi.

39. According to information received by OHCHR, on the evening of 29 May 2024, Mr. Cappelle was reportedly arrested upon arrival at Yaoundé Nsimalen airport on the basis of a 2016 arrest warrant, and was released later that same evening. Reportedly, in July 2024, due to security concerns, the case file was transferred from the Courts in Mbengwi to the High Court of Mezam, in Bamenda, North-West Region. Mr. Cappelle appeared before the Examining Magistrate of the High Court of Mezam on multiple occasions between July 2024 and June 2025, during which he was reportedly under surveillance.

40. According to information received by OHCHR, threats and attacks against Mr. Brown, legal counsel of Mr. Cappelle, continued during the reporting period. These included an attempted break-in at his residence on 15 July 2024, the presence of unknown armed individuals searching for a lawyer near his location on 8 September 2024, and threatening phone calls received on 15 February 2025. Reportedly, during the call he was told he was “a very stubborn lawyer who needs punishment” and that he had been “warned repeatedly.”

6. China

41. The case of **two members of the international legal team supporting Jimmy Lai and his son Sebastian Lai** was included in the 2023 and 2024 report of the Secretary-General³⁵ on allegations that their statements at the Human Rights Council were considered by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) as intended to interfere with or obstruct the course of justice and could very likely constitute a

³¹ These charges carry particularly severe penalties under Article 3 and 4 of Cameroon’s 2014 anti-terrorism law, including life imprisonment and the offence of rebellion, under Article 157 of the Penal Code, is punishable by imprisonment penalties from 3 months to 4 years.

³² A/HRC/45/36, Annex I para. 53, Annex II paras. 21–23; A/HRC/48/28, Annex II paras. 14–16; A/HRC/51/47, Annex II paras. 28 and 29; A/HRC/54/61, Annex II paras. 26–27; A/HRC/57/60, Annex II paras. 48–53.

³³ See Government reply at <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27212> and <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=37222>.

³⁴ A/HRC/54/61, Annex II para. 26.

³⁵ A/HRC/57/60, Annex II, para. 54; A/HRC/54/61, Annex I paras. 26–32.

criminal offence, according to a public statement that the Government made following their statements.³⁶

42. On 7 June 2024, the Government of HKSAR replied to a communication sent by the Special Rapporteur on torture on Jimmy Lai's case (CHN 2/2024),³⁷ stating that "making statements with the intention to interfere with or obstruct the course of justice, or engaging in actions with the same intent, including attempting to interfere with witnesses appearing in court or creating bias against such witnesses, is highly likely to constitute criminal contempt of court or obstruction of justice".³⁸

43. On 13 September 2024, the Government of HKSAR stated publicly that it "strongly disapproved and opposed the acts of the 'international legal team' for Lai Chee-ying and his son Sebastian Lai, and those of Sebastian Lai himself, to 'scandalize' the NSL and the judicial system of the HKSAR, and to abuse the United Nations mechanisms by soliciting the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture to interfere in the judicial proceedings of Lai Chee-ying's case concerning the NSL".³⁹

44. The 1 May 2023 decision of the **Working Group on Arbitrary Detention** that found the detention of **Ms. Chow Hang Tung** to be arbitrary (A/HRC/WGAD/2023/30),⁴⁰ and related concerns that the submission by the source to the Working Group may be deemed to constitute "criminal contempt of court" and trigger corresponding liability, as suggested in the reply of the Government of HKSAR, was included in the 2024 report of the Secretary-General.⁴¹ According to information received by OHCHR, following the Working Group's decision, Ms. Chow Hang Tung was put into solitary confinement nine times between June and December 2023, and repeatedly again throughout 2024. Reportedly, she was placed in a 7 square meter cell for 23 hours a day, for periods that usually ranged from 7 to 14 days (although the longest stretch was of 18 days), and she was taken for one hour a day to an indoor area of the facility with other detainees, but with no access to fresh air or sunlight.

45. During the reporting period, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention noted with grave concern that it had received allegations of reprisals and/or intimidation against Ms. Chow Hang Tung. The Working Group referred to the Government's response and expressed grave concerns that the source's submission regarding Ms. Chow's detention could potentially give rise to liability for the crime of criminal contempt. The Working Group emphasized that any such acts were absolutely unacceptable and called for such actions to cease immediately (A/HRC/57/44 para 30).

46. The case of **Ms. Li Qiaochu**, a human rights defender working on gender-based violence and labour rights, has been included in reports of the Secretary-General since 2021⁴² on allegations that her detention had been in reprisal for meeting online with two experts from the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances in September 2020.⁴³ On 28 February 2022, Ms. Li Qiaochu was indicted for "inciting subversion of state authority," reportedly tried on 19 December 2023 and sentenced on 5 February 2024 to three years and eight months in prison for inciting subversion of State power. According to information received by OHCHR, on 3 August 2024, Ms. Li Qiaochu was released from prison after having served her sentence but remains under police surveillance. Reportedly, her residential area is monitored by guards 24 hours a day, and she was warned by the

³⁶ According to information received by OHCHR, during the reporting period, the legal team continued its engagement with special procedures, including on the case of Jimmy Lai.

³⁷ The communication relates specifically to the possible admission of evidence allegedly obtained under torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

³⁸ <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=38742> The reply also stated that: "(...) on the basis of the sub judice principle of avoiding discussions of cases under judicial consideration, no one, including the Special Rapporteur, should comment on the case. (...)"

³⁹ <https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202409/13/P2024091300850.htm>.

⁴⁰ See also A/HRC/WGAD/2023/30/Corr.1.

⁴¹ A/HRC/57/60, Annex I para. 32.

⁴² A/HRC/48/28, para. 58, Annex I, para. 26; A/HRC/51/47, Annex II, paras. 36–38; A/HRC/54/61, Annex II para. 30. 58, Annex I, para. 26; A/HRC/51/47, Annex II, paras. 36–38; A/HRC/54/61, Annex II para. 30; A/HRC/57/60, Annex II, para. 55.

⁴³ See also CHN 4/2021.

authorities that she is not allowed to accept media interviews, speak publicly, or make public comments.

47. The case of **Ms. Xu Yan**, who reportedly had been targeted for engaging with United Nations human rights mechanisms, has been included in the reports of the Secretary-General since 2019,⁴⁴ in relation to her interrogation due to her campaign to release her detained husband, **Mr. Yu Wensheng**, a human rights lawyer whose detention was considered arbitrary by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention⁴⁵ (CHN 5/2018).⁴⁶ On 1 March 2022, Mr. Yu Wensheng was reportedly released, after completing a four-year sentence, and subsequently placed under close surveillance. Reportedly, on 14 April 2023, they were both arrested and charged on 30 April 2024 with the crime of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble”. According to information received by OHCHR, Ms. Xu Yan and her husband Mr. Yu Wensheng were tried in closed proceedings before the Suzhou Intermediate Court between 28 and 30 August 2024 on charges of “inciting subversion of state power.” On 29 October 2024, the Court reportedly convicted and sentenced Ms. Xu Yan and Mr. Yu Wensheng to 21 and 31 months of imprisonment respectively. On 15 November 2024, OHCHR issued a social media statement expressing regret over their conviction and sentencing and reiterated its calls for their immediate and unconditional release.⁴⁷

48. Ms. Xu Yan was reportedly released on 13 January 2025 and is now under police surveillance. According to information received by OHCHR, her residence is monitored by a guard 24 hours a day and she is photographed and followed when she leaves her home. Mr. Yu Wensheng remains in prison as of April 2025.

49. The case of **Ms. Chen Jianfang**, a human rights defender, has been included in the reports of the Secretary-General since 2019 and prior to that in the 2014 report,⁴⁸ on allegations of intimidation and reprisal for her campaign for civil society participation in the UPR, including a tribute to Ms. Cao Shunli⁴⁹ on the fifth anniversary of her death (CHN 11/2013).⁵⁰ On 19 August 2019, mandate holders raised concerns about Ms. Chen Jianfang’s alleged arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance (CHN 16/2019).⁵¹ Reportedly, in August 2022, Shanghai No. 1 People’s Court sentenced Ms. Chen Jianfang to four years and six months in prison for “inciting subversion of state power,” followed by four years of deprivation of political rights. Reportedly, she was released on 21 October 2023 after having served the full term of her sentence. According to information received by OHCHR, Ms. Chen Jianfang remains under police surveillance with guards stationed outside her home 24 hours a day, confined to her home, and prevented from leaving. During the reporting period, Ms. Chen’s efforts to seek hospital treatment for a condition diagnosed during her detention were hindered, she was barred from attending church services, and several friends who attempted to visit her were reportedly physically blocked by guards, threatened, and removed by police. Reportedly, Ms. Chen Jianfang’s phone was confiscated.

50. The case of lawyer **Ms. Wang Yu** has been included in the reports of the Secretary-General since 2018⁵² on allegations of arrest and charges of “subversion of state

⁴⁴ A/HRC/4/2/30, para. 45 and Annex I, paras. 13, 17, A/HRC/45/36, Annex II, para. 16; A/HRC/48/28, para. 59, Annex II, para. 19; A/HRC/51/47, Annex II, para. 40; A/HRC/54/61, Annex II, para. 32; A/HRC/57/60 Annex II, para. 57.

⁴⁵ A/HRC/WGAD/2019/15 paras. 30, 38, 49 and 50.

⁴⁶ See government reply at:

<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=33962>.

⁴⁷ <https://x.com/UNHumanRights/status/1857386320408039910>.

⁴⁸ A/HRC/27/38, para. 17, A/HRC/42/30, Annex II, para. 18; A/HRC/45/36, Annex II, para. 19–20, A/HRC/48/28, para. 59, Annex II, para. 20, A/HRC/51/47, Annex II, para. 41; A/HRC/51/47, Annex II, para. 41; A/HRC/54/61, Annex II, para. 33; A/HRC/57/60, Annex II, para. 59.

⁴⁹ A/HRC/27/38, paras. 17–19, A/HRC/45/36, paras. 19, 21 and 34.

⁵⁰ See government reply at:

<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=32042>.

⁵¹ See government reply at:

<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=34911>.

⁵² A/HRC/39/41, Annex I, para. 10–12; A/HRC/42/30, Annex II, para. 19; A/HRC/45/36, Annex II, para. 21, A/HRC/48/28, para. 59, Annex II, para. 21; A/HRC/51/47, Annex II, para. 42; A/HRC/54/61, Annex II, para. 34.

power,” (CHN 6/2015),⁵³ including in connection with her role in the case of **Ms. Cao Shunli**, who had cooperated with the United Nations. On 26 November 2020, the Beijing Justice Bureau reportedly cancelled Ms. Wang Yu’s license to practice law. Between 23 October and 1 November 2024, Ms. Wang Yu was reportedly held in administrative detention in Wei County Detention Center, in Hebei Province, in relation to a scuffle that involved her client’s son, but in which she herself was reportedly not involved. Both Ms. Wang Yu and Mr. Jiang Tianyong were part of the legal team advising the same client (See below. Mr. Jiang Tianyong). During her detention, she reportedly undertook a hunger strike in protest of her situation and required hospitalization upon release. According to information received by OHCHR, during the reporting period, Ms. Wang Yu remained under surveillance and her movements were monitored by police. Her husband, Mr. **Bao Longjun**, was reportedly subjected to similar surveillance, due to his association with her.

51. The case of **Ms. Li Wenzu** has been included in the reports of the Secretary-General since 2019, and prior to that in the 2017 report,⁵⁴ on allegations of her arbitrary arrest and detention following her cooperation with the then Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights during his visit to China in August 2016 (CHN 9/2016)).⁵⁵ According to information received by OHCHR, during the reporting period, **Ms. Li Wenzu** and her husband **Mr. Wang Quanzhang** remained under police surveillance, which allegedly also has now extended to their son and members of their extended family. A 24-hour surveillance camera has reportedly been installed outside their residence, and their movements were also monitored. Reportedly, Ms. Li Wenzu and their son were subjected to an exit ban on grounds that their travel could “endanger national security,” while Mr. Wang has been denied permission to apply for a passport.

52. The case of **Ms. Wang Qiaoling** has been included in the reports of the Secretary-General since 2019, and prior to that in 2017,⁵⁶ on allegations of intimidation and harassment for her cooperation with the then Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights during his visit to China in August 2016 (A/HRC/34/75, CHN 9/2016).⁵⁷ On 8 May 2021, the conditions of the four-year suspended sentence for “subversion of state authority” of **Mr. Li Heping** (Ms. Wang Qiaoling’s husband) were lifted (CHN 3/2017, CHN 5/2017)⁵⁸. Reportedly, they were subjected to an exit ban on grounds that their travel could “endanger national security.” According to information received by OHCHR, during the reporting period, Ms. Wang Qiaoling, Mr. Li Heping and now all of their children were under surveillance, and monitored by police regularly.

53. The case of human rights lawyer **Mr. Jiang Tianyong** was included in the reports of the Secretary-General from 2019 until 2022, in 2024 and prior to that in 2017,⁵⁹ on allegations of intimidation and harassment for his cooperation with the then Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights during his visit to China in August 2016⁶⁰ and was the subject of actions by special procedure mandate holders (CHN 9/2019⁶¹ and CHN 13/2016,

⁵³ <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=32826>.

⁵⁴ A/HRC/36/31, Annex I, paras. 20–21; A/HRC/42/30, Annex II, para. 22, A/HRC/45/36, Annex II, para. 242; A/HRC/48/28, para. 59, Annex II, para. 24, A/HRC/51/47, Annex II, paras. 44–45; A/HRC/54/61, Annex II, para. 35; A/HRC/57/60, Annex II, para. 61.

⁵⁵ See government reply at:

<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=33318>.

⁵⁶ A/HRC/36/31, Annex I, paras. 20–21, A/HRC/42/30, Annex II, paras. 23–24, A/HRC/45/36, Annex II, para. 25, A/HRC/48/28, para. 59, Annex II, para. 25, A/HRC/51/47, Annex II, para. 46; A/HRC/54/61, Annex II, para. 35; A/HRC/57/60, Annex II, para. 62.

⁵⁷ See government reply at

<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=33318>.

⁵⁸ See government replies at:

<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=33449>;

<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=33516>.

⁵⁹ A/HRC/36/31, Annex I, paras. 22–24, A/HRC/39/41, Annex II, paras. 14–16, A/HRC/42/30, para. 46 and Annex II, paras. 25–26 and 31, A/HRC/45/36, Annex II, para. 26 and A/HRC/48/28, para. 59, Annex II, para. 26; A/HRC/57/60, Annex II, para. 60.

⁶⁰ <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20987>.

⁶¹ <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=34846>.

CHN 15/2016;⁶² CHN 3/2017).⁶³ In 2018, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention found the detention of Mr. Jiang Tianyong arbitrary (A/HRC/WGAD/2018/62, paras. 59, 62, 77, 78). On 24 September 2019, special procedure mandate holders called upon China to immediately end harassment and surveillance of Mr. Jiang Tianyong.⁶⁴ Reportedly, since his release from prison in February 2019, Mr. Jiang Tianyong has remained under house arrest at his parents' home in Luoshan, banned from international travel and under close surveillance by local public security. According to information received by OHCHR, between 23 and 31 October 2024, Mr. Jiang Tianyong was held in administrative detention in relation to a scuffle that involved his client's son, in which he himself claims was not involved. Both Ms. Wang Yu and Mr. Jiang Tianyong were part of the legal team advising the same client (see above Ms. Wang Yu). He was allegedly released by the authorities at a train station 50 kilometers away from the detention center, where his relatives and lawyer were awaiting him. Reportedly, he is subjected to police surveillance, at the time of writing.

54. Regarding the case of the international legal team of Mr. Jimmy Lai and his son Sebastian Lai, the Government reiterated that, as the legal proceedings are still ongoing, under the legal principle of sub judice, no one should comment on the case. It stated further that the "so-called international legal team" had wilfully discredited the National Security Law and openly smeared the HKSAR justice system, was unauthorized to act on behalf of Mr. Jimmy Lai, had misrepresented facts, and misused UN mechanisms to interfere with the case.

55. Regarding Ms. Hang Tuan Chow, the Government stated that her detention conditions complied with Hong Kong law and international standards and that, under the Prison Rules, authorities may restrict an inmate's contact with others to protect the individual or maintain order.

56. Regarding the situation of Ms. Li Qiaochu, the Government noted that in July 2024, the Shandong Provincial High People's Court upheld her three-year and eight-month prison sentence on appeal, and that she was released upon completion of her sentence on 3 August 2024.

57. Regarding the situation of Mr. Yu Wensheng and Ms. Xu Yan, the Government noted that on 30 August 2024, the Suzhou Intermediate People's Court held separate hearings on charges of inciting subversion of state power. On 29 October 2024, Mr. Yu Wensheng was sentenced to three years' imprisonment and political rights deprivation for three years, ten months, and fifteen days. Ms. Xu Yan received a sentence of one year and nine months, with one year of political rights deprivation. Mr. Yu Wensheng appealed, but on 6 January 2025, the Jiangsu Provincial High People's Court upheld the original judgment. He is serving his sentence at the time of writing while Ms. Xu Yan was released on 13 January 2025 upon completion of hers.

58. Regarding the situation of Ms. Chen Jianfang, the Government referred to the legal proceedings initiated against her since 2019, noting she was released in October 2023 upon completion of her sentence for inciting subversion of state power.

59. Regarding the situation of Ms. Wang Yu, Mr. Wang Quanzhang, Ms. Li Wenzu Mr. Li Heping Ms. Wang Qiaoling and Mr. Jian Tianyong, the Government referred to the residential surveillance at a designated location imposed on Ms. Wang Yu in 2015 and to the court sentences issued for the remaining individuals. It further stated that, at the time of writing, Chinese judicial authorities have not taken any compulsory measures against them.

7. Egypt

60. The case of **Mr. Ebrahim Abdelmonem Metwally Hegazy**, a human rights lawyer and co-founder of the Association of the Families of the Disappeared, has been included in

⁶² <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=33355>.

⁶³ <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=33449>.

⁶⁴ <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2019/09/china-harassment-human-rights-lawyer-jiang-tianyong-must-stop-say-un-experts>.

reports of the Secretary-General since 2018⁶⁵ on allegations of enforced disappearance and torture while he was attempting to attend a meeting in 2017 with the United Nations Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances. In 2019, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention found his detention to be arbitrary, noting that his detention amounted to an act of retaliation for cooperation with the UN (A/HRC/WGAD/2019/41, paras 34, 40, 46, 51). Mr. Metwally was charged with founding and leading an illegal terrorist organization, conspiracy with foreign entities to harm state security, and spreading false news. Special procedure mandate holders and treaty bodies have addressed his case on several occasions.⁶⁶

61. On 8 January 2025, mandate holders raised concerns regarding the prolonged pre-trial detention of Mr. Metwally – reportedly exceeding seven years as a result of the addition of new cases with nearly identical charges on three occasions, and in violation of the two-year limit for pre-trial detention under Egyptian law. Mandate holders highlighted that each of the charges against him appear directly linked to his human rights work and interaction with United Nations human rights mechanisms and expressed concerns over his deteriorating health and apparent lack of adequate medical care or treatment. (EGY 8/2024) Reportedly, Mr. Metwally's first two trials, after seven years in pre-trial detention without one, are scheduled to take place in August and October 2025, in relation to case No. 900/2017 and case No. 1470/2019. The Government responded to mandate holders describing Mr. Metwally's alleged involvement in terrorist related activities, including while in prison, and confirmed that he had been charged with the offence of joining a terrorist group while aware of its purposes, and is currently detained at Badr Prison 3.⁶⁷

62. The case of **Mr. Ahmed Shawky Abdelsattar Mohamed Amasha**, a human rights defender and co-founder of the League for the Families of the Disappeared, was included in reports of the Secretary-General from 2017 until 2022, on allegations of abduction, detention, and torture following his engagement with UN mechanisms, including the Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances.⁶⁸ In 2017, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention found his detention arbitrary (A/HRC/WGAD/2017/78, paras. 89–91). In 2019, Mr. Amasha was released on bail but detained again in June 2020. Mandate holders have addressed Mr. Amasha's case on several occasions.⁶⁹ According to information received by OHCHR, the latest hearing on his case was due to have taken place on 13 April 2025 but was postponed to 24 May 2025. Mr. Amasha has remained in pretrial detention to date, for almost five years at the time of writing under the same case since his initial investigation on 12 July 2020. In September 2022, he was reportedly transferred to Badr Prison in Cairo, where he remains in the Correction and Rehabilitation Center.

63. References to the **impact of Egyptian legislation on the ability of individuals and civil society groups to cooperate with the United Nations** have been included in the reports of the Secretary-General since 2017,⁷⁰ noting allegations on the misuse of the Terrorist Entities Law (Law 8 of 2015), the Anti-Terrorism Law (Law 94 of 2015), and the NGO Law 149/2019 and its regulations, to hinder or punish cooperation with the United Nations, as well as the use of travel bans. On 8 November 2024, mandate holders raised concerns about the Draft Law on the Issuance of the Criminal Procedure Law No. 150 of 1950, which would repeal the current Law No. 150 of 1950 on the Code of Criminal Procedure and any provision in Egyptian law that is in contradiction of the draft law (EGY 5/2024). Reportedly, this draft

⁶⁵ A/HRC/39/41, Annex I, para. 32–35; A/HRC/42/30, Annex II, paras. 42–44; A/HRC/45/36, Annex II, paras. 44–46; A/HRC/48/28, Annex II, paras. 40–41; A/HRC/51/47, Annex II paras. 64–65, A/HRC/54/61, Annex II paras. 50–51, A/HRC/57/60, Annex II paras. 77–78.

⁶⁶ EGY 5/2021, <https://media.un.org/en/asset/k12/k1260210x0>; CCPR/C/SR.3959, para. 19; and <https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2023/03/dialogue-egypt-experts-human-rights-committee-commend-measures-combatting>. EGY 10/2020, EGY 12/2019 and EGY 14/2017.

⁶⁷ <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=38915>.

⁶⁸ A/HRC/36/11, Annex I, para. 34, A/HRC/39/41, Annex II, para. 17–18. A/HRC/42/30, Annex II, paras. 45–46; A/HRC/45/36, Annex II, paras. 44–46; A/HRC/48/28, Annex II, paras. 42–43; A/HRC/51/47, Annex II paras. 62–63.

⁶⁹ EGY 5/2021, EGY/5/2017.

⁷⁰ A/HRC/36/31, Annex I, para. 33; A/HRC/42/30, Annex II, paras. 49–50; A/HRC/45/36, Annex II, paras. 50–53; A/HRC/48/28, Annex II paras. 50–53; A/HRC/51/47 Annex II, para. 73, A/HRC/54/61, Annex II para, 57 and A/HRC/57/60 Annex II, para 85.

law was passed by the House of Representatives on 29 April 2025 and is pending the President's ratification at the time of writing.

64. Specifically, mandate holders expressed concern that Article 147 permits one-year travel bans with unlimited renewals, and Article 148 allows judicial challenge without guarantying notification to affected individuals. They also warned that Articles 266 and 267 could limit the ability to report on and comment on judicial processes without fear of reprisals, as they restrict media coverage, criminalize publishing trial related information that may "influence the trajectory of justice," and prohibit disclosing information about judges, prosecutors, witnesses or defendants, especially in terrorism cases. (EGY 5/2024).

8. Guatemala

65. Alleged acts of reprisals against judges, lawyers and prosecutors for their cooperation with the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) have been included in the reports of the Secretary-General since 2019⁷¹, and have been addressed by multiple United Nations actors.

66. The case of **Ms. Claudia González Orellana** was included in the 2024 report of the Secretary-General⁷² on allegations of arbitrary detention and prosecution in reprisal for her work with the CICIG during 2011-2019, and as a lawyer of justice officials who worked for or investigated cases with the technical assistance of the CICIG. The Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers had expressed concerns regarding her detention and prosecution for "abuse of power," reportedly in connection to a high-profile investigation with the technical support of the CICIG. (GTM 5/2023). Reportedly, in November 2023, Ms. González was released under non-custodial measures, including house arrest and a prohibition on leaving the country without authorization from the Court, after 81 days in detention. According to information received by OHCHR, during the reporting period, the trial against Ms. González continued behind closed doors. Reportedly, her request for the recusal of the presiding judge, on the grounds of alleged lack of impartiality, was denied. After several delays, the evidentiary hearing has been scheduled for August 2025.

67. The case of **Ms. Samari Gómez Díaz**, a prosecutor at the Special Prosecutor's Office Against Impunity (FECI), was included in the 2023 report of the Secretary-General⁷³ on allegations of detention and prosecution for allegedly leaking confidential information to the former FECI Chief in connection with a high-profile case investigated with CICIG's technical assistance.

68. According to information received by OHCHR, in June 2023, Ms. Gómez Díaz was acquitted of the charge of disclosing confidential information and released from prison, following 309 days of detention. In July 2023, special procedure mandate holders addressed allegations of due process violations in her case (GTM 4/2023). Reportedly, an appeal court ordered a retrial of the case, which may result in her detention upon the resumption of proceedings. According to information received by OHCHR, based on the second instance judgement, three appeals of Cassation were filed in September 2024. The hearing on these appeals is scheduled for September 2025.

69. The case of **Ms. Virginia Laparra Rivas**, former FECI Chief in Quetzaltenango, was included in the 2022 and 2023 reports of the Secretary-General⁷⁴ on allegations of arrest, arbitrary detention, conviction and sentencing for her work with the FECI in high-profile corruption cases against public officials and organized crime, including many investigated with the technical assistance of the CICIG. In May 2023, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention issued opinion 24/2023 considering her detention arbitrary

⁷¹ A/HRC/42/30, Annex I paras. 40-45 and Annex II para. 52; A/HRC/45/36, Annex II paras. 54-64; A/HRC/48/28, Annex II para 53-61; A/HRC/51/47, Annex I para. 27-30 and Annex II paras. 74-79; A/HRC/54/61, Annex I paras. 50-55 and Annex II paras. 58-73; A/HRC/57/60, Annex I paras. 56-65 and Annex II paras. 90-106.

⁷² A/HRC/57/60, Annex I paras. 56-60.

⁷³ A/HRC/54/61, Annex I para. 52.

⁷⁴ A/HRC/51/47, Annex I paras. 29-30; A/HRC/54/61, Annex II paras. 61-62.

(A/HRC/WGAD/2023/24, para. 109). In January 2024, Ms. Laparra was released under non-custodial measures, such as house arrest, prohibition to leave the country and biometric control checks every 15 days in court, after 680 days of detention.

70. According to information received by OHCHR, on 8 July 2024, a second judgement was issued against Ms. Laparra, finding her guilty of disclosing confidential information from a case in 2017. She was sentenced to a commutable five-year sentence, a ten-year ban from holding public office, and a fine amounting to 50,000 quetzales. Right after the issuance of the sentence and under the constant threat of detention, Ms. Laparra decided to leave the country. In April 2025, the Public Prosecutor's Office and plaintiffs reportedly requested the revocation of the alternative measures to the deprivation of liberty of Ms. Laparra. Even though the petition was dismissed by the sentencing court, plaintiffs reportedly requested that the Fifth Chamber of Appeals for Criminal Matters, Drug Trafficking and Crimes against the Environment of Quetzaltenango declare Ms. Laparra in contempt and revoke the alternative measures. They also reportedly requested that the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) issue a Red Notice for her international arrest. The Chamber has not yet responded to this request.

71. The case of **Ms. Leily Santizo**, a lawyer and former CICIG employee, was included in the 2022 and 2023 reports of the Secretary-General⁷⁵ on allegations of two undue criminal proceedings against her on charges of obstruction of justice. According to information received by OHCHR, during the reporting period, the Constitutional Court lifted the "total confidentiality" order in her case. Reportedly, this procedural measure, which restricts access to case information and proceedings for all parties, was requested over 28 times by the Public Prosecutor's Office. Reportedly, a recusal request against the fourth judge of the Criminal Court is pending and arrest warrants issued against Ms. Santizo remain outstanding. Despite having left the country, Ms. Santizo has reportedly continued to suffer the consequences of ongoing criminal proceedings abroad, including efforts to issue an international migration alert and a formal extradition request.

72. During the reporting period, reprisals also allegedly continued against former judge **Ms. Érika Aifán**, who has been included in reports of the Secretary-General since 2019⁷⁶ on allegations of intimidation, attacks and reprisals from State and non-state actors linked to her decisions on high impact and emblematic cases. Special procedure mandate holders addressed her case on several occasions.⁷⁷ Reportedly, an arrest order was issued in May 2023 against Ms. Aifán in connection with her judicial functions in a high-profile case investigated in collaboration with CICIG. According to information received by OHCHR, in December 2024, a new arrest warrant was reportedly issued against Ms. Aifán and another individual, on the grounds that their personal relationship may have influenced her judicial decisions.

73. The case of **Mr. Juan Francisco Sandoval**, former Chief of the FECI, was included in the 2020 and 2024 reports of the Secretary-General⁷⁸, on allegations of intimidation and reprisals for cooperating with the CICIG.

74. According to information received by OHCHR, one extradition request and seven arrest warrants have been issued against Mr. Sandoval, the last on 18 March 2025. Reportedly, on 13 March 2025, the Public Prosecutor's Office added new charges that had not been originally considered.

75. The case of **Mr. Stuardo Ernesto Campo Aguilar**, former anti-corruption prosecutor and former Chief of FECI, was included in the 2024 report of the Secretary-General⁷⁹ in relation to his detention on charges of abuse of authority, due to a complaint in connection with his work on high-profile cases investigated with the technical assistance of the CICIG.

⁷⁵ A/HRC/51/47, Annex I paras. 29-30; A/HRC/54/61, Annex II paras. 63-64.

⁷⁶ A/HRC/42/30, Annex I para.42; A/HRC/45/36, Annex II, paras. 57; A/HRC/48/28, Annex II, para. 57; A/HRC/51/47, Annex II, para. 76; A/HRC/54/61, Annex II paras. 67-68; A/HRC/57/60, Annex II, para. 102.

⁷⁷ GTM 1/2022; GTM 3/2021; GTM 6/2019; GTM 7/2018.

⁷⁸ A/HRC/45/36, Annex II paras. 58; A/HRC/57/60, Annex II para. 99.

⁷⁹ A/HRC/57/60, Annex I paras. 61-64.

Mr. Campo was arrested a second time on 1 December 2023. Throughout the reporting period, he has remained in detention. The High Commissioner for Human Rights and his office expressed concern in this regard, noting that his detention violates international norms and standards on deprivation of liberty, including those of reasonableness, necessity and proportionality.⁸⁰

76. The case of former Attorney General, **Ms. Thelma Aldana**, was included in the 2023 report of the Secretary-General⁸¹, regarding an arrest warrant issued against her in January 2023 on charges of conspiracy, obstruction to justice and abuse of authority in a high-profile case investigated with CICIG's technical assistance. In 2019, Ms. Aldana left the country, and in 2022 and 2023, two extradition orders were requested against her on charges of abuse of authority, ideological falsehood, embezzlement, and fraud. According to information received by OHCHR, as of April 2025, the new Attorney General reportedly reiterated the extradition requests.

77. The case of **Ms. Claudia Maselli**, former Deputy Ombudsperson of the National Human Rights Institution, was included in the 2022, 2023 and 2024 reports of the Secretary-General⁸² following attempts to undermine the institution for its support to the work of the CICIG. She faced criminal proceedings related to the exercise of her official duties on charges of alleged non-performance of duties and abuse of authority. According to information received by OHCHR, on 13 August 2024, Ms. Maselli was sentenced to three years of non-commutable imprisonment and a four-year ban from holding public office. Reportedly, she has been granted alternative measures, including prohibition to leave the country and control checks every 15 days at the courthouse, until the ruling becomes final.

78. According to information received by OHCHR, the case file against judge **Mr. Pablo Xitumul de Paz**, that was included in reports of the Secretary-General since 2020 in relation to high-profile cases investigated with CICIG's technical assistance,⁸³ was transferred to the Second Criminal Court of First Instance in the jurisdiction of Guatemala City in early 2025, as all judges of Mixco recused themselves from hearing the case. At the time of this report, the defence team had not yet received notification of the transfer, nor of the new court taking control of the case.

79. The case of judge **Mr. Carlos Ruano Pineda** was included in the 2023 and 2024 reports of the Secretary-General⁸⁴ on allegations of criminalization and online attacks against him in relation to a complaint he filed before the CICIG and the FECI (GTM 3/2023). According to information received by OHCHR, in early 2024, he was declared in contempt of court, and the file was declared confidential. Reportedly, the employment benefits accrued over his 14 years of judicial service in the Judicial Branch have been seized. During the reporting period, and at the time of writing, the tenth Criminal Court of First Instance had not yet ruled on the appeal filed in February 2025 to review this decision.

80. On 18 July 2025, the Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection to the present report expressing concern about ongoing practices within the justice system that violate the rights of human rights defenders, including justice officials, who have played a significant role in the fight against corruption and impunity in Guatemala. The Government acknowledged that the criminalization of human rights defenders remains a serious issue and reiterated its strong commitment to creating the necessary conditions for all defenders to carry out their work without coercion, intimidation, or reprisals.

⁸⁰ A/HRC/58/22, para 56.

⁸¹ A/HRC/54/61, Annex I para. 53.

⁸² A/HRC/51/47, Annex II para. 78; A/HRC/54/61, Annex II para. 70; A/HRC/57/60, Annex II para.105.

⁸³ A/HRC/45/36, Annex II, para. 57; A/HRC/48/28, Annex II, para. 54; A/HRC/51/47, Annex II, para. 76; A/HRC/54/61, Annex II, para. 69; A/HRC/57/60, Annex II, paras. 100-104.

⁸⁴ A/HRC/54/61, Annex I. para. 54; A/HRC/57/60, Annex II paras. 100-101.

9. India

81. The situation of the staff and associates of the **Jammu and Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society (JKCCS)**, a union of various non-profit organizations based in Srinagar, has been included since 2017 in the reports⁸⁵ of the Secretary-General on allegations of travel bans, ill treatment, and arbitrary detention as a result of counter-terrorism charges in relation with their cooperation with United Nations entities and mechanisms.

82. The case of **Mr. Khurram Parvez**, a Kashmiri human rights defender who is also the Chair of the JKCCS, was also included in previous reports of the Secretary-General,⁸⁶ and addressed on several occasions by special procedure mandate holders.⁸⁷ In September 2023, the National Investigation Agency reportedly filed a chargesheet claiming that the concerned NGOs and individuals collected domestic and foreign funds to support terrorist and secessionist activities.

83. In its concluding observations of 22 July 2024 on India's fourth periodic report, the Human Rights Committee raised concerns over allegations that human rights defenders had been barred from travelling abroad and engaging with United Nations bodies. The Committee cited the case of Ms. Khurram Parvez, who was prevented from attending a Human Rights Council session and has been arbitrarily detained since 2021. The Committee urged the State party to prevent and combat harassment, intimidation, persecution and violence, including arbitrary detention and prosecution, against individuals expressing criticism of actions or policies of public authorities, and to ensure their protection and freedom to carry out their work without fear of harassment, violence or reprisal; (CCPR/C/IND/CO/4, paras. 51 and 52). According to information received by OHCHR, Mr. Khurram Parvez remains in detention at the Rohini Jail Complex.

84. The situation of the **Centre for Social Development (CSD)** in Manipur and its staff, including the case of its secretary **Mr. Nobokishore Urikhimbam and his close relatives**, have been included since 2018 in the reports of the Secretary-General.⁸⁸ Reportedly, **staff from the CSD and Mr. Nobokishore Urikhimbam** have been subjected to surveillance, freezing of bank accounts under the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act of 2010 (FCRA), and attempted killing and abduction of close relatives for their engagement with the United Nations in relation to uranium mining and cement factories in Meghalaya, and more recently, in relation to their activities and attempt to report on the human rights situation in Manipur.

85. According to information received by OHCHR, during the reporting period, the CSD's office and its staff continued to be under permanent surveillance by unknown individuals, allegedly linked to the government. On 17 May 2024, an event organized by CSD to promote dialogue among civil society organizations and ethnic groups in relation to the situation in Manipur was allegedly subjected to surveillance by two officers of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Reportedly, on 20 May 2024 the officers requested information from the administration in charge of the meeting venue about the event's organizers, the participating civil society organizations and the payment arrangements for the meeting venue, among others. Reportedly, CSD was further intimidated and compelled to apologize for the organization of the event in local newspapers.

86. On 30 June 2024, Mr. Urikhimbam was allegedly interrogated by immigration officials upon his return to India from Geneva. Specifically, he was reportedly questioned

⁸⁵ A/HRC/36/31, Annex I paras. 39–42; A/HRC/42/30, Annex II, para. 59; A/HRC/48/28, Annex II paras. 62–64; A/HRC/51/47, Annex II paras. 82–83; A/HRC/54/61, Annex II, paras. 76–77, A/HRC/57/60, Annex II, paras. 107–110.

⁸⁶ A/HRC/36/31, Annex I paras. 39–42; A/HRC/39/41, Annex II, para. 23, 24; A/HRC/42/30, Annex II, para. 59; A/HRC/48/28, Annex II paras. 62–64; A/HRC/51/47, Annex II paras. 82–83; A/HRC/54/61, Annex II, paras. 76–77, A/HRC/57/60, Annex II, paras. 107–110.

⁸⁷ IND 4/2023, IND 7/2016; IND 9/2016; IND 2/2020; IND 19/2021.

⁸⁸ A/HRC/57/60, Annex II, paras. 112–115 A/HRC/51/47, para. 61, Annex II, paras. 80–81; A/HRC/48/28, Annex II, paras. 66–68; A/HRC/45/36, para. 76, Annex II, paras. 72–73; A/HRC/42/30, Annex II, para. 57; A/HRC/39/41, Annex I paras. 63–65.

about the reasons why he had submitted reports to the United Nations and the objectives of his human rights activities.

87. According to information received by OHCHR, on 29 June 2024, Mr. Urikhimbam was informed that CSD's application for the renewal of its registration under the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act of 2010 (FCRA) had been denied again and CSD's bank account had been frozen, with severe impacts on the organization's staff and on the beneficiaries of its humanitarian programs. Reportedly, despite several attempts to communicate with the FCRA, CSD has not received a response.

88. The situation of **Mr. Henri Tiphagne**, Executive Director of the **Centre for Promotion of Social Concerns (CPSC, also known as People's Watch)**, has been included in the reports of the Secretary-General⁸⁹ since 2020 and, prior to that, in 2018. Allegedly, the postponement and non-renewal of CPSC's license under the **Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act of 2010 (FCRA)** was a reprisal for the organization's human rights work, including its continuous cooperation with the United Nations in the field of human rights over the years.⁹⁰ According to information received by OHCHR, between May 2024 and January 2025, the case concerning the postponement and non-renewal of CPSC's licence was listed on seven occasions before the Delhi High Court. On 4 February 2025, the counsel for CPSC was required to resubmit final arguments due to the retirement of the presiding judge. On 24 March 2025, the case was listed for arguments, however an adjournment was requested by the counsel for the Government of India. The following hearing was scheduled for 13 May 2025.

89. On 29 July 2025, the Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection to the present report affirming its firm belief that States bear the primary responsibility for promoting and protecting human rights, and that global human rights challenges are best addressed through greater cooperation with States. The Government regretted that the report included again information on developments in the situations of Mr. Khurram Parvez and the Jammu and Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society, Mr. Nobokishore Urikhimbam and the Centre for Social Development and the Centre for Promotion of Social Concerns, without considering the detailed replies previously provided and underlined that it replied in good faith to ensure a constructive and cooperative two-way dialogue with the UN.

90. The Government underlined that India is a democracy with a vibrant civil society who plays a vital role and is well represented in the work of the UN. It stated further that civil society and human rights defenders, cooperating or not with the UN, must abide by domestic rules and procedures and referred to global networks of NGOs working to sabotage independence and national sovereignty, especially of countries from the Global South. The Government stated that India's commitment to human rights originated from the Constitution, which protects the right to life and liberty, noting that arbitrary arrest or detention is not possible and that no detention can take place without the sanction of the court.

91. Regarding Mr. Khurram Parvez, the Government referred to its previous responses of 2016, 2020, 2021 and 2023, stating that law enforcement agencies had found him to be involved in instigating and carrying out violent acts deemed prejudicial to public order in Indian-Administered Kashmir since July 2016. The Government further indicated that his preventive detention was based on cases registered under sections 151 and 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedures. It also affirmed that Mr. Parvez had been provided with the necessary medical care and that he had full access to legal assistance.

92. The Government noted that the Foreign Contribution (regulation) Act of 2010 (FCRA) was enacted to regulate the acceptance and use of foreign funds by individuals and association, ensuring they are not used for purposes contrary to India's national interests. It added that over 16,000 organizations registered under the Act continued to operate without impediment. Regarding the Center for Social Development and the Center for Promotion of

⁸⁹ A/HRC/39/41, para. 50, and Annex I, paras. 61–62; A/HRC/42/30, para. 58 and Annex II, para. 58; A/HRC/48/28, Annex II para. 65; A/HRC/51/47, Annex II paras. 84–85.

⁹⁰ IND 14/2018; OTH 27/2017.

Social Concerns, the Government noted that both had been suspended after being found in violation of the FCRA Act.

10. Israel

93. The cases of six Palestinian human rights and humanitarian organizations, namely the Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association (Addameer), Al Haq, the Bisan Center for Research and Development (Bisan), Defense for Children International – Palestine, (DCI-P), the Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC), and the Union of Palestinian Women’s Committees (UPWC) have been included in the reports of the Secretary-General since 2022, on allegations that their designations as “terror[ist] organizations” under the Counter-Terrorism Law 5776 of 2016 were related to their cooperation with the United Nations and their human rights and humanitarian work.⁹¹ UN actors condemned the designations⁹² and noted the critical work of these long-standing key partners of the United Nations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.⁹³

94. During the reporting period, and according to information received by OHCHR, most of the designated organizations faced challenges regarding their banking transactions, including de-risking practices by banks, intermediary banks and donors. Reportedly, these practices have affected most of the organizations variably including with some organizations being unable to receive or send any funds.

11. Nicaragua

95. **The case of Mr. Guillermo Gonzalo Carrión Maradiaga** was included in the 2019 and 2024 reports of the Secretary-General on allegations of vilification by public officials, criminalization, and surveillance for sharing information on human rights violations with OHCHR.⁹⁴ Mr. Carrión is a lawyer and human rights defender who was the legal director of the now dissolved Nicaraguan Center for Human Rights (CENIDH) and who later founded the Human Rights Collective “Nicaragua Nunca Más”. In February 2023, the Court of Appeals of Managua stripped 94 individuals, including Mr. Carrión, of their nationality and ordered the confiscation of their assets in the country. Mr. Carrión was also denied access to his pension and in May 2023 he was disbarred. According to information received by OHCHR, in March 2025, Mr. Carrión’s house was allocated to another family without his consent or any official notification, effectively completing the confiscation process.

96. **The cases of Ms. Ana Quirós Víquez, Ms. Francisca Ramirez Torrez and Mr. Braulio Abarca** were included in the 2019 report of the Secretary-General,⁹⁵ among the 23 cases concerning allegations of harassment and persecution for sharing information on human rights violations with OHCHR. Ms. Ana Quirós is a human rights defender, a feminist activist and founding member of the “Movimiento Autónomo de Mujeres.” Mr. Braulio Abarca is a human rights defender of “Nicaragua Nunca Más”. Ms. Francisca Ramirez Torrez, known as “Doña Chica,” is a peasant leader and human rights defender. In 2018, Ms. Ana Quirós was expelled and Mr. Abarca and Ms. Ramirez Torrez were forced into exile in Costa Rica due to escalating persecution.

97. According to information received by OHCHR, in May 2024, **Ms. Ana Quiróz** learned that she had been removed from the civil registry and from the National Institution for Social Security. Despite her attempts, she was unable to obtain the birth certificate of her daughter and to access her pension, although she had reached the required age and had

⁹¹ [A/HRC/51/47](#), Annex I, paras. 35–39, [A/HRC/54/61](#), Annex II, paras 89-97, [A/HRC/57/60](#), Annex II, 133–136.

⁹² <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/un-agencies-and-association-international-development-agencies-stand-civil-society-organisations-occupied>; <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2021/10/un-experts-condemn-israels-designation-palestinian-human-rights-defenders>, [A/HRC/49/25](#), para 26 and [CCPR/C/ISR/CO/5](#), paras 18-19.

⁹³ [A/HRC/49/25](#) para. 36.

⁹⁴ [A/HRC/42/30](#), Annex I paras. 78–79; [A/HRC/57/60](#), Annex II paras. 143-144.

⁹⁵ [A/HRC/42/30](#), Annex I paras. 69 and 78.

contributed the necessary number of years. During the reporting period, Ms. Quiróz was also allegedly informed that her two properties in Managua had been confiscated and transferred to third parties. Reportedly, between 2024 and 2025, Ms. Ana Quiróz was the target of an online defamation and harassment campaign, accusing her of receiving millions of dollars from the United States with the aim of overthrowing the government.

98. According to information received by OHCHR, **Ms. Francisca Ramirez Torrez**, who was among the 94 individuals stripped of their nationality by the Court of Appeals of Managua in 2023, had five of her properties confiscated by the authorities between March and May 2025. This brings the total number of her confiscated properties to six.

99. According to information received by OHCHR, during 2024, **Mr. Braulio Abarca**, who now resides in Costa Rica, was allegedly followed on several occasions by unknown individuals riding an unmarked motorcycle, from his workplace to his residence. In May 2024, patrol vehicles from the Nicaraguan police reportedly conducted visible surveillance operations of his relatives' residence.

100. The case of **Mr. Félix Alejandro Maradiaga** was included in the 2019, 2022 and 2023 reports of the Secretary-General⁹⁶ for an arrest warrant in 2018,⁹⁷ conviction in March 2022 and sentencing to 13 years in prison in connection to his briefing to the UN Security Council in September 2018.⁹⁸ Mr. Maradiaga, a political scientist, was the executive director of the Institute for Strategic Studies and Public Policy (IEEPP) and a pre-candidate for the 2021 presidential elections.⁹⁹ In 2022, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention found his detention to be arbitrary.¹⁰⁰ Reportedly, in February 2023, Mr. Maradiaga was arbitrarily deported from Nicaragua to the United States, arbitrarily deprived of his nationality and his records were reportedly erased from the Civil Registry.¹⁰¹

101. According to information received by OHCHR, in 2024, at least 15 of Mr. Maradiaga's family members were reportedly subjected to harassment by the Nicaraguan police, including short-term arbitrary detention without formal charges, surveillance of their residences, being followed by unmarked vehicles, and repeatedly receiving threatening phone calls. This sustained pressure reportedly created a climate of fear, prompting some relatives to cut off communication with Mr. Maradiaga. Reportedly, between 2022 and 2024, the Nicaraguan government arbitrarily cancelled or refused to renew the passports of at least 11 of his close relatives and several were barred from re-entering the country upon attempting to return from travel abroad, including his mother.

102. In 2024, at least three of Mr. Maradiaga's former co-workers were reportedly summoned for interrogations by the Ministry of the Interior and questioned regarding their communications with him. Four additional former administrative staff were reportedly visited by police and ordered to report regularly, as well as questioned about their former roles in IEEPP, relationship with Mr. Maradiaga and any ongoing contact with him.

103. According to information received by OHCHR, on 24 September 2024, officials from the Attorney General's Office, accompanied by police, arrived without prior notice or judicial order and seized Mr. Maradiaga's family property in Jinotega. Additionally, a systematic defamation campaign intensified in 2024. State-aligned media and social media accounts circulated content labeling Mr. Maradiaga as a "traitor," "terrorist," and "foreign agent." In May 2024, the director of pro-government Radio La Primerísima dedicated several broadcasts to defaming Mr. Maradiaga, with official media amplifying these accusations across platforms.

⁹⁶ [A/HRC/42/30](#), Annex I para. 82; [A/HRC/51/47](#), Annex II para. 118; [A/HRC/54/61](#), Annex II para. 114.

⁹⁷ [NIC 5/2021](#).

⁹⁸ [S/PV.8340](#), pages 4–5.

⁹⁹ [A/HRC/49/23](#), para. 8.

¹⁰⁰ [A/HRC/WGAD/2022/73](#) para 109.

¹⁰¹ The order of "immediate deportation" was based on the Constitution, the Penal Code and the Law of Defense of the Rights of the People to Independence, Sovereignty and Self-Determination for Peace. See also [A/HRC/54/60](#) para 28-32.

104. The case of the **Comisión Permanente de Derechos Humanos (CPDH)** and its staff has been included in the reports of the Secretary-General between 2019 and 2023,¹⁰² on allegations of threats, harassment, and intimidation of its staff by police for regularly engaging with OHCHR. On 2022, special procedure mandate holders addressed the dissolution of CPDH and the cancellation of its legal personality (NIC 2/2022). As a result, CPDH was no longer able to receive national and international funding, including from the United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture, and its real estate and vehicles were reportedly confiscated (NIC 2/2022). Reportedly, the CPDH and its staff relocated abroad to continue its human rights work and activities.

105. According to information received by OHCHR, between April 2024 and May 2025, CPDH staff that remained in Nicaragua were reported being subjected to constant surveillance and intimidation by police forces and paramilitary groups in Managua, Matagalpa, León, and other regions. Authorities reportedly explicitly prohibited them from posting on social media and threatened them with declaring them “Traitors to the Homeland” (“Traidores a la Patria”), with all the legal and constitutional consequences that follow, including? stripping them of their nationality, expelling them from the country, and confiscating their property, if they continued their activities. As a result, CPDH was forced to shut down its online accounts, and restrict access to prevent sensitive information from being obtained. In April 2025, paramilitary groups and members of the Citizens’ Power Councils (CPC) visited the homes of several CPDH staff and questioned them about their whereabouts and the duration of their stay abroad.

106. The case of **Mr. Brooklyn Rivera**, Indigenous leader and at the time Deputy of the National Assembly for the YATAMA, was included in the 2024 report of the Secretary-General,¹⁰³ on allegations that he was not allowed to return to Nicaragua following his participation in the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII). In September 2023, upon his clandestine return to the country, he was arbitrarily arrested and has since been held without charges or contact with his relatives. His daughter, **Ms. Tininiska Rivera Castellón**, was reportedly harassed and subject to surveillance following her statement at the 23rd Session of the UNPFII, where she demanded proof of life of her father and his release.¹⁰⁴

107. On 30 September 2024, OHCHR’s Regional Office for Central America called for Mr. Rivera’s immediate release.¹⁰⁵ On 13 November 2024, during the interactive dialogue for the Universal Periodic Review of Nicaragua, the Government of Nicaragua acknowledged that Mr. Rivera’s parliamentary immunity had been lifted to allow an investigation into serious criminal offences, including treason, for which formal charges had already been brought against him. During the reporting period, his daughter was reportedly subjected to attempts to hack her private social media accounts, including one incident shortly before her participation in the Human Rights Council sessions in December 2024. On that occasion, she reportedly received a notification from a social media platform indicating that someone was trying to access her account. Additionally, in February, she reportedly received information that individuals with family ties to members of the Nicaraguan government were inquiring about her in the country where she had sought refuge. Reportedly, at the time of writing, Mr. Rivera’s family has not been informed of his whereabouts. Ms. Rivera has remained outside Nicaragua due to fear of persecution and further reprisals while advocating for her father’s release, including with the United Nations. On 9 December 2024 and on March 2025, OHCHR reiterated its call for Mr. Rivera’s release during the oral updates to the Human Rights Council.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰² A/HRC/42/30, Annex I, para. 78; A/HRC/45/36, Annex II, paras. 95–96; A/HRC/48/28, Annex II para. 105; A/HRC/51/47, Annex II para. 120; A/HRC/54/61.

¹⁰³ A/HRC/57/60, paras 78, 81 y 85.

¹⁰⁴ <https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k13/k13w7qk515> (time stamp 02:37:00).

¹⁰⁵ <https://www.oacnudh.org/oacnudh-expresa-su-preocupacion-ante-la-creciente-persecucion-de-los-pueblos-indigenas-en-nicaragua/>.

¹⁰⁶ <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2024/12/deputy-high-commissioner-updates-human-rights-situation-nicaragua?sub-site=HRC> and <http://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1v/k1vbqyzxps> in 01:14:07.

12. Russian Federation

108. References to the **alleged impact of the arbitrary application of restrictive legislation**,¹⁰⁷ in particular laws on “foreign agents” or “undesirable organizations”, on the willingness and ability of civil society actors to engage with international bodies, including with the United Nations, have been included in the reports of the Secretary-General since 2019 and, prior to that, in 2013, 2014, and 2015.¹⁰⁸ In her 2024 report to the Human Rights Council, the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Russian Federation noted that the Ministry of Justice had designated a total of 846 individuals and organizations as “foreign agents” as of 16 August 2024. As of June 2024, 25 criminal cases had been opened due to non-compliance with the legislation (A/HRC/57/59, para 16-18). During the reporting period, the Special Rapporteur further addressed new amendments to the law on “undesirable” organizations, (Federal Law No. 219-FZ), adopted in August 2024 (A/HRC/57/59, para 29 and [RUS 6/2024](#)).

109. The case of the international NGO **Human Rights House Foundation (HRHF)** was included in the 2024 report of the Secretary General, on allegations that its designation as an “undesirable organization” pursuant to the decision of 5 July 2023 by the Office of the Prosecutor General, in accordance with Federal Law No. 129-FZ,¹⁰⁹ of May 2015, constituted a reprisal for the organization’s engagement with the United Nations bodies and mechanisms in Geneva on the human rights situation in the Russian Federation.¹¹⁰

110. According to information received by OHCHR, on 29 March 2024, the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow rejected HRHF’s application seeking to overturn the Prosecutor General’s designation. The court upheld the designation, following the reasoning of the Prosecutor’s office in full. On 20 May 2024, HRHF lodged an appeal regarding the court’s decision. These proceedings could suggest that the Russian authorities continue to view HRHF’s international human rights advocacy, including its public statements at the United Nations, as grounds for legal sanction.

111. The case of the **Centre for Support of Indigenous Peoples of the North (CSIPN)** was included in the 2020 report of the Secretary-General¹¹¹, on allegations that its dissolution under the Foreign Agent Law in 2020 and the targeting of its director were in reprisal for the organization’s engagement with the United Nations. Reportedly, CSIPN was one of the few organizations of Indigenous Peoples in the region with ECOSOC status and its dissolution impacted the participation of indigenous peoples from Siberia and the Russian North and Far East in United Nations activities.

112. During the reporting period, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Russian Federation reported to the Human Rights Council that, in May 2024, the Government had requested that CSIPN’s consultative status be revoked on the grounds that CSIPN lacked legal recognition in the Russian Federation (A/HRC/57/59, para 133).

113. According to information received by OHCHR, in July and December 2024, an Indigenous Peoples human rights defenders network operating in the Russian Federation was designated as an “extremist” and “terrorist organization” by national authorities, following

¹⁰⁷ These included the N 121-FZ Foreign Agent Law for Non-Commercial Organizations, adopted in July 2012 and amended in June 2016 (N 147-FZ and N 179-FZ) and several pieces of federal legislation signed into effect on 30 December 2020 as well as Federal Law No. 538-FC, which introduced a five-year prison sentence for libel, and Federal Law No. 525-FZ which introduced criminal liability for malicious violation of the duties of a “foreign agent” with a penalty of up to five years in prison. On 5 April 2021, Bills No.1052327-7 and 105895-7 were adopted and published introducing amendments and penalties for non-compliance with the norms mentioned above.

¹⁰⁸ [A/HRC/57/60](#), Annex II, paras. 154–155; [A/HRC/54/61](#), Annex II, paras. 130–131; [A/HRC/51/47](#), Annex II, paras. 126–127; [A/HRC/48/28](#) Annex II, paras. 111–114; [A/HRC/45/36](#), Annex II, paras. 105–107; [A/HRC/42/30](#), Annex II, para. 88; [A/HRC/30/29](#), Annex II para. 3; [A/HRC/27/38](#), para. 43; [A/HRC/24/29](#), paras. 29–31.

¹⁰⁹ [A/HRC/54/54](#), para. 29.

¹¹⁰ During the reporting period, the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Russian Federation reported on its designation ([A/HRC/54/54](#), paras. 27, 29–30).

¹¹¹ [A/HRC/45/36](#), para 102.

which the network reportedly ceased its activities and is no longer in existence. CSIPN, which was a member of this network, temporarily suspended its website.

13. Saudia Arabia

114. The case of **Mr. Mohammad Fahad Al Qahtani**, of the Saudi Association for Civil and Political Rights (ACRPA), was included in the 2012, 2013, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2023 and 2024 reports of the Secretary-General¹¹² on allegations that he was interrogated, subjected to a travel ban, and sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment for charges of providing false information to outside sources, including United Nations human rights mechanisms. Special procedure mandate holders have addressed his situation repeatedly with the relevant authorities, including raising allegations of acts of reprisals for his cooperation with the United Nations, ill treatment, and lack of contact with his family while in prison, to which the Government responded, confirming new criminal charges and his detention.¹¹³ Reportedly, in May 2023, six months after his 10-year prison term ended, Mr. Al Qahtani was tried in closed proceedings by the State Security Court in Riyadh and in July 2023 was still detained in Riyadh. According to information received by OHCHR, on 7 January 2025, he was reportedly released, more than two years after the completion of his prison term of 10 years. Mr. al-Qahtani is reportedly under a 10-year travel ban.

115. The case of **Mr. Essa Al Nukheifi**, a human rights defender and anti-corruption activist, was included in the reports of the Secretary-General from 2018 until 2023,¹¹⁴ following his six-year prison sentence, with a six-year travel and social media ban upon release, for his cooperation with the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty during a visit to Saudi Arabia in January 2017 (SAU 2/2017). In November 2019, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention stated that Mr. Al Nukheifi's detention was arbitrary (A/HRC/WGAD/2019/71, paras. 76, 83, 90, 95) and raised particular concern about the reprisals against him for his consultation with the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty (para. 93). Special procedure mandate holders have addressed his situation repeatedly with the relevant authorities.¹¹⁵ According to information received by OHCHR, on 7 January 2025, Mr. Essa al-Nukheifi was reportedly released, more than two years after the completion of his 6-year prison term. He is reportedly under a 6-year travel ban.

116. The case of **Ms. Loujain Al-Hathloul**, a woman human rights defender, was included in the 2019, 2020, 2021, 2023 and 2024 reports of the Secretary-General¹¹⁶ on allegations of disappearance, detention and torture following her engagement with the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women in March 2018. In June 2020, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention found her detention arbitrary (A/HRC/WGAD/2020/33). In December 2020, Ms. Al-Hathloul was sentenced on national security related charges (SAU 3/2021).¹¹⁷ On 10 February 2021, she was released from prison on probation for three years and subjected to a travel ban.¹¹⁸ The Committee and special procedure mandate holders have raised her situation repeatedly with the relevant authorities,

¹¹² A/HRC/21/18, paras. 35–37; A/HRC/24/29, para. 42; A/HRC/42/30, Annex II, para. 92; A/HRC/45/36, Annex II, para. 114; A/HRC/48/28, Annex II, paras. 119–120, A/HRC/54/61, Annex II, paras. 130–131, A/HRC/57/60, Annex II, para. 156.

¹¹³ SAU 13/2021, SAU 12/2017, SAU 4/2016, SAU 11/2014, SAU 5/2013, SAU 8/2013, SAU 7/2012, SAU 10/2022. See government reply at <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=37348>.

¹¹⁴ A/HRC/39/41, para. 65 and Annex I, paras. 95–96, 98. A/HRC/42/30, para. 74 and Annex II, para. 93; A/HRC/45/36, Annex II, paras. 115–116; A/HRC/48/28, Annex II, paras. 120–121; A/HRC/51/47, Annex II, paras. 132–135. A/HRC/51/47, Annex II, paras. 132–135.

¹¹⁵ SAU 10/2022 SAU 6/2021, 13/2021, SAU 12/2017, SAU 4/2016.

¹¹⁶ A/HRC/42/30, para. 73 and Annex I, paras. 91–93; A/HRC/45/36, Annex II, paras. 110–111; A/HRC/48/28, Annex II, paras. 114–116, A/HRC/51/47, Annex II, paras. 128–129; A/HRC/54/61, Annex II, paras 132–133; A/HRC/57/60, Annex II, paras 157–159.

¹¹⁷ <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=36216>.

¹¹⁸ <https://www.ohchr.org/en/2021/02/bachelet-updates-human-rights-council-recent-human-rights-issues-more-50-countries?LangID=E&NewsID=26806>.

including allegations of acts of reprisals for her cooperation with the United Nations¹¹⁹ and her travel ban (SAU 1/2024), to which the Government responded.¹²⁰ Reportedly, the travel ban against her should have ended on 12 November 2023, however, it remains in effect as of the time of writing.

117. According to the information received by OHCHR, on 10 September 2024, the Judge of the Diwan al-Mazalem Administrative Court dismissed the complaint filed by Ms. Alhathloul regarding the travel ban on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear that matter. The judgement was upheld on appeal, and Ms. Alhathloul has no further legal avenues to challenge the travel ban. During the reporting period, Ms. Alhathloul attempted to travel abroad several times without success. Her last attempt was in March 2025, when the passport authorities stated that she remained under an indefinite travel ban. Reportedly, her relatives are also banned from travelling outside the country. To date, neither Ms. Alhathloul nor her relatives have received any official notification from the authorities regarding the existence of an ongoing or newly imposed travel ban against them. Ms. Alhathloul is reportedly refraining from freely engaging with the media or expressing herself on social media due to fear of re-arrest.

118. The case of **Mr. Fawzan Mohsen Awad Al-Harbi**, a human rights defender and member of ACPRA, was included in the 2014, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022 and 2023 reports of the Secretary-General,¹²¹ on allegations of arrest and detention for his cooperation with the United Nations. Special procedure mandate holders have addressed his situation repeatedly with the relevant authorities, including allegations of acts of reprisals for his cooperation with the United Nations.¹²² Reportedly, his sentence of a 10-year prison term was due to expire in September 2023. According to information received during the reporting period, Mr. Fawzan Mohsen Awad Al-Harbi was released in late 2023 but to-date is under a ten-year travel ban.

119. Regarding the situation of Mr. Mohammad Fahad Al Qahtani and Mr. Essa Al Nukheifi, the Government stated that both had been lawfully arrested and, on 21 November 2022 and 5 March 2024, respectively, convicted and sentenced to 3 years and 15 years of imprisonment, on terrorism charges. The Government further noted that on 1 October 2024, the Specialized Criminal Court of Appeals had found them guilty of terrorist offences under article 34 of the Law on Combating Crimes of Terrorism and its Financing. Mr. Al Qahtani had been sentenced to five years, with two years and 10 months suspended and Mr. Al Nukheifi to six years, with three years and nine months of suspended sentence. The Government noted that both had been released from custody on 7 January 2025 after having served their sentences.

120. Regarding the situation of Mr. Fawzan Mohsen Awad Al-Harbi and Ms. Loujain Al-Hathloul, the Government stated that they had been released on 5 February 2024 and 10 February 2021, respectively, after having served their sentences. The Government noted further that Ms. Al-Hathloul had been sentenced by the Specialized Criminal Court of Appeals to five years and eight months in prison, with two years and 10 months suspended, for crimes under the Terrorist Crimes and Terrorism Financing Act. The Government stated that she had been banned from travelling outside the country after the completion of her sentence for a period equal in duration to her prison term, pursuant to a ruling by the Court of first instance, upheld by the Court of Appeal. The travel ban remains in effect in accordance with the court ruling.

121. On 30 July 2025, the Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection to the present report noting that Saudi Arabia's legal framework provides robust protection for individuals' rights and freedoms grounded in the principles of Islamic Sharia and codified in national legislation. It stated further that the Basic Law of Governance and the Code of

¹¹⁹ SAU 3/2021, SAU 8/2020, SAU 1/2019, SAU 7/2018, SAU 15/2014. See also, <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26593&LangID=E>, A/HRC/48/55, paras. 46–50.

¹²⁰ <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=38436>.

¹²¹ A/HRC/27/38, para. 30; A/HRC/42/30, para. 74 and Annex II, para. 94; A/HRC/45/36, Annex II, para. 118 and A/HRC/48/28, Annex II, para. 124; A/HRC/51/47, Annex II, paras. 131, 133–35 A/HRC/54/61, Annex II, para 134.

¹²² SAU 6/2021, SAU 13/2021, SAU 4/2016, SAU 11/2014, SAU 8/2013.

Criminal Procedure establish key safeguards, including the presumption of innocence, the principle of legality in criminalization and punishment, and the requirement that penalties be imposed only following a lawful conviction. It noted that arbitrary arrest and detention are prohibited, with strict procedural requirements for warrants and custody durations and that the independence of the judiciary is enshrined in the Constitution.

14. Thailand

122. The reports of the Secretary-General between 2017 and 2021,¹²³ drew attention to alleged harassment, intimidation and an online smear campaign against human rights defenders who had documented cases of torture and ill-treatment by military in the Southern Border Provinces, including of individuals recipients of a grant of the UN Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture. Grant recipient **Ms. Angkhana Neelapaijit**, who continues to cooperate with the UN, was among those targeted (THA 6/2017). Reportedly, Ms. Neelapaijit was harassed on social media and, in November 2020, filed a civil case against the Office of the Prime Minister and Royal Thai Army concerning alleged disinformation and smear campaign online. She petitioned to have the reported fake news, offensive content and disinformation removed. Ms. Angkhana Neelapaijit is a woman human rights defender and former National Human Rights Commissioner of Thailand and a member of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance.

123. On 20 June 2024, special procedure mandate holders addressed allegations of surveillance of Ms. Angkhana Neelapaijit during commemorative events held on 11 March 2024 for the families of individuals who have been forcibly disappeared, including his husband (THA 7/2024), to which the government responded.¹²⁴ Reportedly, two individuals present at the event identified themselves as working for the Internal Security Operations Command when approached. One of them allegedly took photos of Ms. Neelapaijit and other participants, including relatives of other forcibly disappeared persons. They reportedly stated to have sent the photos to his supervisor. On 18 March 2024, Ms. Neelapaijit submitted a letter to the Minister of Justice, requesting an investigation into the alleged surveillance and intimidation targeting families of the disappeared. At the time of writing, no response has been received (THA 7/2024).

124. With regard to the ongoing case of Ms. Neelapaijit against the Office of the Prime Minister and Royal Thai Army, on 16 February 2023, the Court of Justice dismissed her civil case and Ms. Neelapaijit subsequently filed an appeal. According to information received by OHCHR, the decision on the appeal is still pending. In another legal case concerning a defamation claim filed against Ms. Neelapaijit and other human rights defenders, (THA 3/2020),¹²⁵ the matter is at the time of writing before the Appeal Court, and remains pending decision.

15. Turkmenistan

125. The case of **Ms. Gurban Soltan Achilova**, a freelance photojournalist and woman human rights defender, was included in the 2024 report of the Secretary-General¹²⁶ on allegations of undue restrictions of her freedom of movement which had prevented her travel to Geneva and her engagement with representatives of OHCHR in November 2023. These allegations had also been addressed by special procedure mandate holders, who noted that this incident would be linked to Ms. Achilova's work and cooperation with international human rights actors, in particular the United Nations (TKM 1/2023).

¹²³ A/HRC/45/36, Annex II, paras 119-21, 123-124; A/HRC/42/30, Annex II, para. 101; A/HRC/39/41, Annex II paras. 51-53; A/HRC/36/31, para. 57 and Annex I, paras. 80-81, A/HRC/48/28, Annex II, para 131.

¹²⁴ <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=38524>.

¹²⁵ <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/12/un-experts-concerned-systematic-use-slapp-cases-against-human-rights>.

¹²⁶ A/HRC/57/60, Annex I paras. 105-112.

126. On 7 March 2025, mandate holders addressed new allegations about attempts to poison Ms. Achilova and her daughter, their involuntary hospitalisation that prevented their travel to Geneva for the Martin Ennals Award ceremony, and Ms. Achilova's ongoing harassment, which includes alleged surveillance, and alleged monitoring of her online communications and calls (TKM 1/2025).

127. Ms. Achilova's travel to Geneva for the award ceremony was scheduled for 20 November 2024, and she was supposed to be accompanied by her daughter. Between 10 and 18 November 2024, alleged poisoning attempts targeting Ms. Achilova and her family occurred when unknown individuals reportedly offered Ms. Achilova juice and food as part of sadaqah (an Islamic charitable tradition). Ms. Achilova set the items aside, and a guest who visited later then ate the items. This guest then allegedly experienced severe symptoms. Moreover, on the day of the planned departure, four individuals in doctor's uniforms arrived at her house when she was preparing to leave for the airport. Ms. Achilova was forced into an ambulance and taken to an infectious disease hospital, where she was allegedly told that her hospitalization was linked to her guest's health condition. Her daughter was hospitalized shortly after, and both remained involuntarily hospitalized for six days, until the human rights event had concluded. Reportedly, they were not diagnosed with any infectious disease. (TKM 1/2025).

128. Mandate holders expressed their deep concern that Ms. Achilova remains unable to travel, emphasizing that the poisoning attempts seemed a deliberate attempt to prevent her from attending the Martin Ennals Award Ceremony. They urged the Government to end all acts of reprisal and intimidation against human rights defenders, to guarantee the safety of Ms. Achilova and her family, and to allow her to travel to carry out her legitimate human rights activities. (TKM 1/2025). In April 2025, mandate holders demanded an immediate investigation into the alleged poisoning attempt.¹²⁷

129. In its concluding observations of the third periodic report of Turkmenistan, the Committee against Torture also expressed concern about the information regarding efforts to prevent Ms. Achilova from travelling to Geneva for the awards ceremony in 2024. The Committee also noted with concern the numerous and consistent allegations of serious acts of intimidation, reprisals and threats against human rights defenders, journalists and their relatives, and the arbitrary arrest and imprisonment of such individuals in relation to their work (CAT/TKM/CO/3, para. 17).

16. United Arab Emirates

130. The case of **Mr. Mohamed al-Mansoori** was included in the 2014 and 2024 reports of the Secretary-General¹²⁸ as one of the civil society activists on trial in the so-called UAE 94 case for calling for change in a peaceful way in March 2013. In 2013, his detention was deemed arbitrary by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (A/HRC/WGAD/2013/60) together with 60 other individuals. In December 2023 and January 2024, mandate holders raised concerns about the allegations concerning the mass trials of 84 individuals, a majority of whom, including Mr. Al-Mansoori, had already served their sentences (ARE 1/2024).¹²⁹ The Government responded to mandate holders denying the allegations.¹³⁰

131. The case of **Mr. Ahmed Mansoor**, advisor to the Gulf Centre for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch's Middle East and North Africa Division, was included in the 2014 and 2017, 2018, 2019, 2021 and 2022 and 2024 reports of the Secretary-General.¹³¹

¹²⁷ See <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/04/un-expert-urges-turkmenistan-investigate-alleged-poisoning-attempts>.

¹²⁸ A/HRC/27/38, para. 45; A/HRC/57/60, Annex II, paras. 160-165.

¹²⁹ United Arab Emirates: UN experts alarmed by new charges brought against civil society in UAE87 trial | OHCHR; <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/12/uae-un-expert-denounces-new-charges-brought-against-jailed-human-rights>.

¹³⁰ <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=38338>.

¹³¹ A/HRC/36/31, para. 60 and Annex I, paras. 86-87; A/HRC/39/41, Annex II, para. 55; A/HRC/42/30, para. 79 and Annex II, paras. 103-104; A/HRC/45/36, Annex II, paras. 126-127; A/HRC/48/28,

Mr. Mansoor is alleged to have suffered intimidation and reprisals for his collaboration with United Nations human rights mechanisms. In 2011, his detention was deemed arbitrary by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (A/HRC/WGAD/2011/64). In January 2021, special procedure mandate holders raised concerns about his imprisonment, alleged ill treatment and solitary confinement (ARE 1/2021).¹³² to which the Government responded.¹³³ Reportedly, Mr. Ahmed Mansoor was among the 84 individuals facing new terrorist charges.

132. According to information received by OHCHR on 10 July 2024, the Abu Dhabi Federal Court of Appeal convicted and sentenced 53 individuals in the context of the abovementioned mass trials of 84 individuals, pursuant to counter-terrorism charges under Federal Law No. 7/2014. Reportedly, Mr. Mohamed al-Mansoori and Mr. Ahmed Mansoor were both convicted under this Law for the crime of “establishing, founding and managing a clandestine terrorist organization” known as the Justice and Dignity Committee, in the case of Mr. Al Mansoori allegedly with the aim of committing terrorist acts on the country’s soil. Mr. Mohamed al-Mansoori was reportedly sentenced to life imprisonment and Mr. Ahmed Mansoor to 15 years in prison. Together with their co-defendants, they filed an appeal in November 2024. On 4 March 2025, following closed proceedings, the Federal Supreme Court of Abu Dhabi rejected their appeal and upheld the judgment.

133. On 16 April 2025, special procedure mandate holders raised concerns about the rejection of the appeal (ARE 3/2025) and reiterated concerns previously communicated to the Government (ARE 1/2024), noting that those who had previously been convicted in the so-called UAE 94 case, which reportedly included Mr. Mohamed al-Mansoori, were retried for the same acts, but this time under Federal Law No. 7/201.

134. The case of **Mr. Ahmad Ali Mekkaoui**, a Lebanese citizen, was included in the reports of the Secretary-General in 2019, 2020 and 2021,¹³⁴ after he allegedly faced reprisals following the issuance of an opinion of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention in August 2017, which found his detention arbitrary (A/HRC/WGAD/2017/47, paras 23, 34). Reportedly, in May 2021, Mr. Mekkaoui remained in detention without in-person contact with his family since the COVID-19 outbreak in early 2020. While, beginning in February 2021, he was reportedly able to make brief monitored one- to two-minute calls to his family, according to information received by OHCHR, during the reporting period, he now has no contact with his family whatsoever.

17. Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

135. The case of **Ms. Karen Caruci**, a human rights lawyer, has been included in reports of the Secretary-General since 2022¹³⁵ on allegations of re-arrest and police questioning about her engagement with the United Nations. Ms. Caruci was granted conditional release in March 2022. During the reporting period, Ms. Caruci, was reportedly subjected to threats by public officials, including individuals affiliated with the Office of the Attorney General. These threats have allegedly impeded her from performing her legal functions and have had a detrimental impact on her ability to work at full capacity and on her family, in particular her daughter with disabilities.

136. The case of **Mr. Franklin Caldera Cordero**, the Coordinator of the Victims’ Committee “S.O.S. Libertad Family”, was included in the 2024 report of the Secretary-General¹³⁶ on allegations of physical surveillance, anonymous threats, including

Annex II, paras. 133–135 and A/HRC/51/47, Annex II, para. 149; A/HRC/57/60, Annex II, paras. 160–165.

¹³² <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=25866> and <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2021/06/uae-un-expert-condemns-long-term-detention-human-rights-defenders>.

¹³³ <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=36081>.

¹³⁴ A/HRC/42/30, para. 78 and Annex I, paras. 103–104; A/HRC/45/36, Annex II, paras. 131; A/HRC/48/28 Annex II, paras. 138.

¹³⁵ A/HRC/57/60, Annex II, para 169. A/HRC/51/47, Annex I para. 77; A/HRC/54/61, Annex II, para. 136. See also VEN 7/2021.

¹³⁶ A/HRC/57/60, Annex I, paras 113–116.

death threats, in relation to his cooperation with the United Nations. The Inter-American Commission for Human Rights (IACHR) issued precautionary measures in favour of Mr. Caldera Cordero in July 2023 due to retaliation faced in connection to his engagement with United Nations representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights. According to information received by OHCHR, in November 2024 the IACHR extended the precautionary measures of Mr. Cordero to his relatives.¹³⁷

137. References to the **Bill on the control, regularization, performance, and financing of non-governmental and related organizations**¹³⁸ were included in the 2023 and 2024 reports¹³⁹ of the Secretary-General noting its impact on the ability of civil society groups to carry out their work, including cooperation with the United Nations.

138. According to information received by OHCHR, civil society actors are concerned about the negative impact of the legal framework, including recent legislative initiatives (see below), and its potential arbitrary application, including on their advocacy and engagement on human rights issues with the United Nations and its human rights mechanisms.

139. During the reporting period, OHCHR,¹⁴⁰ the International Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela,¹⁴¹ and mandate holders,¹⁴² expressed ongoing concerns over Venezuela's legal framework and recent legislative initiatives.¹⁴³ In particular, UN actors condemned the adoption of the Law on the control, regularization, performance, and financing of non-governmental and related organizations (hereinafter referred to as the NGO Law), and of the Organic Law of the Liberator Simón Bolívar Against Imperialist Blockade and in Defence of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, both of which were adopted and promulgated in November 2024. UN actors called for the repeal of both laws, and voiced alarm over the potential adoption of the Bill Against Fascism, Neo-Fascism and Similar Expressions.¹⁴⁴ (VEN 8/2024) Specifically, OHCHR noted that the NGO Law imposes arbitrary limitations on the autonomous functioning of NGOs and special procedure mandate holders stated that the approval of a national law for the control of civil society would only tighten restrictions on the right to freedom of association.

140. According to information received by OHCHR, under the NGO Law, organizations were required to register by 13 February and 15 May 2025. At the end of April, only two had completed registration and no penalties had been reported for delays at the time of writing. Unregistered NGOs reportedly face possible prosecution while those registered or attempting to register may be subject to close monitoring. The registration process has reportedly been marked by inconsistent criteria across registries and frequent changes in documentation requirements. Additionally, most organizations cited the costs of required financial statements (ranging from USD 150 and 200 each) as a significant financial burden.

¹³⁷ https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/decisiones/mc/2024/res_92-24_mc_143-13%20y%20181-19_ve_es.pdf; https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/mc/2024/res_87-24_mc_409-23_ve_en.pdf.

¹³⁸ Ley de fiscalización, regularización, actuación y financiamiento de las organizaciones no gubernamentales y afines.

¹³⁹ A/HRC/54/61, Annex I, para. 116; A/HRC/57/60, Annex II, para. 171.

¹⁴⁰ OHCHR <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/08/venezuela-ongoing-arbitrary-detentions-disproportionate-use-force-fuelling>, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2025/03/oral-update-human-rights-situation-venezuela> <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2024/12/high-commissioners-update-human-rights-council-venezuela>; A/HRC/54/57, para 109.

¹⁴¹ A/HRC/57/57, paras 102-103; A/HRC/54/57, para. 109 (e).

¹⁴² <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/09/venezuela-must-stop-human-rights-violations-following-elections-say-experts>, VEN 8/2024, VEN 11/2024.

¹⁴³ <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2024/03/deputy-high-commissioner-updates-human-rights-council-venezuela>.

¹⁴⁴ <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2025/03/statement-marta-valinas-chair-independent-international-fact>; A/HRC/57/57, para 102; <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/08/venezuela-ongoing-arbitrary-detentions-disproportionate-use-force-fuelling>; <https://www.ohchr.org/es/statements-and-speeches/2025/03/oral-update-human-rights-situation-venezuela>.

18. Viet Nam

141. The cases of **Mr. Y Khiu Niê and Mr. Y Sĩ Êban** were included in the 2023 and 2024 report¹⁴⁵ of the Secretary-General on allegations of arbitrary arrest, surveillance and travel restrictions which prevented them from participating in the 2022 SEAFORB Conference, held in Bali (Indonesia).¹⁴⁶ Mr. Y Khiu Niê and Mr. Y Sĩ Êban are human rights defenders belonging to the Montagnards indigenous community and religious minority of Christian Protestants.

142. On 14 June 2024, special procedures mandate holders reported that Mr. Y Khiu Niê was summoned to the Government centre of Ea Tu Commune on 9 April 2024 and interrogated as to whether he had been taking part in further civil society trainings, pressured to convince his family members to return from Thailand to Viet Nam, and questioned about his contacts with civil society organizations overseas. Mandate holders also addressed that, on 20 August 2023, Y Sĩ Êban was threatened by two police officers who entered his residence with fines and imprisonment if he observed the International Day of Commemorating the Victims of Acts of Violence Based on Religion or Belief (VNM 2/2023). They also stated that his wife had been interrogated on 10 and 11 April 2024 (VNM 4/2024).

143. References to the **alleged impact of the arbitrary application of restrictive legislation in place**, including vaguely defined provisions in the Criminal Code related to propaganda against the State and the NGO regulatory framework, on the ability and willingness of civil society organizations to engage with the United Nations was included in the report of the Secretary-General in 2024. During the reporting period, civil society organizations were allegedly hesitant to engage with the United Nations as implementing partners, or to receive funds from the United Nations, for fear of being investigated and found in violation of the complex and vague taxation legislation. Several NGOs and long-standing United Nations partners refrained from publicly engaging with human rights mechanisms, including treaty body reviews during the period and the ongoing preparations leading up to the fourth cycle of the Universal Periodic Review of Viet Nam, which took place on 7 May 2024, due to fear of reprisal. Names and additional details of those concerned are withheld due to fear of reprisals.

19. Yemen

144. The case of the **Mwatana Organization for Human Rights**, a Sana'a-based civil society organization, and members of its staff, has been included in reports of the Secretary-General since 2021,¹⁴⁷ and previously in 2019, on allegations of detention and prevention of travel following engagement with the United Nations Security Council and United Nations human rights mechanisms (SAU 8/2018; YEM 4/2018). On 25 January 2022, the Chairperson of Mwatana, Ms. Radhya al-Mutawakel, briefed the Security Council on the situation in Yemen¹⁴⁸ following which she was subjected to a smear campaign and threats on social media.

145. According to information received by OHCHR, on 17 April 2025, local administrative authorities in the city of Taiz reportedly issued a directive banning Mwatana's activities. Allegedly, public messages were subsequently shared on social media platforms urging the authorities to arrest Ms. Radhya Al-Mutwakel should she enter the city and stating that individuals or entities cooperating with Mwatana or its Chairperson should be subjected to legal action.

146. Reportedly, 31 incidents against Mwatana staff were documented during the reporting period by various parties to the conflict, the majority of which were reportedly attributed to

¹⁴⁵ A/HRC/54/61, Annex II paras.

¹⁴⁶ VNM 2/2023.

¹⁴⁷ A/HRC/42/30, paras. 74, 85, Annex I, para. 94, 124 and A/HRC/48/28, Annex II, paras. 160–161 and A/HRC/54/61, Annex II, para. 143.

¹⁴⁸ <https://media.un.org/en/asset/k19/k19ame0jq8>.

the Houthis (Ansar Allah). These acts reportedly aimed to obstruct the organization's work in monitoring and documenting human rights violations and providing legal support to victims of arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, and torture. The reported incidents included arbitrary detention, travel bans, restrictions on freedom of movement, threats of detention or liquidation, summonses, interrogations, and other forms of harassment in ten governorates, including Sana'a, Taiz, Hadhramout, Hudaydah, Lahj, Dhale, Aden, Ibb, Sa'adah, Amran, and Hajjah.

20. State of Palestine

147. The case of **several Palestinian and international women's organizations and human rights defenders** had been included in the reports of the Secretary General since 2020¹⁴⁹ concerning allegations of online smearing, intimidation and threats, including death threats against them for their support for the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and for their actual or perceived engagement with the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW/C/PSE/CO/1, para. 15c).

148. During the reporting period, a social media page entitled "Mass Movement against CEDAW", continued to issue statements, employing violent language, and threatening and stigmatizing Palestinian women human rights defenders and Palestinian civil society organizations working on gender justice, particularly those cooperating with the CEDAW Committee and other UN women's rights fora. A number of women's rights organizations and their staff members have reportedly been targeted in online posts by the anti-CEDAW campaign during the reporting period. Names and details of those concerned are withheld due to fear of further reprisals.

149. According to information received by OHCHR, social media posts called for an end to the work of these organizations. On 17 December 2024, one such post stated "Organizations like this should have their hands cut off, regardless of whatever justification they may claim." Another post called "upon all of our people in the West Bank, particularly in Hebron, especially the educated and influential groups, to seriously confront these people to cut off their dirty hands from our land, our children, and our religion and ethics." Reportedly, other statements over the period also accused individuals and organizations of being "criminals" and of "continuing to spread its corrupt and morally decaying ideas, which aim to destroy the dignity and role of women."

150. There are concerns that these online statements discredit and threaten women human rights defenders and their organizations for their work promoting women's rights and the CEDAW Convention, including for their participation in UN Women's rights fora.

151. This environment has contributed to a heightened climate of fear and insecurity for women human rights defenders and Palestinian civil society organizations promoting gender equality in the West Bank and could intimidate and dissuade them from further interaction with the CEDAW Committee for fear of reprisal. As in previous reporting periods, OHCHR is not aware of any action taken by the Government of the State of Palestine to protect affected women human rights defenders and their organizations from ongoing smears, threats and intimidation related to their work on the implementation of CEDAW and engaging with the United Nations.

¹⁴⁹ A/HRC/48/28, Annex II, paras. 162–166 and A/HRC/54/61, Annex II, para. 144–147, A/HRC.57/60, 182–185.